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This dissertation examines how eighteenth century thinkers Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Adam 
Smith, and Immanuel Kant defended the value of free markets. It reconstructs their defense of 
liberal economic reforms, including free trade (domestic and foreign) and the deregulation of 
markets in labor and land. Through this reconstruction, I demonstrate how the normative 
foundations of early free market thought were contested throughout the period. Pro-market 
thinkers (e.g. Turgot, Smith, and Kant) viewed economic liberalization as a mechanism that 
increased the economic freedoms of individuals, whereas critics of the market, including Richard 
Price and other “agrarian republican” thinkers, concluded that liberal reform diminished 
opportunities for material self-sufficiency and independence. Contemporary scholars, who often 
emphasize the egalitarian commitments of eighteenth century pro-market thinkers, have largely 
downplayed the significance of this latter group of thinkers and their egalitarian proposals for 
agrarian reform (which Turgot, Smith and Kant did not support). In contrast, this dissertation 
contends that although the agrarian republican outlook constituted a path not taken in the history 
of economic thought, the conceptualization of economic freedom as a form of nondomination 
and material self-sufficiency remains an important idea for contemporary discussions of 






            
Introduction Rethinking Market Economies: What Can We 
                        Learn from the Past?       1 
Market Economies      6 
Economic Democracy      12  
Republicanism and the Market Economy   19 
The Significance of the Eighteenth Century    24 
 
Chapter 1 Dis-embedding the Market: The Grain Debate in 
  Eighteenth Century France       27 
   The Grain Debate      28 
   The Liberal Defense: Turgot on Welfare,  
Property, and Liberty      37 
Turgot and the Critics of Reform    51 
 Grain Owners and Merchants    51 
 Equality in Property      54 
 Wage Labor      61 
Conclusion        65 
 
Chapter 2 Smith’s System of Natural Liberty      67 
   Labor, Poverty, and Grain       70 
   Smith’s Response: Labor, Poverty, and Grain  78 
   Foreign and Colonial Trade     88 
   Smith’s Response: Foreign and Colonial Trade  91 
   Markets and Economic Independence    102 
   Conclusion        109 
 
Chapter 3  Smith and the Society of Equals      111 
   Enclosure, Engrossing, and Agrarian Capitalism   112 
   Richard Price and the Owner-Occupier Model  116 
   Smith on the Society of Equals     125 
   Republican Freedom and Wage Labor   135 
   Conclusion        141 
 
Chapter 4  Kant’s Republican Defense of the Market Economy   143 
   Republican Freedom and Hereditary Privilege   144 
   Virtue, Commerce, and Doux-Commerce   152 
   Kant on Wage Labor       158 
   Intervention: Wealth Redistribution and Protectionism  166 
   Conclusion         177 
 
Conclusion  Economics Beyond Turgot, Smith, and Kant    179 
   Smith the Anti-Laissez-Faire Thinker   180 
 vi 
   Smith the Commercial Republican     186 
   Laissez-Faire Republicanism      189 
   Labor Republicanism       192 
   Conclusion       199 
 
Bibliography          202
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Rethinking Market Economies: What Can We Learn from the Past?  
 
   
Recent events, including the 2008 financial crisis and the resurgence in left social 
democratic and environmentalist movements, have put markets at the center of contemporary 
political debate. These events signify a growing discontent with the ideological predominance of 
neoliberalism—a theory that extolls free markets for their efficiency and alleged ability to 
maximize wealth and freedom. Critics claim that neoliberal policies have worsened economic 
inequality, exacerbated the environmental crisis, and placed political power into the hands of a 
corporate elite. In response to these concerns, there has been a noticeable shift in debate. New 
theories are now being put forward, and old ones revived, that seek to mitigate environmental 
destruction and decrease economic inequality and disempowerment. What many of these theories 
hold in common is their support for greater economic regulation and, in some cases, the radical 
reconstruction of economic institutions and free market practices.      
It is within this context that some contemporary political philosophers have developed an 
interest in historical ideas about markets. Scholars believe that in studying the past we can gain 
normative insight into how to reshape current free market practices. While I believe political 
philosophy can contribute to these normative projects, this dissertation will delineate economic 
and philosophical approaches to markets that I view as part of the problem, not the solution, to 
our current economic impasse.   
The focus of this dissertation will be on the free market thought of Anne Robert Jacques 
Turgot, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant. As will be discussed, contemporary scholarship on 
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this period is largely revisionist, insofar as it disassociates eighteenth century economic thought 
from the nineteenth century doctrine of laissez-faire and contemporary neoliberalism. Scholars 
tend to emphasize, for instance, how early proponents of liberal economic policies permitted 
state intervention, economic regulation, and wealth redistribution to a far greater extent than 
many contemporary advocates of free markets would now support. They conclude that, for these 
reasons, early pro-market thinkers were far more egalitarian than contemporary free market 
proponents. This revisionist project seeks, moreover, to destabilize some of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying contemporary free market ideology by showing how disparate the views 
were of its avowed predecessors.               
While it is accurate to claim that early proponents of free markets addressed the welfare 
needs of the laboring poor, the suggestion that their economic views radically depart from the 
traditional tenants of economic liberalism seems a less credible one. As will be discussed below, 
support for government intervention is not necessarily inconsistent with support for a capitalist 
free market economy. This is the standard contemporary liberal view.1 Like libertarians, liberals 
do not question the ability of free markets to enhance economic growth and freedom. Unlike 
libertarians, however, liberals believe that the state has a greater role to play in correcting for 
market failures and growing wealth inequality. This is generally expressed in their support for 
welfare state capitalism. On this model, unequal market outcomes are corrected by the state 
                                                
1 In this dissertation my use of the term “liberal” or “free” (as in “free market”) refers to policies   
or economic theories that favor a market economy, i.e. an economy where the distribution and 
production of goods and services are coordinated through the market as opposed to the state. In 
my use of the term here, however, it designates a particular political-economic outlook. As I will 
go on to explain, market economies come in a variety of institutional forms. In market 
economies, the function of the state can be minimal or robust in terms of its ability to regulate 
markets or redistribute wealth. I designate views that favor the former approach as libertarian or 
neoliberal, and views that favor the latter as liberal. On both outlooks, however, markets play a 
primary role in supplying goods and services.  
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through income redistribution. To the extent that these thinkers do share some perspectives in 
common with the liberal outlook, it is questionable what more we might learn, given that, as will 
be seen, their discussions of distributive justice remain underdeveloped. 
While on the liberal outlook, moreover, the role of markets in organizing economic life is 
limited, it is not limited to the extent that the economy is fully subordinated to the governance of 
non-market institutions or actors (i.e. the state or civil society). This latter outlook is represented 
in various traditions of socialist thought and in theories of economic democracy (more on these 
distinctions below). From the perspective of these traditions, welfare state capitalism fails to 
correct for other harmful forms of inequality that can occur even in the context of greater income 
equality. For these reasons, proponents of these theories suggest that economic equality and 
freedom require structural and institutional changes that go beyond wealth redistribution. Some 
interpretations of Smith also suggest that his economic thought is amendable to certain of these 
more overtly anti-capitalist views. 
Against this more recent academic trend, this dissertation demonstrates that once the 
views of Turgot, Smith, and Kant are located in the wider eighteenth century debate about the 
merits of economic liberalization, these contemporary interpretations encounter several 
problems. While from a contemporary standpoint the admission of some forms of regulation and 
wealth redistribution may be identified with liberal views of the economy, in the eighteenth 
century there existed a very different and more robust understanding of what was required of 
society if the aims of freedom and welfare were to be met for the laboring poor.  
As one example of this, a common view that circulated during the period was the 
republican idea that freedom, as a form of nondomination, required economic self-sufficiency. 
This view was advanced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by republican thinkers 
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including James Harrington and Richard Price. Likening wage labor to a form of slavery, these 
thinkers supported reforms that increased opportunities for land ownership (by opposing the 
unequal distribution of property) and self-employment. In contrast, Turgot, Smith, and Kant did 
not follow in identifying wage labor as a form of domination. Nor did they adopt agrarian 
reforms that would allow for a more equal distribution of land. Alternatively, in adopting a 
contractarian view of labor relations, they understood commercial employment and wage labor 
to be compatible with republican freedom. From this perspective, as long as a person is in 
possession of their labor power (not property), they are held to be economically independent. 
Pro-market and anti-market thinkers, then, characterized emerging free market relations in 
dramatically different ways.   
This dissertation examines these conflicting eighteenth century assessments of the ethical 
basis of a market economy. While the primary focus is on the pro-market thought of Turgot, 
Smith, and Kant, I also pay close attention to the views of their opponents. What becomes clear 
in this reconstruction, is that pro-market and anti-market thinkers alike employed the values of 
freedom and welfare but used them to defend very different economic policies and reforms. As 
just suggested, the diversity of their views may be rooted in their conceptual disagreement about 
the meaning of economic freedom. Where agrarian republicans, including Price, identify 
economic freedom with ownership of property or productive assets, Smith, Kant, and Turgot 
identify economic freedom with ownership of property in the person, which can be alienated in 
the form of labor. Depending on which definition is adopted, one is led to support a different 
position on a variety of economic issues, including property distribution and ownership, free 
markets, and labor regulation.   
 5 
In highlighting these differences, this dissertation challenges recent scholarship that 
identifies early pro-market thought with the development of a “free society of equals.”2 For, once 
the arguments of Turgot, Smith, and Kant are compared to the views of their opponents, they 
look markedly less committed to egalitarian aims. As will be discussed, critics had good reason 
to believe that liberal reform posed a new set of problems for securing the liberties of the poor. 
They articulated these concerns in their criticisms of the monopolization of grain by merchants 
and suppliers, the proletarianization of the laboring poor, and the consolidation of property 
produced by the enclosures. In short, they associated liberal reform with the loss of economic 
control over their livelihood and subsistence. In this way too, they anticipated theories of 
economic democracy, which seek to place the economy under greater public and social control.  
Conversely, while pro-market thinkers addressed the abuse of power by the mercantile 
state, they were less concerned with the monopolization of power in the economic realm. They 
overlooked or refuted the growing concern, expressed by their opponents, that free markets allow 
power to amass to the owners of property and capital—i.e. grain merchants and suppliers, 
employers, and landlords. Much like market fundamentalists today, in upholding the property 
rights of the owners of property and capital, they overlooked the freedoms of those who 
possessed only “human” capital. If contemporary political philosophers are interested in looking 
to the past for alternative ways of theorizing market economies, then it is to the critics, not the 
early proponents, that they should turn. To further clarify and elaborate on the distinctions 
introduced in this section, I now turn to the work of Karl Polanyi to discuss the idea of a “market 
economy.”  
  
                                                
2 Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t 
Talk about It) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
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Market Economies 
The concept of a market economy was developed by Karl Polanyi in his classical text, 
The Great Transformation (1944). In this book, Polanyi traces the social dislocation and 
upheaval that surrounded the development of capitalism in the period of the British industrial 
revolution. He characterizes this development in terms of a monumental shift that occurred in the 
societal organization of economic life. As Polanyi details, in the transition to capitalism, 
economies that were once embedded in society became dis-embedded and subject to the rule and 
organization of markets. The term “embedded” is employed by Polanyi to designate economies 
that are enmeshed in social institutions and norms.3 When economies are dis-embedded, they are, 
alternatively, subject to the “self-regulating” mechanisms of the market—namely, the forces of 
supply and demand mediated through market prices. A dis-embedded economy is, moreover, 
synonymous with a “market economy,” which Polanyi defines as an “economic system 
controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone;” where “order in the production and 
distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism.”4  
Polanyi argues that the development of the market economy in the nineteenth century 
was historically unprecedented. While markets have always existed, they were “incidental” to 
economic life and played a “subordinate” role in the production and distribution of goods for 
consumption.5 To demonstrate this, Polanyi discusses several anthropological examples of non-
market economies that pre-date the development of capitalism. In these societies, economies 
were organized through systems of reciprocity, redistribution, or householding. What is evident 
in each of these economic systems, moreover, is not only their lack of dependency on markets 
                                                
3 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 57. 
4 Ibid., 68.  
5 Ibid., 43; 56. 
 7 
for the distribution of goods, but also the absence of a strictly economic motive (i.e. the motive 
of gain) underlying economic behavior.   
Polanyi describes, for example, a tribal custom where food is supplied to families through 
matrilineal relatives. In this instance, a brother delivers “the finest specimens of his crop” to his 
sister and does not gain, in turn, an “immediate material benefit.”6 Polanyi claims that the 
brother’s aim in this particular act is to secure his social status and reputation. His act will 
ultimately ensure that his family’s needs are met (given the principle of reciprocity), but his 
motivation is oriented first toward securing his social role or status. Polanyi concludes from this 
(and other examples), “man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships.”7 He 
continues, that man “does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of 
material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. 
He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end.”8 Because markets played a 
marginal role in economic life in pre-capitalist societies, Polanyi concludes that the market 
motivation of gain was equally as peripheral to social life.9  
Where markets did exist, moreover, they were subject to social constraints and norms, so 
as, suggests Polanyi, to not overrun or replace existing methods of production and distribution 
within society.10 In the periods preceding the development of capitalism, these constraints 
operated through the regulation of feudal institutions and (with the development of mercantilism) 
the state. In feudalism, for example, property was under the control of “legal and customary 
                                                
6 Ibid., 48. 
7 Ibid., 46.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Polanyi develops the distinction made by Aristotle between wealth acquisition and 
householding. As Aristotle notes, these two forms of production differ insofar as the former is 
organized around production for exchange, and the latter, production for use. Aristotle, Politics, 
trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 15. 
10 Ibid., 61-62. 
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rules,” which determined the use, ownership, and transfer of land.11 Labor was also subject to the 
governance of the guilds, which set the wages of workers, requirements for apprenticeship terms, 
and other regulations related to the production of specific crafts.12 Mercantilism, in its attempt to 
unify disparate local economies, nationalized these practices through legal measures, including 
the Statute of Artificers, and the Poor Laws (which will be discussed later on). The Tudor and 
early Stuart period also inhibited the marketization of land through its interventions in the 
enclosure movement. In sum, Polanyi writes: “Mercantilism, with all its tendency towards 
commercialization, never attacked the safeguards which protected these two basic elements of 
production—labor and land—from becoming the objects of commerce.”13 
The development of capitalism in the industrial period overturned these relations. Instead 
of being peripheral to economic life, markets became the main mechanism through which needs 
were met. In this transformation, economic activity was subordinated to the motives and 
principles of market exchange, i.e. the mechanism of price and the motive of gain. As Polanyi 
defines it, in a market economy all goods are produced to be sold in markets with the aim of 
deriving an income through sales (whether it is the sale of goods, labor, land, or money).14 This, 
then, was a dramatic shift from producing on the basis of need within the household or for 
distribution within the tribal community. The motivations for production, moreover, became 
detached from the social motivations underlying economic activity in pre-capitalist societies.  
The relationship between social institutions and markets, moreover, was also dramatically 
altered. As Polanyi describes it, in market economies the state is prohibited from introducing any 
                                                
11 Ibid., 69-70. 
12 Ibid., 70. 
13 Ibid., 60.  
14 Ibid., 68-69. 
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measure “that would influence the action of these markets.”15 The state cannot regulate “price, 
nor supply, nor demand,” and the only policies permitted are those that “help to ensure the self-
regulation of the market by creating conditions which make the market the only organizing 
power in the economic sphere.”16 Polanyi is careful, then, to note the distinction between support 
for self-regulating markets (i.e. economic liberalism) and non-intervention (i.e. laissez-faire). He 
claims that the introduction of economic liberalism required significant intervention on part of 
the state, i.e. that “laissez-faire was planned.”17 As he explains:  
Strictly, economic liberalism is the organizing principle of a society in which industry is 
based on the institution of a self-regulating market. True, once such a system is 
approximately achieved, less intervention of one type is needed. However, this is far from 
saying that market system and intervention are mutually exclusive terms. For as long as 
that system is not established, economic liberals must and will unhesitatingly call for the 
intervention of the state in order to establish it, and once established, in order to maintain 
it.18  
 
For these reasons, Polanyi views economic liberalism as distinct from the doctrine of laissez-
faire, although notes, “in common parlance there is no harm in using them interchangeably.”19 
The important point here is that support for intervention is perfectly consistent with support for a 
market economy, insofar as intervention promotes the self-regulating market or the interests of 
private market actors.20  
The reversal of the relationship between markets and society is ultimately identified by 
Polanyi as the cause of the social upheavals of the nineteenth century and the rise of fascism in 
the early twentieth century. Polanyi reaches this conclusion through his analysis of the 
destructive tendencies of a market economy as it attempts to subsume all of social life under its 
                                                
15 Ibid., 69. 
16 Ibid., 69.  
17 Ibid., 141. 
18 Ibid., 149. 
19 Ibid. 
20 I will return to this point in more detail below.  
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rule. Polanyi claims, thus, that the idea of a self-regulating market economy was both utopian 
and destructive.21 He writes that such a society “could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of society.”22  
Polanyi’s reasoning here relates to his discussion of “fictitious” commodities. While land, 
labor, and money all operate as commodities in market economies, i.e. as “objects produced for 
sale on the market,” they do so in a “fictitious” way.23 This is because land, labor, and money are 
not objects “produced” to be bought and sold in the sphere of exchange; they are produced “for 
entirely different reasons.”24 Nature or humanity, in other words, cannot be said to exist for the 
purposes of economic exchange alone. To subject humans and nature to this logic, moreover, is 
to subject them to abuse and neglect. As Polanyi describes it:  
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would 
result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be 
shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the 
human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing 
of a man’s labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, 
psychological, and moral entity “man” attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective 
covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social 
exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, 
perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, 
neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the 
power to produce food and raw material destroyed.25 
 
                                                
21 It is important to emphasize that Polanyi did not think there ever existed an entirely 
disembedded economy, thus why the idea was “utopian.” 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Ibid., 72.  
24 Specifically, labor refers to “human activity,” which does not exist for the sake of being sold; 
land is nature, “which is not produced by man;” and money is “a token of purchasing power,” 
something that is not “produced,” but brought “into being through the mechanism of banking or 
state finance.” Ibid., 72. Polanyi notes that his discussion of fictitious commodities “has nothing 
in common” with Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism. Ibid., 72 n.3. 
25 Ibid., 72. 
 11 
The destructive tendency of a market economy relates to the process whereby objects of 
production—land, labor, and money—are brought under the foreign control of economic laws. 
For Polanyi, this amounts to a type of anarchy, where people are no longer in direct control of 
their own economic activity and are therefore made vulnerable to market failure. In being subject 
to market mechanisms, moreover, the particular use values embodied in these objects are 
overlooked or harmed. To commodify persons and nature is to treat them as means to the ends of 
gaining wealth. This comes at the cost of ignoring the intrinsic (i.e. non-economic) value or ends 
that the objects possess outside the sphere of market exchange. It is, moreover, this effect of 
market economies that produces what Polanyi calls a “double movement,” i.e. the historical 
development of counter-movements that resist self-regulating markets and seek to protect 
fictitious commodities from their destructive tendencies.26  
Polanyi’s critical assessment of market economies parallels contemporary criticisms of 
neoliberalism— a theory that also supports the self-regulating market thesis. His work was also 
prophetic in its warnings about the existential threat that market economies impose on the natural 
world. But for present purposes, it is important to highlight how Polanyi’s analysis offers a way 
forward for thinking through what a socially embedded economy might look like in the 
contemporary world.    
In the closing chapter of The Great Transformation, Polanyi states that economic and 
social improvement depends on our ability to (re)create non-market economies. What this means, 
on his view, is not the removal of markets altogether (“the end of market society means in no 
way the absence of markets”) but rather the removal of markets in labor, land, and money (i.e. in 
                                                
26 Ibid. 76. Polanyi uses this framework to analyze the political and economic crises that 
eventually led up to the rise of fascism and World War II.  
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fictitious commodities).27 Polanyi offers only a few brief remarks on what this would look like. 
However, he states that wage contracts, the conditions of work, and even the pricing of certain 
“staple foods” would all be “determined outside the market.”28 He also mentions that the 
removal of land from markets would lead to the “incorporation of land with definite institutions 
such as the homestead, the co-operative, the factory, the township, the school, the church, parks, 
wild life preserves, and so on.”29 In short, an embedded economy would require the 
decommodification of labor, land, and money.30 Importantly, what Polanyi suggests, then, is not 
the regulation of a market economy but the eradication of markets in specific goods altogether. 
Like in pre-capitalist societies, our economies should remain subordinate to society and markets 
(where they do exist) subject to regulation and control. While the implications of this view will 
be explored below, it is clear, as Polanyi himself recognizes, that such changes would be 
“radical” in comparison to the organization of production and distribution in market 
economies.31   
 
Economic Democracy 
In the common usage of the term, a market economy is an economy in which goods and 
services are primarily allocated through market exchanges. According to this definition, a 
capitalist economy is an example of a market economy, given that, in theory, the market, not the 
state, is responsible for the provisioning of goods and services. More specifically, in capitalist 
societies, private individuals or corporations, i.e. the “private sector,” supply the majority of 
                                                
27 Ibid., 251-52.  
28 Ibid., 251. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Other examples of the historical attempt to embed markets in labor, land, and money, are 
discussed in chapters fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen in The Great Transformation.  
31 Ibid. 
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goods and services. The means of production used to produce these goods and services are 
privately owned, as is the surplus generated in production. People who do not independently own 
the means of production (or capital) are reliant on the owners for receiving a wage, which, in 
turn, enables them to purchase the goods and services needed for their subsistence.  
Capitalism is also an example of a market economy in Polanyi’s definition of the term. 
To recall, a market economy does not describe an economy in which the market is fully 
autonomous from the state or social institutions (although the term dis-embedded may appear to 
suggest this). State intervention, as Polanyi notes, was necessary for the establishment and 
continuance of the market economy. For these reasons, the concept of a “free market” is a 
misnomer, insofar as it suggests the complete separation of the market (or markets) from the 
state or society.  
When delineating market economies, the important distinction relates, then, not to the 
existence of intervention, but rather to forms of governance and ownership in the market. This is 
clear in Polanyi’s analysis of “fictitious commodities.” The concern is, if the production and 
distribution of land, labor, and money are left to the “self-regulating mechanisms” of the market, 
they are left to the governance of private market actors (i.e. the owners of capital), who are 
motivated to produce on the basis of gain. Polanyi’s suggestion to decommodify land and labor 
can be interpreted to mean that their distribution and production should come under greater 
public or social governance and ownership. In other words, the price of labor, conditions of 
work, and use of land and resources should be subject to democratic decision-making procedures 
and not be left to the private decisions of owners (i.e. the owners of the firms or capital).32 As 
                                                
32 This could be interpreted to mean undemocratic state control—but in contemporary theories of 
economic democracy, ownership should be decentralized and not concentrated in the hands of 
the state.  
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Malleson puts it, “the fundamental question…is not ‘free market’ or ‘intervention,’ but rather 
intervention ‘for whom’ and ‘for what.’”33  
Herein lies the idea of economic democracy, a broad term that describes the incorporation 
of democratic principles, including freedom, collective deliberation, and shared authority, into 
various economic arenas and practices (i.e. the workplace, markets, investment, and finance).34 
In short, economic democracy gives workers, consumers, and communities greater decision-
making power over economic activities that affect their livelihood and freedom. While a fuller 
account of the theory of economic democracy lies beyond the scope of this dissertation, I’ll 
briefly highlight some of its basic principles by comparing it to welfare state capitalism (or social 
democracy) and state socialism.   
Capitalist economies are not the only economies that make use of markets. Social 
democratic societies and societies with robust welfare states are also market economies. The 
difference between these two types of economies (capitalist vs. social democratic/welfare state 
capitalism) is that in the latter the public sector plays a greater role in the regulation of the 
market and in the provision of goods and services. In general, welfare states are committed to 
establishing a large safety net for those who are negatively affected by unequal market outcomes. 
This can be accomplished through a variety of means, including taxation, social spending, or 
greater support for labor unionization. Welfare state capitalism stops short of socialism, insofar 
as it does not call for collective or state ownership of the means of production or for the 
replacement of markets with central planning. While it is possible for worker cooperatives to 
exist in social democracies (as it is possible in capitalist economies), social democracies may 
                                                
33 Tom Malleson, After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 104.  
34 For an overview of the concept of economic democracy, see Michael Menser, We Decide! 
Theories and Cases in Participatory Democracy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2018). 
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also encourage the practice of codetermination.35 Codetermination allows workers to participate 
on the board of large firms and therefore directly influence decisions within it.   
From an economic democracy perspective, existing social democracies and welfare states 
fall short of fully democratizing the economy.36 Malleson, for example, notes how although the 
Nordic countries have lower levels of economic inequality in comparison to the United States, 
they still have not eliminated inequality. In Norway, for example, “the richest 10% control 
50.5% of the wealth.”37 Malleson views this as a problem that is inherent to the structure of the 
social democratic model. On this model, while higher taxes (or greater fiscal spending) and 
union strength leads to a robust welfare state and higher wages, the private control of firms, 
investment, and finance limits the possibility for an even greater reduction in inequality. 
Malleson’s reasoning (which he develops on the basis of empirical examples) is that further 
attempts to redistribute wealth or authority pose a direct threat to the profits and governance of 
private owners.38 On his view, for greater equality to be achieved—and to more fully “alleviate 
substantial poverty, wealth inequality, or worker powerlessness,”— countries must “replace 
private control of investment by public and cooperative control.”39 Malleson also promotes 
worker cooperatives, which would grant workers, as owners, greater decision-making power in 
their place of work.  
Malleson is not alone in raising criticisms of the social democratic or welfare state model. 
In political philosophy similar concerns have been voiced against theories of distributive justice 
                                                
35 Ibid., 119-20. 
36 Malleson distinguishes between liberal/neoliberal market economies (United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, to name a few), and social democratic market economies (Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark). Ibid., 112. 
37 Ibid., 102. 
38 In short, if the loss in profits becomes too great, the capitalist class will go on the offensive 
against workers. Ibid., 123.  
39 Ibid., 123-124. 
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that favor welfare state capitalism. The central worry is that distributive justice focuses on 
correcting for (ex post) material inequalities without seeking to change institutional or structural 
arrangements that may be the source of such inequalities. As Iris Marion Young puts it, “such a 
focus ignores and tends to obscure the institutional context within which those distributions take 
place, and which is often at least partly the cause of patterns of distribution.”40 Young concludes 
from this, borrowing Nozick’s terms (without adopting his libertarian solution), that distributive 
justice erroneously “conceptualize[s] all issues of justice in terms of patterns,” when the object 
of justice should focus on the underlying “processes” that cause such unequal distributions in the 
first place.41 
In another example, Rawls, although often associated with the welfare state model, 
explicitly rejected this view later in life. He claimed that a capitalist welfare state could not 
“[realize] all the main political values expressed by the two principles of justice,” because “it 
permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets and natural 
resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life rests in few hands.”42 
Rawls promoted as possible alternatives, property-owning democracy or a liberal democratic 
socialist regime (which he distinguishes from state socialism). The former model would 
“disperse the ownership of wealth and capital” and therefore prevent the “near monopoly of the 
means of production” that was permitted under welfare state capitalism (as well as in laissez-
faire capitalism).43 Some contemporary theorists have further developed the idea of a property-
                                                
40 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 21-22.  
41 Ibid., 28.  
42 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 135.  
43 Ibid., 139. He goes on to claim that property owning democracy does not redistribute wealth 
“at the end of each period,” but rather “ensur[es] the widespread ownership of productive assets 
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owning democracy, also referred to as a theory of “predistribution.” Alan Thomson, for example, 
draws from the recent work of Thomas Piketty to argue that inequalities in wealth or capital, as 
opposed to income, generate a different set of problems for equality, including political 
influence, educational access, and class status—problems that welfare states are not capable of 
amending.44 In short, on these outlooks, welfare state capitalism fails to address problems related 
to hierarchy and domination in the workplace, inequalities in property, wealth or productive 
assets, and the lack of decision-making power within economic (and political) institutions.  
Economic democracy also differs from orthodox Marxism. From this latter perspective, 
socialism is associated with state ownership of the means of production and a centrally planned 
economy. Traditional socialist accounts significantly limit (if not eliminate) the role of markets, 
leaving the state in charge of production and distribution. As Malleson details, on this view, as 
Kautsky and Lenin espoused it, worker collectives were ruled out.45 The state, not the workers, 
was held to be the owner of the means of production. Malleson notes certain commonalities 
between economic democracy and socialism, but ultimately finds several faults with the 
orthodox Marxist view, an important one being that nationalization (i.e. state ownership of the 
means of production) supports the hierarchical structure of the workplace, and therefore severely 
limits the idea of workplace democracy. Many Marxists have also come to reject the idea of 
central planning and argue for the superior efficiency of markets and the price mechanism.46 
                                                                                                                                                       
and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this 
against a background of fair equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to assist those who 
lose out through accident or misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to put all citizens 
in a position to manage their own affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic 
equality.” Ibid.  
44 Alan Thomas, Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property-Owning Democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), xix. 
45 Malleson, After Occupy, 17. 
46 Ibid., 18. 
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Thus, even within Marxist thought there exists (and have existed) a variety of economic 
positions, some of which fall closer in line with theories of economic democracy.47   
In the conclusion of the dissertation, I address contemporary interpretations of Smith that 
claim he favored a socially “embedded” market model. As my comments above aim to show, all 
market economies are embedded in social institutions. Even neoliberal capitalist societies depend 
on the state and legislative system for ensuring its basic functioning. It is better thus to think of 
market economies as existing in a variety of institutional forms that can vary in their ability to 
promote egalitarian or freedom-enhancing aims. For example, market economies can exist in 
non-capitalist societies (societies with collective or communal forms of property) or in societies 
with a more equal distribution of property and resources. Moreover, in some societies, markets 
operate on a significantly smaller scale, where people are able to meet a range of subsistence 
needs outside the market altogether.48 To get a clearer idea of what institutional arrangements 
Smith and other pro-market thinkers favored, a closer historical look at the particular debates 
they were engaged in will be the focus of the remaining chapters. But first, a note on another 
important theme discussed throughout the dissertation.  
 
 
Republicanism and the Market Economy 
                                                
47 For a contemporary theory of “market socialism,” see David Schweickart, After Capitalism 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011).  
48 Elinor Ostrom’s work discusses empirical examples of communities that collectively manage 
resources outside the institutions of the state and the market. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). I disagree thus with Milton Friedman’s assessment: “Fundamentally, 
there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central 
direction involving the use of coercion—the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian 
state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals—the technique of the market place.” 
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 40th Anniversary Edition (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), 13. 
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Although the term “economic liberalism” suggests the idea that the early pro-market 
outlook aligned with liberal political tenets, the dominant political framework in the eighteenth 
century was republicanism. In a general sense, republicanism is a body of political thought that is 
opposed to absolutism and favors the ideas of a mixed constitution, civic virtue, and political 
participation. Like liberalism, however, republicanism is also a contested term. Mainly, there are 
two competing interpretations of the history of republican thought. One interpretation, referred to 
as the “civic humanist” view, characterizes republicanism as a political theory committed to 
democratic self-rule. The writings of Hannah Arendt and J.G.A Pocock are commonly associated 
with this view.49 The other, more recent interpretation, referred to as the neo-republican (or civic 
republican/ neo-Roman) view, interprets republicanism as a political theory that values 
democratic participation only as an instrumental good. Alternatively, the ultimate ideal in 
republican thought, according to the neo-republican interpretation, is a specific conception of 
freedom as a form of nondomination.50 This conception has its roots in Roman Jurisprudence, 
whereas civic humanists locate republican ideals in the tradition of the Greek polis. 
While each pro-market thinker’s engagement with republican ideas varies, the idea of 
freedom as a form of nondomination plays a central role in economic debates throughout the 
                                                
49 For a critique of this interpretation see Eric MacGilvrary, The Invention of Market Freedom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 36-38. 
50 In particular, neo-republican thinker Philip Pettit classifies republicanism as a body of political 
thought that promotes the three following ideals: (1) civil freedom (where freedom is defined as 
nondomination), (2) an “empire of law,” or “constitutional constraints associated broadly with 
the mixed constitution,” and (3) a “contestatory citizenry,” i.e. a citizenry with “virtue to track 
and, if necessary, contest public policies and initiatives.” On his account, the second two ideals 
are instrumental to the first. In other words, constitutional law, a division of power, and civic 
virtue, are valued not as ends in themselves, but as ends to the means of securing republican 
freedom. Philip Pettit, “Two Republican Traditions” in Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law, 
and Politics, eds. Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2013), 170; Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), 20.  
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eighteenth century.51 The concept has its origins in the legal category of sui juris in Roman law. 
Sui juris denotes the status of a free, independent person—a person who is not under the power 
(potestas) of another—i.e. a person who is not a slave.52 As will be discussed later on, unlike a 
liberal (negative) conception of freedom, republican freedom emphasizes the importance of 
securing a subject’s legal status so as to protect them from interpersonal forms of arbitrary power 
and domination.53 It emphasizes, moreover, the importance of self-sufficiency, construed in both 
economic and political terms. The reasoning here is that if a person is self-reliant, they are 
protected from domination in interpersonal relations of dependency.   
Originally, in the ancient republics of Roman society, this term was applied only 
descriptively. During this period, it was also believed that free republics required an unfree class 
of laborers (i.e. slaves) to support a class of independent and politically active citizens. On the 
classical republican view, then, the commitment to freedom as a form of nondomination was not 
yet universal. As one commentator writes, “the sheer conceptual opposition of freedom to 
slavery did not, on its own, generate a criticism of slavery.”54 For classical republicans, 
moreover, any involvement in trade or labor was associated with unfreedom. Cicero, for 
example, describes wage labor as “a contract to servitude” and trade as a “demeaning” activity, 
where profit is earned through the “dishonorable” act of telling “lies.”55 It was believed, then, 
                                                
51 As Eric MacGilvray claims, “although it is true that not everyone who appealed to freedom as 
a political value in the pre-modern period is properly described as republican, it is nevertheless 
the case…that anyone who appealed to freedom as a political value would have defined the word 
in republican terms. Eric MacGilvray, The Invention of Market Freedom, 16.  
52 Alan Watson ed. The Digest of Justinian, Volume 1. (Philadelphia: University of  
Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 18. The idea of republican freedom, and how it is different from a 
liberal conception of freedom, is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.  
53 That is, power that is not accountable to those who are governed by it.   
54 Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican 
Liberty in the Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 23. 
55 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 58. 
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that if someone worked for another or was employed in a trade they were unfit for citizenship 
and involvement in the political sphere. Only those who owned land and earned a living through 
the employment of workers or slaves were sui juris and therefore permitted to participate in the 
affairs of the republic.       
In the seventeenth century, republicanism underwent a change. Due, in part, to the 
influence of natural law theory, which asserted the equality of all persons, some thinkers asserted 
that civil and political freedoms ought to be extended to all members in society (albeit not, on 
some accounts, to women).56 Elizabeth Anderson refers to this new development in republican 
thought as “radical republicanism.” She identifies it with the political outlook and constitutional 
reforms advanced in the seventeenth century by the Levellers and John Locke. These thinkers, on 
her account, sought to expand the franchise and advocated greater “equality under the law” on 
the basis of their commitment to republican freedom and anti-absolutism.57  
Like the classical republican thinkers, radical republicans also viewed economic 
independence as a necessary requirement for political participation. Given, however, that radical 
republicans sought to extend political freedoms, they used this as a justification for equalizing 
property ownership.58 This outlook is especially clear in republican thinkers like James 
Harrington (in the seventeenth century) and Richard Price (in the eighteenth century), who 
shared a vision of an agrarian society consisting of small, independent landowners (these 
                                                
56 Eric MacGilvray, The Invention of Market Freedom, 75.  
57 Anderson, “Equality and Freedom in the Workplace: Recovering Republican Insights,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 31, no. 2 (2015): 54. See also Elizbeth Anderson, Private Government 
Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It) 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).   
58 Ibid., 55-56. 
 22 
thinkers are also referred to as “agrarian republicans”).59 Price, for instance, employed 
republican arguments to criticize parliamentary enclosures, which consolidated small land-
holdings in favor of large-scale agricultural development.60 I will suggest later on that Price’s 
outlook can be characterized as an early republican critique of agrarian capitalism.  
Radical (or agrarian) republicans, then, were less hostile to the activity of labor in 
comparison to their classical predecessors. The important caveat here is that labor was 
considered free only when it was self-governed.61 Articulating this outlook, Abraham Lincoln, 
one of the many Americans influenced by the British commonwealthmen, writes: “The prudent, 
penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves surplus with which to buy tools 
or land, for himself; then labors on his own account another while…[this] is free labor.”62 
Lincoln makes it clear that “free labor” is distinct from “hired labor,” claiming that those who 
remain hired laborers do so on account of the fact that their “dependent nature” prefers it.63 For 
the agrarian republicans (like the classical republicans), wage labor was viewed as the antithesis 
of economic independence. As Alex Gourevitch describes it, on the agrarian view, “economic 
                                                
59 S.J. Thompson, “Parliamentary Enclosure, Property, Population, and The Decline of Classical 
Republicanism in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” The Historical Journal 51 no. 3 (2008): 621-642. 
60 Thompson argues that Price’s use of republican ideas in his critique of parliamentary 
enclosures (which consolidated small landholdings) represented a broader ideological movement 
in the eighteenth century. Ibid. 
61 This departs from the classical view, where it was believed (as Anderson describes it) that, 
“free citizens should not have to work at all, even for themselves, as self-employment in a trade 
focused the mind on base private interest and supposedly made people unfit to consider the 
public interest.” Anderson, “Equality and Freedom in the Workplace,” 54.   
62 Abraham Lincoln, “Address before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin,” in Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 3 (Anne Arbor: University of 
Michigan Digital Library Production Service, 2001), 478-79.  
63 Ibid. 
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independence” entailed the “control over one’s labor and property—a lack of subjection to the 
commands of others in how one performs one’s daily activity.”64  
 As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, Turgot, Smith, and Kant depart from the 
agrarian republican outlook. While it is evident that republican values informed their political 
and economic views, they were markedly less hostile to wage labor and did not support 
republican agrarian reforms to equalize property ownership. Alternatively, Turgot, Smith, and 
Kant characterized wage labor as a form of free labor. In doing so, self-employment and the 
equalization of property did not feature as strongly, if at all, in their political and economic 
outlooks.65  
In the concluding chapter, I will demonstrate how the interpretation presented in this 
dissertation departs from contemporary scholarship on the period. While some scholars note the 
difference between anti-market and pro-market republican outlooks, and label the latter as 
“commercial republicanism,” I argue that they overlook the important distinguishing features 
within this typology of eighteenth century republicanism. I suggest that the commercial 
republican thinkers (e.g. Smith, and Kant) understood republican values, including freedom, to 
be compatible with the development of agrarian capitalism, whereas the agrarian republicans 
(e.g. Rousseau and Price) did not. If my interpretation is correct, this poses some problems, as 
well, for contemporary theorists who look to these thinkers for insight into the development of an 
alternative (i.e. anti-capitalist) market arrangement.  
  
                                                
64 The agrarian republican critique of wage labor and support for property ownership went hand 
in hand. For one to be avoid “unfree” forms of wage labor, one must be in possession of their 
own property. Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 49. 
65 Smith did oppose the practice of primogeniture, which prevented the breaking up of large 
estates. This will be addressed in a later chapter.   
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The Significance of the Eighteenth Century 
Before getting into the details of this contemporary debate, it is necessary to locate the 
eighteenth century pro-market outlook in the economic debates of its own time. This is what the 
following chapters set out to do. I should first clarify, however, why this period is of historical 
interest. The study of political economy did not begin in the eighteenth century, but it did receive 
widespread treatment by a large number of enlightenment thinkers throughout the period. Their 
discussion of the economy was a philosophical one. As such, it was sensitive to the normative 
dimensions of economic debate. The economic outlook of Turgot, Smith, and Kant was also 
forward-looking. That is, although they criticized existing economic policies tied to feudal and 
mercantile regimes, they were also concerned with theorizing an alternative economic system 
that could take its place. For Smith, this was his model of “natural liberty,” where liberty refers 
not only to liberal economic policies, but also to a system of natural rights.      
As will be seen, these new economic proposals were intended for a future economic and 
political regime that was realized at the start of the nineteenth century. As Thomas Piketty 
details, the eighteenth century marked the transition from “ternary” to “ownership” societies.66 
According to Piketty, both types of societies were “regimes of inequality” with unique 
justificatory ideologies. He refers to the ideology of the former as “trifunctional” and the latter as 
“proprietarian.” A ternary society consists of three distinct classes: the clergy, the nobility, and 
the third estate (commoners and workers). In these societies, the former two classes owned the 
majority of property and therefore held all the political and economic power.67 In ownership 
societies, the status-based distinctions and privileges found in ternary societies were abolished 
                                                
66 Thomas Piketty, Capital and Ideology (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2020).  
67 Piketty notes (in France) “by 1780 the nobility and clergy represented roughly 1.5 percent of 
the total population but owned nearly half the land.” Ibid., 85-86. 
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and replaced by a regime of equal rights and private property (secured by the state). The 
Physiocrats, Smith, and Kant, as will be seen, all articulate criticisms of ternary societies, and the 
seeds of proprietarian ideologies lie within their political and economic frameworks.       
Importantly, moreover, Piketty claims that ownership societies consistent of various types 
of property schemes.68 In Western Europe, the scheme that ownership societies adopted 
remained inegalitarian.69 Piketty suggests that such an outcome was not inevitable, and that 
historical proposals for egalitarian distribution schemes had been vocalized during this 
transitional period.70 Piketty’s description here maps well onto the discussion that follows in the 
remaining chapters. As I suggest above, Turgot, Smith, and Kant, although critical of the 
privileges of ternary societies, failed to fully address new forms of domination and economic 
inequality that characterized developing ownership societies. Their strong defense of property 
rights prevented them from proposing the types of egalitarian (i.e. anti-capitalist) property 
schemes advocated by thinkers like Price. Therefore, Price was far more egalitarian and sensitive 
to the harms of what Piketty refers to as the “quasi-sacralization of property” in proprietarian 
ideologies.71   
In sum, the eighteenth century was an important period for studying the ideological 
defense of modern inequality. The debates of this period are also of more than just historical 
                                                
68 Ibid., 122. 
69 In France, for example, despite the abolition of privileges of the nobility and clergy in the 
Revolution, there occurred a rapid expansion of economic inequality in the nineteenth century. 
Between 1800-1810 the top 1 percent owned 45 percent of the wealth and between 1900-1910, 
they owned 55 percent. In Paris, the concentration of wealth was even higher. Ibid., 127. Piketty 
comments how this would be to the dismay of some enlightenment thinkers, including 
Condorcet, who insisted that free commerce would naturally tend toward equality. Ibid., 139.  
70 As examples of this, Piketty cites the progressive tax proposal by Louis Gaslin in the period 
leading up to the French Revolution, and Thomas Paine’s proposals in Agrarian Justice. Ibid., 
110-11; Ibid., 118-19. 
71 Ibid., 122. 
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interest. Piketty notes that although ownership societies entered into a more egalitarian phase 
following World War II, economies throughout the world have witnessed growing inequality 
since the 1980s.72 According to Piketty, we are now living in an ideological period of neo-
proprietarianism.73 Studying the emergence of proprietarianism in the eighteenth century can 
therefore help provide insight into contemporary justifications of inequality. It can also assist in 
the normative project of constructing a new egalitarian ideal. As Piketty writes:   
All human societies need to make sense of their inequalities, and the justifications given 
in the past turn out, if studied carefully, to be no more incoherent than those of the 
present. By examining them all in their concrete historical contexts, paying close 
attention to the multiplicity of possible trajectories and forks in the road, we can shed 
light on the present inequality regime and begin to see how it might be transformed.74  
 
This quote speaks well to the historical approach of this dissertation. In considering the 
justifications provided in defense of the new ownership society (which was also an emerging 
capitalist society)—and the objections of their critics— I hope to shed light, not only on the 
internal inconsistencies of eighteenth century economic thought, but also our own. I suggest thus 
that contemporary views on wage labor, property ownership, and free markets still remain deeply 




                                                
72 Ibid., 20-23.  
73 Ibid.,16-20; Ibid., 27-29. 
74 Ibid., 29.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Dis-embedding the Market: The Grain Debate in Eighteenth Century France 
  
  
In mid-eighteenth century France, there occurred an important debate that addressed the ethical 
basis of a market economy. The debate was over the introduction of liberal reform in the grain 
trade. As will be discussed, from the perspective of the critics of reform, liberalization threatened 
to upend the customary policy of provision, which ensured that grain was available and 
affordable for the laboring poor. While proponents of reform asserted that a deregulated grain 
market would better meet the subsistence needs of the poor, subsistence crises put these 
assertions into doubt, causing political and economic turmoil throughout the period. This chapter 
provides a historical description of these events and examines the defense of liberal reform 
advanced by the Physiocratic thinker, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781).    
The economic thought of the Physiocrats is a helpful place to begin an investigation of 
the philosophical underpinnings of economic liberalism. Political economy did not begin with 
the Physiocrats, but they are commonly attributed with introducing the first scientific and 
systematic approach to economics.1 They also approached the study of economics from the 
perspective of justice and morality. Like Smith, they defended liberal reform on the basis of its 
rootedness in natural law. Smith, moreover, was in contact with various Physiocratic thinkers. 
Judging by his intention to dedicate the Wealth of Nations to Quesnay, Smith felt indebted (albeit 
                                                
1 David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 85.  
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was not entirely faithful) to their economic contributions.2 Surprisingly, however, in revisionist 
accounts of Smith, the influence of the Physiocrats is sometimes overlooked. In elucidating some 
of the key arguments that the Physiocrats put forward, I hope to provide a broader historical 
context for examining Smith’s economic model. This debate is important too, not only for better 
understanding the pro-free market position of the eighteenth century, but also for elucidating the 
anti-market position of its critics. This chapter begins to challenge thus the extent to which the 
pro-market position was successful in defending its ethical claims about liberalization, especially 
in the face of its empirical shortcomings.     
 
The Grain Debate  
Throughout the eighteenth century the French government was largely responsible for 
overseeing the availability, quality, and price of grain. Although exceptions were sometimes 
granted, especially when the price of grain was low, government regulations addressed all 
aspects of the grain trade and were enforced by local officials known as the police. These 
restrictive policies included the prohibition or restriction of trade both abroad and internally, the 
banning of any purchases or sales outside the public market place, a mandatory registering of 
traders with the police, and a prohibition on engrossing, forestalling, and regrating.3 In a general 
sense, the policies common to the old regime restricted who was permitted to deal in grain as 
well as the location of sale. The idea was that in keeping trade exclusive to public markets, it 
                                                
2 Smith met several French liberal economists during his stay in France from 1764 to 1766. 
However, there is some debate over whether Turgot influenced Smith, or the other way around. 
See P.D. Groenewegen, “Turgot and Adam Smith,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy 15, 
no. 3 (November 1968): 271-287.  
3 Steven L. Kaplan, Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV: Second 
Edition (London; New York, NY: Anthem Press, 2015), 66-68. Engrossing refers to the buying 
up of large quantities of grain, forestalling to the purchasing of grain on its way to market, and 
regrating to the purchasing of grain for local resale. Ibid., 69. 
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would keep all grain related activities visible and better guarded from fraudulent practices. Of 
utmost concern throughout the period was the possibility of collusion between producers and 
sellers and the formation of monopolies, both of which could artificially drive up the price of 
grain at the expense of the consumers. Other aspects of the trade, including the price, 
measurement, storage, and transport of grain, also remained under the surveillance of the police.   
From the perspective of the government, paternalism was justified on account of the 
threat to social stability that subsistence crises posed. Food crises occurred periodically 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France.4 One scholar attributes this to the 
outcome of absolutist policies beginning in the fifteenth century, when the king, in an attempt to 
end the peasant uprisings of the feudal era, increased taxes on the peasantry and eradicated 
existing feudal controls to consolidate state power.5 The increase in taxation was exponential. As 
one scholar notes, “Total taxation quadrupled in the decade after 1630…By 1628, in fact, 
Normandy alone was providing Louis XIII with revenues equal to all those raised by Charles I in 
England.”6 As a result of these measures, the peasantry was prevented from accumulating 
enough wealth to expand their agricultural production—the surest form of protection from 
famine and scarcity.7 Correspondingly, the state experienced a financial crisis that continued into 
the eighteenth century, where, by 1789, “the annual deficit equaled one-fifth of the state budget 
while interest payments on the national debt rose to more than half of annual government 
expenditures.”8  
                                                
4 Ibid., 3-4. 
5 McNally, Political Economy, 15-16. 
6 Ibid., 16. 
7 McNally also attributes economic stagnation to the fact that the state did not encourage 
enclosures. Because the nobility was exempt from taxation, permitting enclosures would 
decrease the peasant population and thus the source of the state’s revenue. Ibid., 18-19. 
8 Ibid., 20.  
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It was within the context of economic stagnation and excessive taxation that the first calls 
for liberal reform were advanced. In particular, during the period of Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s rule 
as Controller-General (minister of finance) under Louis XIV (1661-1683), there emerged a 
growing-body of anti-mercantilist literature.9 Colbert implemented policies that were emblematic 
of the French mercantilist outlook. He identified money (or bullion) with wealth, and located the 
source of wealth in gains made through foreign trade and commerce. Under the influence of the 
mercantilist “balance of trade” theory, he also encouraged the exportation of manufactured 
goods, while placing restrictions and tariffs on imports.10   
The calls for early reform advanced by a number of thinkers, including Claude Fleury, 
Archbishop Fénelon, and Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert, were based on a rejection of Colbert’s 
conception of wealth.11 According to the anti-mercantilist outlook, wealth was measured not by 
the amount of money a nation possessed, but instead by its domestic goods, especially, in the 
case of France, its agricultural output. From this position, reformers argued that in hindering 
agricultural production the current system of taxation and protectionism prevented the nation 
from becoming more prosperous. In place of mercantile controls they advocated a single income 
tax and a system of free export to increase the demand of domestic products.12      
Although the early calls for liberal reform went unheeded, support continued to grow 
throughout the eighteenth century. McNally comments that the period was marked by 
“agromania and anglomania.”13 During this time, French intellectuals were introduced to English 
                                                
9 Ibid., 75. 
10 Mercantilism will be explored further in the next chapter.  
11 These thinkers are members of what is referred to as the “Christian Agrarianism” movement. 
Ibid., 76. 
12 Ibid., 79.  
13 Ibid., 90; See also Kaplan, Bread, Politics and Political Economy, 119. 
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political economy through the writings of Locke, Petty, Tucker, and Hume.14 Attributing 
England’s prosperity to its agricultural methods, they also became interested in new methods of 
agricultural production and science.15 The most important advocates of liberty to emerge in this 
context were the Physiocrats, a “sect” or “school” of thought that formed around the figure of 
François Quesnay (1694-1774).16 The Physiocrats further developed the criticisms raised against 
mercantile policies. Like the early reformers, they viewed the current system of taxation as a 
hindrance to economic progress and supported the liberalization of grain.    
Originally trained in medicine, Quesnay served as a court physician to King Louis XV 
and Madame de Pompadour, the King’s mistress and patroness of the philosophes (French 
Enlightenment thinkers). As a consulting physician to the King, Quesnay lived in an entresol 
(mezzanine) in the Palace of Versailles. It was here, moreover, that a meeting in July 1757 
between Quesnay and Victor de Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715-1789), author of L’Ami des 
Hommes (Friend of Mankind, 1756), is said to have marked the “birth” of the Physiocratic 
School.17 Quesnay began writing on the topic of economics only later in life, with his first 
writings on the topic dating from the period of this initial meeting. They include two articles 
published in the Encyclopédie: “Fermiers” (Farmers) in 1756, and “Grains” (Grains) in 1757. 
Both texts discussed important themes of what would eventually be identified with the 
Physiocratic doctrine. This doctrine received its full exposition in Quesnay’s Tableau 
Économique (Economic Table), originally published in 1758 and followed shortly thereafter by 
three subsequent versions. 
                                                
14 McNally, Political Economy, 95. 
15 Ibid., 90. 
16 The Physiocrats were referred to during their time as “economistes.” The Economics of 
Physiocracy: Essays and Translations, ed. Ronald L. Meek (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1963), 15.  
17 Ibid., 15. 
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 In addition to its two founders, other members and associates of the school included 
Dupot de Nemours, Mercier de la Rivière, several intendants, and Encyclopédistes, including 
Denis Diderot.18 Jacques Turgot, the protégé of Marquis de Gournay (another well-known free 
trade advocate) was included among the latter. Turgot held a number of important administrative 
positions, moving from a magistrate, to intendant (tax collector) of Limoges, and lastly to the 
position of Controller-General. Turgot also wrote on several intellectual topics, including 
philology, the natural sciences, and history. His best-known written work in economics was a 
text entitled Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth, written in 1766.  
Despite its growing popularity during the era leading to reform (the school even had its 
own Journal, Ephémérides), Physiocracy only thrived for a short decade. As will be discussed, 
even Turgot’s attempt as Controller-General to re-institute liberal reform fell short of reviving 
liberal momentum after the rescinding of reform in 1770. While the details of Turgot’s defense 
of liberal reform will be explored below, it is important to make note of the foundational 
principles that the Physiocrats developed.  
Physiocracy, which translates as the rule or government of nature, was based on the 
premise that there existed economic rules that were analogous to natural laws. In their scientific 
attempt to uncover these laws, the Physiocrats developed a systematic model of economics. The 
central economic idea they uncovered, which led them to support liberalization, was the concept 
of the “net product,” i.e. the surplus that remains after a producer earns back a value equivalent 
to the costs of production. Importantly, the Physiocrats claimed that only agriculture was capable 
of producing a net product, and that industrial forms of production were “sterile” and 
                                                
18 Intendants were powerful administrative officials who served directly under the King. 
Intendants were in control of généralités, or financial administrative divisions in France 
(généralités are distinct from provinces).  
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unproductive. This surplus, created by the cultivators (who employed wage laborers to work for 
them), was then given to proprietors in the form of rent. Importantly, from the Physiocrats’ 
perspective, the net product was the sole source of wealth that could legitimately be taxed by the 
state. To tax the cultivator, as was practiced, would cut into the funds available for the cost of 
production, which was necessary for agricultural expansion, whereas the net product was not. It 
was important, moreover, to allow free exports so that cultivators could accumulate more wealth, 
expand production, and, as a result, increase state revenue.   
While attempts were made to introduce liberal reform throughout the period, it was not 
until 1763 that legislation finally came to pass with the May declaration under Controller-
General Henri Léonard Jean Baptiste Bertin.19 The early draft of Bertin’s proposal reiterated 
arguments in line with the outlook of liberal reformers. It was critical of the police, blamed 
regulation for dearth, and supported free trade on the grounds that it would improve agricultural 
development.20 In response, the declaration liberalized trade in the interior. Registration 
requirements were removed (opening up the trade to newcomers), as were bans on off-market 
exchanges and other barriers including road tolls.21 Police regulations in Paris remained, 
however, and export abroad was still prohibited. It was not until 1764, when Clément Charles 
François de Laverdy replaced Bertin as the new Controller-General, that this final step was 
taken. Under Laverdy’s July 1764 edict, exports abroad were finally permitted with the caveat 
that they would be cut off as soon as prices rose above 30 livres.22  
                                                
19 In 1754 the government issued an arrêt du conseil (parliamentary law) that permitted domestic 
free trade (internally) and allowed exportation of grain in two ports. The arrêt was not 
sufficiently enforced, however, nor did it advance anything entirely new in practice. Kaplan, 
Bread, Politics and Political Economy, 106. 
20 Ibid., 137. 
21 Ibid., 138. 
22 Ibid., 142. 
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The initial reaction to reform was mixed. Not all of the thirteen courts (Parlements), for 
instance, were in full support of the May declaration and July edict.23 Many expressed the 
concern that social unrest would inevitable result from undoing the traditional policy of 
provision.24 The Parisian municipality was especially hesitant to pass Laverdy’s reforms. Joly de 
Fleury, the advocate general of the Paris Parlement, voiced many criticisms about the new 
measures, including the possibility that wages would not, at least initially, match the rise in price 
caused by increased exportation.25 Fleury, moreover, commented about the reformers: “They 
want to subject the commerce of a good so necessary to life to the same principles to which is 
subjected that of things less useful and even superfluous.”26 As will be seen, this was a concern 
that would reemerge in response to the subsistence crisis that followed reform. While for the 
most part good harvests and low grain prices kept resistance to a minimum in the initial phase of 
reform, things quickly changed as France entered into a period that experienced less favorable 
conditions.  
As predicted, riots against grain exportation soon followed reform, beginning as early as 
1764 in the north and spreading to the south throughout the 1770s.27 The grain riots typically 
entailed a process whereby grain was requisitioned from dealers, merchants, or cultivators, 
brought to the market for the local populace, and then given a new price (“taxation 
Populaire”).28 This process, moreover, was sometimes carried out with the assistance of the 
police. As Kaplan notes:  
                                                
23 It should be noted that the Parlements had significant autonomy from the king. Ibid., 185. 
24 Ibid., 170. 
25 Ibid., 172. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 188. 
28 Ibid., 196. 
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The riot involved certain risks, but they were not entirely unpredictable and if they 
frequently seemed worth taking it was because more often than not they resulted in an 
improvement in the collective lot of the village or town. In the most favorable 
circumstances, the police would preempt or dissipate the riot by requisitioning supplies 
and/or readjusting the price of grain as a measure of general interest and social control 
founded on the vague but widely shared premise that private property had public 
obligations.29  
 
As the passage details, it was common for the police to partake in price-fixing and to help bring 
the grain to market when it was available. Kaplan attributes to the police a “crisis of conscience” 
in trying to implement reform that went against the traditional practice of provision.30 He writes: 
“it seemed perilous and wrong-headed to undermine the public order and well-being by 
abandoning the grain trade to a concourse of self-interest.”31  
Liberals and their opponents disputed the underlying cause of the crisis.32 Those in favor 
of liberal reform attributed it to natural causes and the failure of officials to fully implement the 
new liberal controls. Alternatively, from the perspective of the critics, liberal reform and dearth 
were invariably linked. Critics claimed that by removing the ban on off market exchanges, the 
reforms empowered merchants and traders to engage in monopolistic practices, allowing them to 
control the supply and drive up the cost of grain. Prices, moreover, were on the rise. For 
example, in Paris between 1763 and 1768, the cost of grain rose from 13 to 27.90 livres.33 The 
freedom to export, moreover, allowed merchants to seek out other markets at the expense of 
local needs.  
Kaplan notes that most historians of this period tend to favor the liberal interpretation of 
the subsistence crisis in France. He concedes that, given the available information, “it can be 
                                                
29 Ibid., 194. 
30 Ibid., 201. 
31 Ibid. 
32 It should be noted that there were two ways of understanding the crisis: as a dearth or famine 
(an actual lack of food) or a chérte (the unavailability of food due to its high price). Ibid., 542. 
33 Ibid., 236.  
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plausibly argued that harvest lapses and disasters were sufficiently pronounced and widespread 
to occasion a conventional scarcity and chérte.”34 He goes on to add, however, that such a reality 
should not lead us to conclude, “liberalization played no role.”35 He states: 
The harvest of 1765 does not seem to have been unusually short in most places, while 
opinion on the severity of the deficits between 1766 and 1768 differs from source to 
source and place to place…For different purposes, économistes and their critics often 
pointed to the paradox which suffered (allegedly) abundant supplies to coexist with 
exorbitantly high prices. A critical reading of administrative evidence and impressionistic 
testimonies strongly suggests that the freeing of the grain trade, if it did not itself provoke 
chérte, exacerbated the short-term oscillations and quickened the cyclical and long-run 
movement by overturning market habits, modifying the customary flow-patterns of grain, 
multiplying the number of intermediaries, reducing the local visible supply, encouraging 
forestalling and rerating, and introducing a whole new dimension of adventure and 
uncertainty which influenced supply and demand.36   
 
Kaplan also provides details about a variety of complaints submitted by officials, including 
reports on the disappearance of local markets, rising prices, falling wages, unemployment, and 
the buying up of grain by merchants.37 A noteworthy report also cited by Kaplan is the 
occurrence of a riot sparked by the “discovery of a huge pit of charred grain covered with fresh 
sand containing between 25 and 50 muid [a unit of measurement] on the road.”38 He comments, 
“The incident struck the people as an example of the sort of terrible maneuvers that merchants 
engineered in order to keep the markets empty and the prices exorbitant.”39 All of this points to 
empirical evidence that the claims of the critics were grounded in worsening economic 
conditions.      
The government was not initially responsive to growing resistance and criticism against 
reform. Laverdy accused the public of “prejudice” and sought to discipline the police to conform 
                                                
34 Ibid., 253. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 253-54. 
37 Ibid., 205-11; 270-71. 
38 Ibid., 270. 
39 Ibid. 
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to the new legislative measures.40 The outlook changed, however, in 1769 under the new 
Controller-General, Joseph-Marie Terray. At this time, several Parlements were already 
implementing measures that were in violation of liberal practices, including prohibiting exports, 
banning off-market exchanges, and subjecting private granaries and inventories to search.41 An 
arrêt was then issued in July 1770, which prohibited exports on the grounds that the price 
surpassed that which was permitted under the July 1764 edict.42 This was followed by another 
arrêt in December of 1770 that went much further in rescinding liberal policies. The new 
legislation required all traders to register with the local police, prohibited the practice of 
“enarrhement” (the purchasing of future harvests, which caused an increase in prices), 
criminalized the purchasing of grain outside the public market, and forced all exchanges to occur 
within the public marketplace.43 Kaplan considers this last legislative move as its most 
important, commenting “the concentration of supplies on the market would assure a regular, 
predictable, visible supply, facilitate exchanges between buyers and sellers, and expose them to 
constant scrutiny.”44 He adds, “without a fixed market system, the police could not possible 
wage a successful war again monopoly.”45   
 
The Liberal Defense: Turgot on Welfare, Property, and Liberty  
In 1770, Turgot, one of the leading proponents of liberal reform, exchanged a series of 
letters with the Controller-General Terray. At the time, Turgot was an intendant on tour of 
Limoges, which was especially hard hit by the grain crisis. Several of the letters were lost, but 
                                                
40 Ibid., 216. 
41 Ibid., 492-93. 
42 Ibid., 510. 
43 Ibid., 536. 
44 Ibid., 537. 
45 Ibid., 537. 
 38 
the remaining four offer insight into his justification for reform. As Turgot puts it, the letters 
address Terray’s concerns that: “the policy of freedom was favorable only to a very small 
number of subjects; that it is immaterial to the cultivators, and that it is most harmful by far to 
the greatest number of the King’s subjects.”46 In response to these concerns, Turgot sets out to 
show how all classes of society benefit from the liberalization of grain. He agrees that proprietors 
benefit significantly from the profits that accrue under liberal policies, and he also shows 
(against Terray) that the profits earned by cultivators are not cut short by the limited term of their 
leases.47 What is more difficult to explain, and what he spends more time demonstrating, is how 
the laboring poor equally benefit from the liberalization of the grain trade.     
Turgot’s central claim in response to Terray’s comment about the laboring poor, i.e. “the 
greatest number of the King’s subjects,” is that their interests align with the interests of the 
cultivators and proprietors. In his fifth letter, Turgot attributes this to the fact that the wealth of 
the latter two groups (as they spend money on cultivation or purchase goods) is the source of the 
former group’s income and that any increase in wealth for proprietors and cultivators is therefore 
an increase in the wealth for laborers. His outlook here is consistent with the Physiocratic 
understanding of the economy as a circular process; he says that the circulation of wealth is as 
“essential to the life of the body politics,” as “the circulation of blood is essential to the life of 
the animal body.”48 This point is also reiterated in his final letter. Here Turgot claims that the 
                                                
46 Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, “Extracts from ‘Letters on the Grain Trade,’” in The Turgot 
Collection: Writings, Speeches, and Letters of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, ed. David Gordon 
(Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2011), 227. 
47 Ibid., 234-37. 
48 Ibid., 228. 
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“consumer” depends on agriculture (and presumably, its expansion), both because they rely on it 
for their “livelihood” and in regard to the sale of their labor.49 He writes of the consumer:  
He has an interest in selling his labor at a price high enough to enable him to pay for the 
commodities he needs with the price he receives for it, and he must pay for these 
commodities at a price high enough for those who sell them to draw from this price the 
means to generate an equal quantity of produce in the following year, as well as the 
means to continue to buy his labor. Without this exact proportion, either the cultivator 
would cease to make the earth produce commodities and revenue, or the wage earner 
would cease to labor, or rather, these two things would occur at the same time, because 
cultivator and wage-earner, wages and labor, being necessarily correlated, and equally 
dependent on one another, must either exist, or be destroyed together. 50   
 
Turgot concludes by noting that if this “proportion” failed and society declined, it would be 
“wage-earners” who would be the most negatively impacted by it.51 For, it is this group that will 
first starve, not the cultivator who owns the harvest and land. Turgot concludes that the wage 
earner is therefore the most interested in “the extension of cultivation”—even more so than the 
cultivator and proprietor.52 Where, “For the latter two, the question is only that of being more or 
less wealthy, of living more or less comfortably; but for the wage-earning consumer, existence is 
at stake; it is a matter of life or death.53  
Turgot assumes that because wage earners are dependent on the wealth of cultivators and 
proprietors for their livelihood, they have an interest in the ability of both classes to secure 
wealth. Because, moreover, liberalization is said to generate greater wealth (since free export 
would increase demand and profit), he concludes that free trade is also in the interest of the 
laboring class. This is true not only for agricultural laborers, but also those employed in industry, 
since industrial wages, on the Physiocratic outlook, are equally dependent on the purchases made 
                                                
49 Ibid., 238. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 239.  
53 Ibid. 
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by proprietors and cultivators alike.54 Turgot, of course, overlooks how the relationship of 
dependency between worker and employer depends on the existence of a landless group of 
laborers. If people were relatively self-sufficient, such a dependency would not exist.   
The question that follows from Turgot’s commentary, is how exactly did he account for 
the process whereby an increase in wealth for the proprietors and cultivators would necessarily 
lead to an increase in wealth for the laboring poor? Turgot, after all, recognizes in the former 
group a predisposition to resist raising the wages of workers. In his discussion on taxation, for 
instance, he discusses how an increase in taxes for workers would threaten their livelihood and 
lead to a demand for higher wages. In such a situation, Turgot comments that “the less well off 
the laborer, the less domineering he can be, and the proprietor will at first not give in easily to 
the increase in wages.”55 This tendency is also discussed in Reflections on the Formation and the 
Distribution of Wealth. Here Turgot comments how the “simple workman” is paid “as little” as 
the employer is able; he says of the employer: 
since he has a choice between a great number of workmen, he prefers the one who works 
most cheaply. Thus the workmen are obliged to vie with one another and lower their 
price. In every kind of work it is bound to be the case, and in actual fact is the case, that 
the wage of the workman is limited to what is necessary in order to enable him to procure 
his subsistence.56  
 
In this passage, Turgot recognizes that workers have less bargaining power compared to their 
employers. However, in his letters, Turgot departs from this earlier view. For instance, Turgot 
comments on the necessity of some excess above a subsistence wage for workers. He recognizes 
that competition between laborers results in “simple unskilled workers” being paid a subsistence 
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56 Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, “Reflections on the Formation and the Distribution of Wealth,” 
in Turgot on Progress, Sociology and Economics, ed. and trans. Ronald L. Meek (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 122. 
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wage, but claims it is not the case that wages are so low that workers cannot support themselves 
in times of sickness, unemployment, or high prices.57 He writes of this excess fund:  
But it is of this type of luxury especially, that it can be said that it is a most necessary 
thing; it is essential that there is a little of it, just as it is necessary that there is some play 
in every machine. A watch of which all the wheels would work into each other with 
mathematical precision and without the smallest gap, would soon cease to go. If by an 
unexpected decrease in wages or increase in expenses, the worker can put up with being 
reduced to strict essentials, the same causes which had forced wages to rise a little above 
the necessary of yesterday, continue to operate and cause them to rise once more until 
they attain a higher level, in the same proportion with the necessary of today. 58 
 
Turgot suggests, then, that there is a natural tendency for wages to rise above subsistence alone. 
He goes on to claim, moreover, that proprietors may sometimes resist increasing wages due to a 
decrease in revenue. In this event, however, he argues that the market would undermine their 
efforts. If employers were to deny a wage increase, it would compel workers to seek employment 
elsewhere and create a tight labor market. Workers thus, “by curtailing their competition,” could 
“lay down the law” and “force the proprietors to raise wages.”59   
Turgot brings this point up again in the final letter. Here he discusses how an expansion 
of the grain trade (a result of liberal legislation) would lead to an increase in the production of 
agricultural goods. This is ultimately good for workers, he contends, not only because it 
increases the amount of jobs available, but also because it increases the demand for labor, which 
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leads to an increase in wages.60 He points, moreover, to the example of the rise of wages for 
masons in Paris due to an increase in the building trade.61 In sum, he concludes: 
Here then, the increase in values brought about by the policy of free trade, is an obvious 
advantage for the class of wage-earning consumers, since it causes a greater wages fund 
to be available for distribution, which produces: firstly, a greater certainty of finding 
work, and, for each laborer, a greater number of useful working days; secondly, an actual 
increase in the price of wages, through the competition of cultivators and proprietors, 
who will raise it in emulation of one another to attract workmen; thirdly, an increase in 
population, consequence of the greater affluence of the people.62   
 
In showing how free trade would potentially increase the wages of workers and thus benefit a 
group other than the property-owning class, Turgot adhered to the Physiocratic outlook. 
Quesnay, for instance, on the topic of the grain (i.e. corn) trade, asserts: “The ordinary proper 
price of corn, which procures such a large revenue for the state, does no harm at all to the lower 
orders.”63 In the case, moreover, that the price of grain increases under free trade, he asserts that 
“wages would also rise proportionately” and that such a rise would be “a matter of little concern 
to those who paid it, in comparison with the wealth which would result from the establishment of 
the proper price of corn.”64   
Turgot also dismissed fears about a rise in the price of grain, or the unaffordability of 
grain for consumers. During this period, the liberal view was associated with an encouragement 
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of high grain prices. The idea was that the opening up of trade to new markets would lead to an 
increase in demand and therefore a rise in price. Historically, a rise in the price of grain was 
something to be discouraged. From the (Physiocratic) liberal perspective, however, high grain 
prices were viewed as beneficial, insofar as it increased the cultivator’s revenue, which permitted 
an expansion of production and economic growth. Quesnay, who advocated such an outlook, 
claimed thus, “Valuelessness plus abundance does not at all equal wealth. Dearness plus dearth 
equal poverty. Abundance plus dearness equals opulence.”65 Quesnay argued, moreover, that it 
was low prices that were harmful for the country and synonymous with poverty and low 
population.66  
Turgot offers a few related responses to this concern. In general, he often assumes that 
wages and prices will reach a state of equilibrium with one another. For instance, he claims that 
before the laboring class was burdened by taxes, “wages were on a level with the customary 
price of commodities, and this level, which is the result of a multitude of causes combined and 
balanced with each other, must tend to re-establish itself.”67 In his final letter, he reiterates this 
point, claiming that while it is “necessary” for some “proportion” to exist between wages and 
prices, a just “equilibrium” may be difficult to obtain.68  He continues:  
The proportion can be disturbed for shorter or longer intervals in such a way that a great 
number of men experience all the excess of misery, and that societies are in a state either 
of crisis and convulsion or weariness and decline. What ought to be desired? Two things: 
firstly, that this proportion between the price of wages and the price of commodities is the 
fairest, the closest to equilibrium, the most advantageous possible for the cultivators and 
the proprietor on the one hand, and the wage-earner on the other; the most suitable, in 
short, to procure for the whole of society the greatest amount of production, of 
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enjoyment, of wealth and of strength; secondly, that the disturbances occasioned by 
natural causes are as rare, as short-lived, and as light as possible.69 
 
Turgot then states that this “is the true end of legislation on the matter of subsistence,” but that it 
is through freedom, not regulations, that such ends are met.70 He remarks, moreover, that he will 
not be able to show how exactly free trade accomplishes this in his letter.71 Turgot’s assurance 
that wages and prices tend toward equilibrium is therefore never fully explained. What is clear to 
him, however, is that such equilibrium exists, and it does so, not on account of the efforts of 
regulation, but rather through the mechanisms of the free market.  
 Turgot also claims, somewhat at odds with Quesnay’s outlook, that the belief that 
liberalization would lead to “dearer grain” is “not necessarily true, as the statistics of average 
grain prices show.”72 He claims that it is not the case that a significant amount of grain would 
even be exported (as feared), using as an example England, where, “in spite of their 
encouragement of exports,” they “do not export a great deal of grain.”73 He even suggests that 
free trade would lead to a fall in prices, in the case that production increases faster than demand. 
His reasoning here is that it will take time for a demand (i.e. population) to catch up to increases 
in production, and so there will be an initial decrease in the price of the commodity.74 In this 
response, Turgot points to a more specific mechanism to explain how prices would remain low 
(albeit, only as an initial phase of agricultural expansion). In line with other liberal claims, he 
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also states that the freedom of trade would help reduce prices by permitting the free transport of 
grain from areas that are abundant to those where grain is scarce.75 In general, moreover, free 
trade helps avoid the high prices that result from dearth and famine, because it encourages 
consumption (through exports) which leads to greater production: “The stimulus to production 
and capital formation given by the policy of free trade will increase the sum of produce in the 
nation and therefore the fund from which everyone can consume.”76  
To summarize thus far, Turgot offered several lines of defense against Terray’s claim that 
liberal reform only benefited the class of proprietors. Specifically, in regard to the effects on the 
laboring poor, Turgot claims three things. First, he demonstrates that because the wealth of the 
proprietors is the source of income for cultivators and consumers (i.e. wage laborers), an increase 
in their wealth is beneficial to the poor. The second and third arguments contend that free trade 
can stimulate higher wages for workers and also cause a decrease in the price of grain. Turgot 
rests his claims thus on the positive economic effects that reform would have on the welfare of 
the laboring poor.    
Turgot’s defense of liberal reform, however, did not rely on economic arguments alone. 
He also appealed to the value of justice. This appears in his final letter to Terray, where he offers 
political advice on how to handle the subsistence crisis. Turgot cautions Terray against blaming 
the dearth on “scheming,” as opposed to natural causes.77 In doing so, Turgot adhered to the 
liberal position that the dearth was the outcome of a bad harvest—a fact of nature that the 
government could not control. For this reason, he also advises against the government promising 
to provide for the provision of the poor:  
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The people are well aware of the fact that the Government cannot command the seasons, 
and they must understand that it has no right to violate the property of the husbandmen 
and the grain merchants. It is a sign of strength, even in the eyes of the people, when they 
can be told: What you ask of me is an injustice. Those who are not satisfied with this 
reasoning, will never be satisfied with any, and will always slander the government, no 
matter what measures it takes to please them; for it will not gratify them seeing that it is 
impossible for the government to procure cheap grain for the people when the harvests 
have failed, and that there is no possible means of obtaining it at a lower price than that 
which would result from complete freedom, that is, from the observance of rigorous 
justice.78 
 
It is evident from this passage that Turgot associates the economic model of free trade (in grain) 
with the laws of justice, primarily because it protected the property rights of the husbandmen and 
merchants. As another example of this view, Turgot states in his letter to Richard Price (1778):  
The right to control commerce is everywhere taken for granted; exclusive bodies, or the 
governors, are even authorized to prohibit the exportation of certain commodities in 
certain circumstances. So far are people yet from realizing that the law of complete 
freedom of all commerce is a corollary of the right of property—so deep are they still 
immersed in the fog of European illusions.79  
 
While no systematic treatment of justice is provided in the letters, it is evident from Turgot’s 
other writings and correspondences that, like Quesnay, he grounded his economic outlook in a 
theory of natural law.80 Specifically, the Physiocrats, including Turgot, understood the right of 
free commerce to be grounded in the natural right of property.81  
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Turgot also claimed that property rights pertain to the ownership of one’s own labor.82 
This view is voiced in his Six Edicts to the King (1776), where he calls for the suppression of the 
Parisian guilds. Turgot claims that the suppression is necessary in order to ensure “the full and 
complete enjoyment” of a laborer’s right to employ “their sole resources for subsistence,” (i.e. 
their labor).83 On his view, with its requirements of apprenticeship terms and other various 
exactions, the guilds hindered free labor markets and this fundamental right. Likening guilds to 
monopolies, he claims that they result in a “loss of wages and means of subsistence” for the 
laboring class by limiting the number of people employed in particular trades. In place of the 
view that “the right of labor is a royal right, one that the Prince could sell and that the subjects 
ought to purchase,” Turgot claims:  
God, by giving to men needs and making them dependent upon the resource of labor, has 
made the right of labor the property of all men, and that property is primary, the most 
sacred and most imprescriptible of all. We regard it as one of the first obligations of our 
justice, and as an act in every way worthy of our beneficence, to emancipate our subjects 
from all the restraints which have been laid upon that inalienable right of humanity.84  
 
Turgot suggests, then, that guild regulations hinder the natural right to alienate one’s labor. For, 
according to Turgot, enterprise only requires two classes: “entrepreneurs” who advance the 
means of production, and “simple laborers” who work for wages.”85 He says this relation is one, 
moreover, that “is based in the nature of things and does not depend on the arbitrary institution of 
corporations.”86 In addition to viewing guilds as institutions that inhibit the natural liberties of 
workers, Turgot also suggests that the institution of the guild enforced an arbitrary power over its 
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members and the community. He concludes thus that the suppression of the “arbitrary and 
injurious regime” of the guilds would increase people’s “independence.”87  
Turgot’s concern for the welfare of the poor is also revealed in his efforts as an intendant 
of Limoges during the subsistence crisis of 1770-71. The policies Turgot adopted to combat 
famine throughout the region suggest his amenability to state intervention as a means of 
accomplishing these aims. On these points, some scholars challenge the association of Turgot 
with the doctrine of laissez-faire. As Emma Rothschild claims, Turgot’s theoretical emphasis on 
economic equilibrium did not preclude him from being concerned with empirical cases of 
economic disequilibrium.   
As evidence of this, Rothschild examines the policies that Turgot implemented in 
response to the subsistence crisis in Limoges. Believing that unemployment worsened the 
subsistence crisis, Turgot’s central policy was the creation of state-financed charity offices and 
workshops that employed people in public works projects, including building new roads.88 On 
Turgot’s economic outlook, the state was permitted to intervene and assist people with finding 
employment, albeit while leaving the grain market untouched. Turgot viewed the policy, 
moreover, as an alternative to public charity, to which he was opposed.89   
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Rothschild mentions three other state-led efforts Turgot introduced to deal with the 
subsistence crisis in Limoges. The first related to the availability of grain. Turgot was concerned 
that merchants were not traveling to certain areas because of the high costs of transport. To fix 
this, he used loans and bounties to encourage imports into struggling areas.90 Secondly, Turgot 
also implemented a new system of taxation that decreased taxes for the poor and raised them for 
the rich. It was from this revenue, moreover, that the charity workshops were to be funded.91 It 
should be noted, that in general, taxation was not at odds with the Physiocratic outlook. To 
recall, the Physiocrats supported a single tax on the land-owning class, which was to be the basis 
for all state expenditure. Turgot’s amenability to taxation is also evident in his suggestion that 
public works be financed by the land-owning class, and not the unpaid (forced) labor of the 
Corvée.92 Lastly, Turgot also imposed restrictions on landowners, prohibiting them from 
dismissing tenant farmers in difficult periods and restricting rents paid in kind.93  
Rothschild concludes from these efforts that Turgot’s “commitment to free commerce in 
corn was consistent…with support for government intervention in other markets.”94 That for 
Turgot, as well as Condorcet and Smith, while “government intervention in commerce is always 
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disastrous than that which they dread to have established.” Turgot, “Six Projects of Edicts,” 268-
69. 
93 Rothschild, Economic Sentiments, 80. 
94 Ibid., 73. 
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to be regretted,” it remained “necessary to ensure minimal welfare for all citizens” and therefore 
was sometimes permitted.95 Rothschild also claims that Turgot’s efforts paid off:  
The effect of Turgot’s policies, by the end of 1770, was that the Limousin had been saved 
from widespread famine. The 1769 harvest had been the worst of the century in the 
region, and the 1770 harvest was again bad, at a time of European scarcity. But by early 
1771, the scarcity was only partial, despite continuing high prices. Mortality rates 
increased little in 1770 and 1771 (although more in 1772).96  
 
Assuming Rothschild’s commentary is accurate, Turgot’s efforts demonstrate how institutional 
support was required to support “free” markets in grain. While these regulations did not attempt 
to alter the price of grain or have the state become a supplier of grain, they did establish the 
importance of the state’s assistance in other areas for the functioning of a free market. It would 
require, however, a deeper investigation to determine the details of Turgot’s taxation 
recommendations. In comparison, an anti-Physiocratic thinker, Louis Graslin, proposed a 
progressive tax policy that would tax the lowest earners at 5 percent, and the highest earners at 
75 percent. 97 As will be discussed below, it seems unlikely that Turgot would be in favor of a 
taxation scheme that would radically reduce the consolidation of wealth of the proprietor class.  
Based on the discussion thus far, one might wonder whether or not Turgot should be 
classified as a laissez-faire thinker—a term commonly associated with Physiocratic thinkers. 
However, as discussed in the introduction, support for intervention is not inconsistent with 
support for a market economy. Perhaps a more important concern, then, in assessing Turgot’s 
economic model, is not the extent to which he was amenable to intervention, but rather whether 
or not he was attentive to new forms of inequality and domination generated by liberal reforms. 
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For, although Turgot associated free markets with welfare and freedom, critics claimed that 
liberal reform threatened these very same values. In order to get clear on these distinctive 
outlooks, a closer examination of the oppositional view is required.    
 
Turgot and the Critics of Reform 
The above reconstruction of Turgot’s defense of liberal reform elucidates how the values 
of welfare and freedom were central to his economic outlook. Rothschild’s interpretation of 
Turgot as a supporter of intervention also casts Turgot in a favorable light. From the 
contemporary perspective of a welfare state proponent, support for wealth redistribution and 
intervention is generally held in opposition to a more extreme free market outlook (i.e. a 
neoliberal or libertarian model). A problem with this interpretation, however, is that it overlooks 
some of the strongest criticisms voiced by opponents of reform throughout the period. These 
criticisms were not concerned about the right to employment or the redistributive efforts of the 
state. Alternatively, they addressed the power that accrued to the owners and suppliers of grain, 
as well as employers and landowners. This section addresses these concerns in light of Turgot’s 
economic outlook.  
 
Grain Owners and Merchants 
For many critics, a problem with liberalization was that the deregulation of the grain 
market empowered certain economic agents, mainly grain suppliers, to pursue profits at the 
expense of consumers and the poor. Kaplan’s historical account of the grain debate offers 
numerous examples of how this concern was expressed. His description of Terray’s reaction to 
reform and justification for issuing the arrêt in 1770 is particular illuminating. While Terray was 
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equally distrustful of the paternalist model—agreeing with liberals that too low a cost of grain 
would hinder agricultural development—he ultimately sided with the view that liberalization, by 
encouraging hoarding and monopoly, was at fault for high prices.98 Terray summarized the grain 
debate as follows: 
[One party] proposed to abolish all the laws and to leave everything to the free will of the 
proprietors of grain. Grain, they say, is their possession, they must be masters to sell it 
when, where, how and at the price they wish. The other demands the rigorous execution 
of the hindrances established by the old laws, because, they retort, grain cannot be 
compared to any other good or merchandise. Man needs bread every day. Thenceforth, 
the grain owner, if he holds it hoarded away, becomes too much the master of the price, 
he can and he is tempted to abuse it.99 
 
Kaplan notes that Terray, although viewing the problem as one of conflicting interests, 
ultimately sided with the consumers, “given their inherent disadvantages in the struggle with 
producers and owners.”100 Kaplan emphasizes, moreover, Terray’s concern that deregulation 
disproportionately favored dealers at the expense of the majority:  
The grain trade, in Terray’s estimation, inevitably generated abuses. It was fatuous to 
imagine that it could or would police itself. Given their control over subsistence, dealers 
exercised an extraordinary sort of authority over society, which had no means to call 
them to account. Left to themselves, Terray felt, they would press their advantage to 
disastrous extremes. Even as the liberals argued that police by its nature was incapable of 
moderation, so the Controller-General maintained that grain dealers, unless checked, 
ineluctably damaged the public interest. ‘Only surveillance can stop Monopoly,’ the 
gravest abuse, he contended. Grain could not be allowed to become ‘an object of 
speculation for the rich’—precisely the liberal goal, from Boisguilbert to Turgot. The 
problem with the reforms of 1763-64, in Terray’s view, was that they ‘opened up an 
excessively great cupidity, they stirred the desire to get rich on the traffic of a commodity 
of indispensable necessity,’ an enterprise which he regarded as morally wrong and 
politically untenable. Since it had lost ‘the spirit of purity’ the grain trade could not post 
its own guarantees of good conduct.101  
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Opponents of reform argued thus that without government oversight there was nothing to prevent 
dealers from misrepresenting the stock of grain and artificially raising its price (or, to take a 
different example, causing a price inflation through speculation in the market).102 In this case, 
price was determined not by supply and demand, but instead by the private interest of the sellers. 
This was particularly disconcerting because grain was an important source of subsistence for the 
poor, and any fluctuation in price could have potentially disastrous effects on their livelihood.  
In defending the property rights of the grain owners and merchants, Turgot sided with the 
liberal position.103 His assurance, moreover, that prices tend toward a state of equilibrium, failed 
to fully explain how, without government oversight, the private owners of grain would be 
prevented from committing these forms of abuse. While Turgot offers several explanations for 
why the price of grain will not rise, his arguments do not directly address the possibility of abuse 
by the owners and merchants. As Rothschild and Kaplan note, prices continued to rise 
throughout the period, suggesting his predictions were not on target. Kaplan’s historical account 
also dismisses the possibility that the collusion of grain owners was apocryphal. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, Smith, perhaps recognizing this oversight, went to greater lengths 
to assure his readers that dealers abstained from the practice of monopoly, viewing it to be 
against their economic interests. The important point here is that although Turgot was concerned 
about the freedom and welfare of the laboring poor, he did not take seriously the claims that 
these values were undermined by economic agents abusing their power as owners of an essential 
commodity. In short, he did not apply his criticisms against the “monopoly” power of the guilds 
to the monopolization of power in the economic realm.    
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103 Turgot, “Letters on the Grain Trade,” 245. 
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Equality in Property  
The concern that absolute property rights empowered producers and sellers of grain was 
representative of a broader concern about inequalities in property ownership throughout the 
period. As discussed in the introduction, this view was largely informed by a republican outlook 
that tied independence and freedom to the ownership of land. The Genevan Enlightenment 
thinker, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), articulates this outlook in his encyclopedia entry on 
“Economy” (1755) (later republished as Discourse on Political Economy). In line with the 
classical republican view, he argues that commerce acts as a corrupting force on civic virtue (a 
point I will return to in chapter four), and, in line with the Physiocratic outlook, claims that 
commerce, i.e. “the arts of pleasure,” and industry are wrongly favored over agriculture and 
“useful and demanding crafts.”104 In contrast to the Physiocrats, however, he notes that a duty of 
government is “to give some thought to their [the citizens] subsistence.”105 Adding that this 
should not be done by “fill[ing] the granaries of private individuals,” but instead “to maintain 
abundance so within their reach that to acquire it, labor is always necessary and never 
useless.”106  
Rousseau also hints at the idea of an agrarian reform as a possible solution to inequality. 
He writes that one of the most “difficult” functions of government is “protecting the poor against 
the tyranny of the rich.”107 He continues, that it is the “most important” priority of government 
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“to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes, not by appropriating treasures from their owners, but 
by denying everyone the means of acquiring them…not by building hospitals for the poor but by 
protecting citizens from becoming poor.”108 While Rousseau’s solution to economic inequality is 
not entirely developed, it is evident that he prefers a preemptive approach, perhaps through 
limitations on the accumulation of property, to an ex post redistribution of wealth.   
The proposal to equalize property is also found in another (French) Enlightenment 
philosopher, Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771). Helvétius, like Rousseau, also interacted 
with the Physiocrats and encyclopédistes, and was best known for his controversial text De 
l’Esprit (1758), which was publicly burned and condemned by the Parlement of Paris, the 
Sorbonne, and the Pope. The major claims associated with his philosophical outlook relate to his 
view that all human actions are motivated by the desire to maximize pleasure and reduce pain, 
and the utilitarian identification of the common good with the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number. In his correspondence with Condorcet, Turgot argues against Helvétius’ view that “self-
interest is the only principle that actuates men.”109 However, although Helvétius defended a 
moral theory that is commonly associated with other laissez-faire outlooks, he was otherwise 
critical of the so-called advances of commercial society.110    
Helvétius claims in De l’Esprit that nations “most celebrated for their luxury and police” 
(i.e. commercial societies) are those “countries where the majority of the inhabitants are more 
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unhappy than the savage nations.”111 Raising a point that, as will be seen, Smith contradicts, he 
adds, “It is a question, whether the condition of a savage be not preferable to that of a peasant?112 
Helvétius states that the unhappiness associated with wealthy nations is the outcome of an 
unequal distribution of wealth: “luxury, and the wealth it produces in a state, will render the 
subjects happier only in proportion as this wealth is equally divided.”113 Helvétius attributes this 
inequality to the following:    
The rich man will have purchased extensive lordships; and being able to take advantage 
of the necessities of his neighbors, he will, in a short time, have annexed an infinite 
number of small farms to his estate. A diminution of the number of proprietors increases 
the number of laborers. When these are multiplied, so that there are more laborers than 
work, it will be with the workmen as with all kinds of merchandize, which becomes of 
less value in proportion as it becomes more common. Besides, the rich man, whose 
luxury even exceeds his wealth, is under a necessity of lowering the price of labor, and 
giving the workman no more than is absolutely necessary for a bare subsistence. The 
latter is obliged, through necessity, to accept of it; but in case of sickness, or an increase 
of his family, for want of sufficiency of wholesome food, he dies, and incumbers the state 
with an indigent and destitute family.114   
  
The contrast with Turgot is quite clear. Unlike Turgot, Helvétius is skeptical about the ability of 
the price of labor to remain above a livable subsistence level. He attributes this to the 
consolidation of land, which devalues labor, since its supply exceeds its demand. He also 
attributes it to the interests of employers to lower the price of labor for their own profit. In 
contrast to Turgot, he offers reasons for why unequal land ownership creates a structural 
tendency for wages to remain at subsistence levels, leaving workers powerless to demand more. 
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Helvétius hints at an interesting solution to this dilemma. In a footnote where he argues 
against the claim that a decrease in taxes would increase the happiness of the workers, he writes 
the following:  
What then must be done to render his condition happy? Make a considerable addition to 
the price of a day’s labor. In order to [do] this, the proprietors must constantly reside on 
their estates: then, like their ancestors, they would reward the services of their domestic, 
by bestowing on them some acres of land. The number of proprietors would insensibly 
multiply; that of day-laborers decrease; and the latter, by becoming more scarce, would 
set a higher value upon their work.115 
 
On his view, an increase in wages is possible by equalizing the ownership of property. This is 
very different from Turgot’s view that market mechanisms will produce a fair, livable wage for 
the laboring poor. In De l’Homme, which was not published until after his death, he offers a 
similar solution:   
What can hinder a people from declaring themselves the heirs of the whole nation; and in 
that case, on the decease of a very rich individual, dividing among several a property that 
would be too considerable for a single person? Why may not a people, after the example 
of those of Lucca, so proportion the taxes to the wealth of each individual, that when his 
land exceeds a certain number of acres, the tax on the supernumerary acres may exceed 
the rent? In such a country, there can certainly be no very great acquisitions. A hundred 
laws of this kind might be invented. There are, therefore, a multitude of ways of 
preventing a too speedy accumulation of wealth in a small number of hands, and of 
checking the too rapid progress of luxury.116 
  
In recommending the breaking up of large land holdings, Helvétius’ outlook aligns with a 
republican approach. As discussed in the introduction, given the republican commitment to 
freedom as non-domination, classical republican thinkers often identified freedom with 
economic independence and property ownership. One scholar notes the possible influence of 
Helvétius on Thomas Paine, who, equally troubled by the injustice of unequal land distribution in 
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America, suggested that landowners be taxed in order to compensate those who did not possess 
property.117  
Turgot, however, does not appear to be committed to such a program. This is not to 
overlook aspects of his political outlook that were amenable to some republican views. Turgot, 
importantly, departed from the “legal despotism” associated with the Physiocratic outlook.118 In 
Vie de M. Turgot, for instance, Condorcet suggests that Turgot supported a republican 
constitution, defining it as a constitution where property owners possessed the right “to concur in 
the formation of laws, to regulate the constitution of the assemblies which digest and promulgate 
these laws, to give a sanction to them by their suffrage, and to alter by a regular deliberation the 
form of every public institution.”119 This outlook is evident in Turgot’s Mémoire to the king 
(1775), which, while never published, argued for the establishment of local and regional forms of 
assembly (i.e. assemblies within the municipalities, the cantons, and the provinces) to 
accomplish these republican aims.120 On Turgot’s account, the institutions would be responsible 
for making decisions related to the distribution of taxes, the creation of public works projects, 
and regulation of poverty relief. Turgot’s model was not fully democratic, however, as only 
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those who owned property, i.e. not wage earners, could participate in the assemblies, and larger 
landholders were allotted more votes.121  
Richard Whatmore suggests that Turgot’s interest in constitutional reform was the 
outcome of his failed attempts to reinstitute liberal reforms as Controller General in 1774.122 He 
claims that Turgot, attributing this failure to the disunion of the nation, proposed constitutional 
reforms in hopes of creating “a patriotic and egalitarian culture in France.”123 In addition to his 
proposal for new representative bodies, Turgot also proposed the creation of a Council of 
National Education. He describes the aims of the council as follows:  
It would be the duty of one of the Councils to get composed a series of classic books, 
according to a regular plan, so that one would lead on to another, and that the study of the 
duties of the citizen, member of a family and of the State, might be the foundation of all 
other studies, which would be graduated in the order of utility they have for the State…A 
new system of education which can only be established by the authority of your Majesty, 
seconded by a well-chosen council, would conduce to form in all the classes of society 
men virtuous and useful, just souls, pure hearts, zealous citizens.124 
   
Like Turgot’s recommendation for the assemblies, the reasoning behind his education proposal 
was to instill in subjects a greater sense of public duty and virtue.125 These commitments are in 
line with a republican outlook, which views a just order as one where subjects submit their 
private interests to the public good (i.e. Rousseau’s conception of the “general will”).126  
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Turgot’s support for greater inclusion and representation of landowners in government 
did not lead him, however, to adopt the republican outlook that set limitations on property 
ownership. This is likely due to Turgot’s (Physiocratic) economic outlook, which supported an 
agrarian capitalist organization of production.127 On this model, large land holdings were favored 
over small ones due to economies of scale. Quesnay, in his general Maxims, written as a follow-
up to the Tableau Economique, summarizes this Physiocratic outlook:  
That the land employed in the cultivation of corn should be brought together, as far as 
possible, into large farms worked by rich husbandmen; for in large agricultural 
enterprises there is less expenditure required for the upkeep and repair of building, and 
proportionately much less cost and much more net product, than in small ones. A 
multiplicity of small farmers is detrimental to the population.128   
 
That Turgot adopts this view is evident in his claim that tenant farming is the most advantageous 
form of farming: 
This method of putting out land to lease is the most advantageous of all to the proprietors 
and to the cultivators; it becomes established in all places where there are wealthy 
cultivators in a position to make the advances involved in cultivation; and as wealthy 
cultivators are in a position to provide the land with much more labor and manure, there 
results from it a huge increase in the product and the revenue of landed property. In 
Picardy, Normandy, the environs of Paris, and in the majority of the Provinces of the 
North of France, the land is cultivated by farmers. In the Provinces of the South they are 
cultivated by Metayers; therefore the Provinces and the North of France are incomparably 
more wealthy and better cultivated than those of the South.129  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Republicanism and the French Revolution, 64. The idea, moreover, of a constitutional monarchy 
was not uncommon in the eighteenth century and was not, by some thinkers, considered to be in 
conflict with a republican outlook.  
127 For the ways the Turgot departs from Quesnay’s economic outlook see McNally, Political 
Economy, 134-36. These differences do not affect my general discussion. McNally agrees that 
both Turgot and Quesnay urged for the adoption of an agrarian capitalist method of production in 
France.  
128 Quesnay, “The ‘General’ Maxims,” in The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and 
Translations, ed. Ronald L. Meek (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), 
235. 
129 Turgot, “Reflections,” 133-34. 
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Turgot does not appear to suggest the benefits of a “multiplicity of small farmers.” Elsewhere he 
also assumes that wage laborers make up most of the population, referring to “agricultural wage 
earners” as those who “make up the greatest part of the population” and also as “poor wage-
earners who carry out the most laborious and most useful work.”130 It is evident, then, that 
Turgot’s economic model supports an agrarian capitalist model, where land is rented out to 
wealthy farmers who then employ wage earners to cultivate the land. Smith, as will be discussed 
in a later chapter, also defended this outlook. In sum, to recall the discussion in the introduction 
of the dissertation, Turgot did not favor an ownership society that was radically egalitarian. 
Alternatively, the political and economic arrangement that he assumes favors large landowners 
(and grants them greater political power) and a system of wage labor.  
 
Wage Labor 
 The republican claim about equality in property was also tied to the identification of 
wage labor with servitude and domination. Helvétius approaches this view in his seemingly 
prescriptive claim that a redistribution of land would cause the number of laborers to decrease 
and therefore the price of labor to rise.131 Rousseau also expresses this view when he claims, in 
On the Social Contract (1762), that, in an ideal polity, no one ought to be “so rich as to be 
capable of buying another citizen,” nor anyone “so poor that he is forced to sell himself.”132 
Equality in property thus was advocated as the means to the end of economic independence and 
self-sufficiency.    
                                                
130 Turgot, “Observations on the Paper by Graslin,” in The Turgot Collection: Writings, 
Speeches, and Letters of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, ed. David Gordon (Auburn, Alabama: 
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2011), 160. 
131 Helvétius, De L’Esprit, 117.  
132 Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, 170. 
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Turgot’s discussion of wage labor is certainly favorable to the view that the price of labor 
should not be too low. As discussed above, Turgot admits that employers are pressured into 
keeping wages at a subsistence level. He claims, however, that wages tend to, and ought to, 
remain above this minimal level and even rise well above it. Turgot’s assurances that wages will 
remain above a subsistence wage still present some problems. Part of Turgot’s argument that 
wages will rise rests on the assumption of a tight labor market, which, on his account, would 
occur during a period of economic expansion (a point Smith also notes) and therefore would be 
limited to a temporary phenomenon.133    
Turgot also acknowledges the possibility for disequilibrium between wages and prices. 
To recall, he comments that equilibrium “can be disturbed for shorter or longer intervals in such 
a way that a great number of men experience all the excess of misery, and that societies are in a 
state either of crisis and convulsion or weariness and decline.”134 Turgot’s recognition of this 
tension, however, does not lead him to propose intervention as a solution. In fact elsewhere in a 
passage that reiterates his claims about economic equilibrium, Turgot explicitly seems to suggest 
the contrary. Here he claims: “employers must be completely free to use such men as they deem 
proper, in order that the local workers may not, by taking advantage of their small number, force 
them to increase wages above the natural proportion.”135 Alternatively, he reiterates (in both 
                                                
133 Turgot, as discussed earlier, also states another situation where low wages would cause 
workers to leave an area (seeking employment elsewhere) and therefore increase the price of 
labor. This assumption seems equally problematic—one reason being because it may be difficult 
for workers to leave their area of residency.  
134 Turgot, “Letters on the Grain Trade,” 239. Full passage is on pgs. 19-20 above. 
135 The full passage reads as follows: “The single practical conclusion that can be drawn from 
this, is that wage laborers must be completely free to work for whom they desire, in order that the 
employers, by contending for them when they need them, may place a just price on their labor; 
and that, on the other hand, the employers must be completely free to use such men as they deem 
proper, in order that the local workers may not, by taking advantage of their small number, force 
them to increase wages above the natural proportion which depends on the stock of wealth, the 
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texts) his belief that a system of free trade is more conducive for achieving fair wages and prices. 
Turgot’s support for job creation programs is distinct, then, from advocating for intervention in 
the form of an agrarian reform, which would decrease the supply of wage laborers (and therefore 
increase its price). Thus, like his outlook on grain, Turgot’s views align with an approach that 
supports the full commodification of goods and labor, where goods and labor are largely subject 
to the organizing mechanisms of the market and not social institutions.  
Additionally, while frequently arguing against government or guild restrictions that 
workers face when employing their labor, Turgot does not seem troubled, as other republicans 
are, by the relationship of economic dependency that exists between wage earners and their 
employers.136 This is evident in his letter to Madame de Graffigny, a fiction writer, where, after 
asserting that people are not born equal in regards to their conditions (i.e. abilities), Turgt states 
the following:  
One cannot labor at the soil without having utensils and the means of sustenance until the 
harvest. Those who have not had the intelligence or the opportunity to acquire these 
means have not the right to deprive of them him who has earned and won them by his 
work. If the idle and the ignorant robbed the laborious and the skillful, all work would be 
discouraged, misery would become general. It is more just and more useful for all that 
those who are deficient in mind or in good fortune should lend their strength to others 
who can employ them, who can, in advance, give them wages, and thus guarantee them a 
share of the future products. Their subsistence then is assured, but so is their dependence. 
It is not unjust that he who has invented a productive work, and who has supplied to his 
co-operators the sustenance and the instruments necessary to execute it, who has made 
with them, in that, only a free contract, should reserve for himself the better part, and, for 
                                                                                                                                                       
value of subsistence goods, the amount of work available and the number of workers, but which 
can never be settled by anything other than competition and freedom.” Turgot, “Observations on 
the Paper by Graslin,” 153-54. It should be noted that Turgot is therefore claiming that free 
competition would benefit both workers and employers, insofar as it would prevent a monopoly 
from forming that would increase or decrease wages at one or the other’s expense.  
136 Nor does Turgot find troubling the fact a proprietor who “took no part in the work himself” is 
entitled to the “part of the product which the land yields over and above the recompense due to 
the cultivators,” i.e. the net product (or profit). He attributes this to the “human conventions and 
the civil laws which guaranteed to the original cultivators and their heirs the ownership of the 
land which they had occupied, even after they ceased to cultivate it.” Turgot, “Reflections,” 128. 
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the price of his advances, should have less hard work and more leisure. This leisure 
enables him to reflect more, and still further to increase his mental resources. What he 
can save from the portion, equitably greater, which he will have of the products, increases 
his capital and his power to undertake new enterprises. Thus inequality will arise, and 
will increase, even among the most capable and most moral peoples.... It is not an evil, it 
is a blessing for mankind.137  
 
Turgot’s comments here suggest that the unequal relationship between workers and employers is 
a relationship based in nature. He states that the former is subject to the latter and dependent on 
them, because the worker is naturally less intelligent or skillful than the employer. He claims, 
moreover, that those with better talents are more deserving of leisure than those less fortunate. 
These comments seem difficult to square with an interpretation of Turgot as an egalitarian 
thinker.   
On this outlook, then, Turgot departs from the agrarian republican view. While both 
Turgot and agrarian republicans identify wage labor with dependency, the latter seek to 
redistribute property as a means of increasing opportunities for self-employment. That is, 
agrarian republicans support the decommodification of labor. This approach is not possible for 
Turgot, given his understanding of economies of scale and identification of wage labor with 
productivity. Alternatively, it is possible that Turgot understood wage laborers to be free, insofar 
as they “voluntarily” enter into relations with their employers through the employment contract. 
To recall, Turgot claims that “the right of labor” is a “property of all men.”138 In this way, if 
Turgot falls within the tradition of republicanism, his outlook aligns with laissez-faire 
republicanism (to be discussed in the concluding chapter) and not the anti-wage labor outlook of 
agrarian republicanism.  
                                                
137 Turgot, “On Some Social Questions, Including the Education of the Young,” in The Turgot 
Collection: Writings, Speeches, and Letters of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, ed. David Gordon 
(Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2011), 420-21. 




  As the preceding sections demonstrate, Turgot’s defense of liberalization was informed 
by normative arguments that addressed the beneficial effects of liberal reform for all members of 
society. In particular, Turgot sought to show how an expansion of the grain market and the 
removal of impediments to employment would improve the economic welfare and independence 
of the laboring class. Turgot’s support for government intervention, demonstrated in his efforts 
to combat the subsistence crisis in Limoges, also evince his commitment to these aims.    
While some scholars may conclude from these facts that Turgot’s economic outlook was 
more egalitarian than most contemporary free market outlooks, a comparison between Turgot 
and the critics of liberal reform puts such an interpretation into question. From the perspective of 
the opponents of reform, liberalization eliminated forms of public oversight and control over 
local economies. In doing so, it gave the owners and sellers of grain significant power over 
consumers in terms of dictating the price of grain and its availability to particular markets. The 
consolidation of land for the creation of large capitalist farms, moreover, forced small peasants 
into dependency on landowners and wage labor for accessing their means of subsistence. From 
the perspective of the critics, the proprietarian ideology of the liberal reformers encouraged new 
forms of economic harms and inequalities. This was only worsened by the proposal to increase 
the voting power of the landowning class.    
These criticisms of economic liberalization should not be dismissed as antiquated. To do 
so would overlook contemporary struggles that assert the right to governance over local food 
systems, i.e. the idea of “food sovereignty.” From this perspective, the increasing control of large 
multinational corporations over the production, sale, and trade of agricultural goods is viewed as 
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detrimental to local economies and small agrarian communities. While critics of free markets in 
the eighteenth century may not have explicitly addressed the ecological aspect of these 
contemporary movements, they did place an importance on local community control over food 
systems. For these reasons, it is with the critics of reform that a closer analogy can be drawn to 
the idea of economic democracy discussed in the introduction. To continue to explore these 
themes, the next chapter turns to a key figure in the revisionist accounts of eighteenth century 
economic thought, Adam Smith. The economic framework of the Physiocrats will be useful in 
interpreting Smith’s outlook, insofar as many of these same ideas were also taken up by Smith in 
his critique of feudal and mercantile economic policies.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Smith’s System of Natural Liberty  
  
 
The Physiocrats’ attempt to introduce liberal reform in France was influenced by the so-called 
success of the new agrarian model that emerged in England. While both England and France 
experienced political and economic turmoil in the feudal period, tensions between peasants and 
landlords unfolded in different trajectories in each country. In England, the peasantry was able to 
establish a greater political claim to land, which, as will be elaborated on in the next chapter, 
allowed them to expand agricultural production to a degree that French peasants, with less 
political rights under absolutism, failed to achieve. This did not prevent the Physiocrats from 
developing an economic model that they believed, if instituted, would allow France to achieve 
the same course of economic development as England. The economic contributions of the 
Physiocrats, in turn, were important in the intellectual development of a (now) better-known 
figure associated with the free market economy—Adam Smith. This chapter examines Smith’s 
attempt to analyze and defend the economic principles and mechanisms associated with the new 
model of agrarian capitalism in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776). Smith, of course, did not explicitly refer to this model as a “capitalist” economy, but 
rather, as a system of “natural” or “perfect” liberty. Liberty here refers to the liberalization of 
markets and the grounding of the economy in natural law. Similar to the “proprietarian” outlook 
found in Turgot, Smith, as it will be argued, also claimed that liberalization was an extension of 
the natural rights that subjects possess in their property.  
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Smith was born in Kirkaldy, Scotland in 1723.1 Upon unifying with England in 1707, 
Scotland experienced a period of agricultural and industrial expansion throughout the eighteenth 
century. These developments informed the intellectual debates and concerns that unified Scottish 
Enlightenment thought. In addition to Smith, other representative figures of this tradition include 
Francis Hutcheson (Smith’s teacher), Lord Kames, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson. The 
ongoing debate concerning Scotland’s union with England, led many of these thinkers to theorize 
about the economic and ethical effects of commercial development.2 Often these discussions 
were informed by a conception of historical progress that followed a linear transgression from 
savage or rude societies, to civilized or commercial ones. As was the case with the Physiocrats, 
agriculture was also an important topic of interest for the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. 
Through their participation in intellectual circles and clubs, like the “Select Society,” Smith and 
others often met with wealthy landowners, “agricultural improvers,” and farmers to discuss 
economic and political matters.3      
As recent scholarship has emphasized, however, Smith’s contribution to this debate was 
not strictly economic. Scholars have recently contested the longstanding view that Smith’s 
economic thought stood in contradiction to the rest of his philosophical work (i.e. the “Das 
Adam Smith Problem”). The late discovery of Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, recorded by 
students in 1762-63, and growing research on Smith has led scholars to suggest that his 
                                                
1 Smith’s father, who died before his birth, worked as a comptroller of Customs in Kirkaldy, an 
area of work that Smith would also enter later in life as a commissioner of customs in 1778. Prior 
to this, Smith was a lecturer at the University of Edinburgh (beginning in 1748) and Glasgow 
University (beginning in 1750). At Glasgow University he eventually took over as the head of 
Moral Philosophy, until resigning in 1764 to work as a personal tutor. 
2 As McNally notes, unification with England continued to be debated during the mid-eighteenth 
century, in particular during the period of Hume’s economic writings. Andrew Fletcher was a 
nationalist opposed to unification, whereas Smith and Hume were in favor of it. McNally, 
Political Economy, 158. 
3 Ibid., 175-76. 
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economic outlook was intended to form part of a larger philosophical system that included his 
moral and political thought.4 From this perspective, Smith’s economic outlook cannot be severed 
from his moral and jurisprudential thought. Some scholars, as will be considered in the 
concluding chapter, even suggest that Smith’s economic approach was an “embedded” one, 
insofar as he believed that markets required the oversight of social and moral institutions to 
prevent corruption and economic inequality.  
In line with this scholarship, this chapter reconstructs Smith’s economic and political-
ethical defense of the market economy. In particular, it reconstructs Smith’s criticisms of 
regulatory policies, including wage regulations, the guild system, a policy of provision in grain, 
and mercantile restrictions in foreign trade. While Smith criticizes these practices on economic 
grounds, claiming that they hinder economic growth, he also claims that they violate norms of 
justice and individual liberty. Liberty, moreover, is defined in two ways in the Wealth of Nations. 
On the first definition, Smith draws from the tradition of natural law to defend economic liberties 
as natural rights. These liberties include the ability to take up employment in the location of 
one’s choosing, the freedom to seek employment in a particular trade, the ability to freely 
employ or hire laborers, and the freedom to invest capital into an industry of one’s choosing. On 
the second definition, Smith employs a republican conception of freedom to claim that market 
economies emancipate people from relations of economic dependency. Smith’s focus here is 
how markets undo interpersonal relations of domination within the economic sphere.  
This chapter provides thus an overview of the various ways that Smith employs the 
values of freedom and economic welfare to defend liberal reforms against feudal and mercantile 
practices. The following chapter will compare Smith to other eighteenth century economic 
                                                
4 Lisa Herzog, Inventing the Market: Smith, Hegel, & Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 20-24 
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outlooks to address the extent that he was successful in defending these claims. For, as I will 
suggest in the concluding chapter, while many contemporary scholars claim that egalitarian 
values informed Smith’s economic outlook, they overlook how critics of the market opposed 
liberal reform on the basis of these very same values.    
 
Labor, Poverty, and Grain 
             In the Wealth of Nations, Smith’s proposal for an economic model of natural liberty 
constituted a critical response to the regulatory policies that had been in place in England from 
(roughly) the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was also in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries that the first “free trade” debates originated. Early calls for free trade did not 
immediately address concerns related to the importation of foreign goods, as they would by the 
late eighteenth century.5 Instead, they criticized the existence of royal patents and monopolies on 
the grounds that such privileges hindered citizens from participating in local and foreign trade. 
As a result, in 1604 a bill for free trade was proposed to the House of Commons, but not passed, 
in response to growing animosities against the privileges of chartered companies.6 In the period 
leading up to the English Civil War, the Levellers also actively promoted free trade. As one 
example of this, in a debate arising over the exclusive privileges of the Levant Company in 1652, 
the Leveller, William Walwyn, himself a member of the Merchant Adventurers guild, put forth 
                                                
5 Raymond De Roover, “Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: A Revision,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 65, no. 4 (Nov 1951): 511-512. 
6 While the House of Lords rejected the bill (even though it was passed initially in the House of 
Commons), the rights of exclusive companies continued to come under attack throughout the 
seventeenth century. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James 
I. to the Outbreak of the Civil War 1603-1642 (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1883), 
188.  
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an argument in defense of free trade to the Committee for Trade and Foreign Affairs.7 From the 
Levellers’ perspective, monopolistic practices were abuses of royal power and prevented citizens 
from becoming economically independent while also raising the costs of goods for the general 
public.  
As will be discussed, the identification of monopoly as an abuse of power was what 
fueled Smith’s ethical and economic complaints against the mercantile regime in Europe. De 
Roover locates the intellectual origins of these views in the writings of the scholastic Doctors. 
The scholastics viewed commerce as a practice that was subject to the constraints of 
commutative justice and the “the principle of absolute equality.”8 From this perspective, the 
scholastics developed a theory of “just price,” which De Roover defines as the price determined 
by “the free valuation of buyers and sellers.”9 The scholastics condemned monopolies on the 
grounds that they sold goods above their just price and violated the principle of equality 
embodied by commutative justice. Smith’s critique of monopoly, as will be discussed shortly, 
adopts a similar line of reasoning. While not using the language of just price, Smith accuses 
monopolies of creating artificial scarcities and selling goods above their “natural” price.10 Smith 
accused various practices of this injustice and supported free competition on the basis that it was 
the only means to ensure a fair equality of opportunity in trade and industry. This section 
provides some historical background on the specific policies that Smith objected to on both 
economic and normative grounds.    
                                                
7 William Walwyn “For a Free Trade,” in The Writings of William Walwyn, eds. Jack R. 
McMichael and Barbara Taft, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 447-52. 
8 De Roover, “Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith,” 496. 
9 Ibid. 
10 De Roover suggests that while it was unlikely that Smith had read the scholastics directly, he 
was indirectly exposed to their views through his reading of the Natural Law theorists, Grotius 
and Pufendorf. Ibid., 521-23. 
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The earlier acts of economic reform that Smith addresses his criticisms to include the 
Statute of Artificers (1563), the English Poor Laws, and the Act of Edward VI (1551/1552). The 
Statute of Artificers regulated various aspects of industry and employment policies, with the two 
most important of its clauses relating to the regulation of wages and terms of apprenticeship in 
various trades. The Poor Laws were a series of laws related to unemployment and poverty, and 
the Act of Edward VI pertained to regulations in the provision of corn (i.e. grain), specifically 
the prohibition on forestalling, regrating, and engrossing. On this latter point, much of Smith’s 
discussion follows the Physiocratic proposal for liberalizing the grain trade. I will consider each 
of these policies in turn, before then discussing Smith’s objection to them.   
 The Statute of Artificers was an extension of two late medieval English labor laws: The 
Ordinance of Labourers (1349) and The Statute of Labourers (1351). In response to the 
population crisis following the Black Death, both statutes instituted regulatory measures on 
labor, including a placement of ceilings on wages. Later reforms, the acts of 1514 and 1515 
under Henry VII, reinstated the regulation of wages, but under new rates that were increasingly 
protested due to inflation in the mid-century.11 Anxieties over employment and unviable wage 
ceilings eventually led to the institution of the Statute of Artificers.12 The 1563 statute did not fix 
wage rates, but left the amount to be determined by local officials, ordering a yearly adjustment 
of wages in relation to the “plenty or scarcity” of food (§11).13    
 Although by the eighteenth century wage regulations had fallen out of practice, exceptions 
were made in specific industries. Smith focuses in particular on a statute issued by George III in 
                                                
11 Donald Woodward, “The Background to the Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour 
Policy, 1558-63,” Economic History Review 33, no. 1 (1980): 33. 
12 Ibid., 35.  
13 R.H. Tawney and Eileen Power, eds. Tudor Economic Documents V.1-II (London: Longmans, 
1924), (I) 342-44. 
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the aftermath of a London tailors’ strike in 1720 (7 Geo. I, stat. 1, c. 13).14 The statute prohibited 
master tailors from raising wages or reducing the hours of work for laborers. It also set the terms 
of punishment against violators of the act, including a two-month prison sentence for employers 
and striking workers.15 The act was the first in a series of “combination” acts in the eighteenth 
century that aimed (often through the regulation of wages) to prevent “conspiring” workers from 
demanding higher pay (the most notable being the Combination Act of 1800). The combination 
acts were repealed in 1824/1825, through the lobbying of Francis Place, a laissez-faire proponent 
who also advocated for the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.  
  In addition to addressing wage rates, the Statute of Artificers also established 
requirements for entry into trades, including the requirement of a seven-year apprenticeship term 
(§19).16 In many respects, the statute nationalized existing guild practices that historically 
mandated labor regulations and entry into the trades. Apprenticeships typically entailed the 
training of laborers in a trade or craft, but also training in other skills, including “religious 
doctrine, personal morality, literacy, numeracy and account-keeping, needlework, knitting, 
sewing, ‘housewifery,’” and other forms of “household management capabilities.”17 Apprentices 
also often took up residence with the master and were given food and goods in exchange for their 
help.18 Despite resistance to the removal of the statute in 1813, over 300,000 signatures were 
raised to maintain the clause, the 1563 statute was repealed in 1814.19  
                                                
14 John V. Orth, “English Combination Acts of the Eighteenth Century,” Law and History 
Review 5, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 181-82. 
15 Ibid., 182.  
16 Tawney and Power, Tudor Economic Documents, (I) 345. 
17 K.D.M. Snell, “The Apprenticeship System in British History: The Fragmentation of a 
Cultural Institution,” History of Education 25, no. 4 (December 1996): 304-305. 
18 David McNally, Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist 
Critique (London: Verso, 1993), 36. 
19 Ibid., 36-37.  
 74 
 The English Poor Laws instituted national policies that addressed employment and 
poverty. Early acts addressing poverty in the Tudor period focused mainly on the punishment of 
vagrancy.20 For example, an act in 1531, Concerning Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds, 
calls for “vagabonds to be whipped” and “returned to place of birth or dwelling for three years,” 
(although it also allows the “impotent” to beg if they have the proper license).21 Several other 
laws were passed with less effectiveness until the enactment of the Vagrancy Act of 1598, which 
simplified existing procedures of punishment for vagrancy, and the Act for the Relief of the Poor 
of 1598 (updated in 1601).22 The Poor Relief law of 1598 strengthened the enforcement of 
existing poor law policies by making parishes directly responsible for carrying out relief.23 Parish 
responsibilities under the acts included setting the poor and children to work, providing relief for 
those who were not able to work, and enrolling children of the poor as apprentices. The parish 
was also responsible for taxing its members to generate funds for relief. Aside from these tasks 
the parish often supplied relief in other forms. This included providing medical services, food, 
clothing, rent, and even money to cover funeral expenses or subsidize wages.24  
 An addition made to the Poor Laws after restoration was the Settlement Act of 1662 (Act 
for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom). Because the place of one’s “settlement” 
conferred parish support, there was a growing concern about the ability of newcomers to 
establish settlement and obtain relief from local parishes. The act was intended thus to define the 
terms of settlement and tighten qualifications for relief. The act permitted a newcomer to attain 
                                                
20 Paul Slack, The English Poor Law, 1531-1782 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 9. 
21 Ibid., 51. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Dorothy Marshall, The English Poor in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Social and 
Administrative History from 1662 to 1782 (London: Routledge, 1926), 2-3. 
 75 
settlement through either renting a home at a price above £10 a year, paying parish rates, taking 
up an apprenticeship (or working for a year as a servant), owning property, or serving a parish 
office.25 While the act was sometimes accused of restricting labor mobility, as will be argued by 
Smith, contemporary historians debate its actual effectiveness. It hindered mostly women or men 
with families, not individual laborers, and its main effect was to deter people from claiming 
relief out of fear of being returned to their original parish (not thus, to prevent them from 
migrating).26 According to some historians, the effects of the settlement laws were positive. As 
one author summarizes, “[it] acted as a useful cushion, allowing parishes to control mobility but 
not preventing it, giving the poor local attachments but allowing them some opportunity to 
establish themselves elsewhere.”27 
 Of equal importance in dealing with the issue of poverty during the Tudor and early 
Stuart period was the regulation of grain. Much like the customary practice of provision in 
France, between 1580 and 1630 local authorities and justices of peace in England strictly 
regulated the sale of grain at local markets. Their responsibilities were codified in the 
Elizabethan Book of Orders, which provided guidelines for action in times of scarcity.28 When 
prices were high, local authorities were ordered to inspect the farmer’s stock of grain and adjust 
the price accordingly. They were also empowered to carry out existing laws on forestalling, 
regrating, and engrossing, which were prohibited by an earlier act (The Act of Edward VI 
1551/1552). E.P. Thompson offers a detailed account of the common market practices during 
this period:    
                                                
25 The act was amended in 1686, 1692, 1697. Slack, The English Poor Laws, 28-29.  
26 Ibid., 29-30. 
27 Ibid., 30. 
28 This document was revised in the Caroline Book of Orders under Charles I in 1630. Ibid., 14-
15. 
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In this model, marketing should be, so far as possible, direct, from the farmer to the 
consumer. The farmers should bring their corn in bulk to the local pitching market; they 
should not sell it while standing in the field, nor should they withhold it in the hope of 
rising prices. The markets should be controlled; no sales should be made before stated 
times, when a bell would ring; the poor should have the opportunity to buy grain, flour, 
or meal first, in small parcels, with duly-supervised weights and measures. At a certain 
hour, when their needs were satisfied, a second bell would ring, and larger dealers (duly 
licensed) might make their purchases. Dealers were hedged around with many 
restrictions, inscribed upon the musty parchments of the laws against forestalling, 
regrating and engrossing, codified in the reign of Edward VI. They must not buy (and 
farmers must not sell) by sample. They must not buy standing crops, nor might they 
purchase to sell again (within three months) in the same market at a profit, or in 
neighbouring markets, and so on. Indeed, for most of the eighteenth century the 
middleman remained legally suspect, and his operations were, in theory, severely 
restricted.29  
 
By the mid seventeenth century, these practices soon fell out of favor. Farmers increasingly sold 
their grain in sample to merchants therefore cutting out direct sales at the market, and by 1772 
the prohibition on forestalling was entirely lifted.   
 Thompson notes that, despite these changes, the Tudor era policies informed popular 
uprisings and food riots throughout the eighteenth century. In moments of scarcity, the poor took 
up various forms of direct action, including blockades, the ransacking of goods in transport, and 
more commonly, crowds seizing and “setting of the price” of grain at local markets. Thompson 
characterizes these forms of dissent as informed by a “moral economy of the poor” that 
reasserted the rights and privileges protected under the paternal regime in the Tudor period.30 
Governments also resorted to the old customs. In 1795, chief justice Lord Kenyon upheld the 
prohibition on forestalling, using common law as his grounding, despite the 1772 statute.31 
Thompson summarizes, “In years of good harvests and moderate prices, the authorities lapsed 
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& Present, no. 50 (February 1971): 83. 
30 Ibid., 79. 
31 Ibid., 88. 
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into forgetfulness. But if prices rose and the poor become turbulent, it was revived, at least for 
symbolic effect.”32   
 In sum, while the policies of the Tudor and early Stuart periods are often characterized as 
“paternalistic,” owing to the significant oversight of the government in domestic industry and 
trade, commentators sometimes point to the positive effects of these policies, which acted as a 
form of “social welfare” for the laboring poor.33 As one historian comments, “The most 
characteristic feature of the economic policy of the Stuarts and the Tudors was the continual 
endeavor to aid the classes of society which suffered from the new capitalist development.”34    
 The author refers to a new class of landless poor that was an outgrowth of a series of land 
enclosures beginning in the second half of the fifteenth century.35 During this period, the efforts 
to consolidate land and create profitable, large-scale farms drastically altered existing property 
ownership. As David McNally notes, “By the end of the seventeenth century, English landlords 
controlled as much as 70-75 per cent of cultivable land, thus leaving owner-occupiers with some 
25-30 per cent of cultivable land.”36 The change of property ownership negatively affected the 
laboring poor. Speaking to the harms of the enclosures, Polanyi referred to the enclosures as “a 
revolution of the rich against the poor” that “disrupted” society: “wasting its towns, decimating 
its population, turning its overburdened soil into dust, harassing its people and turning them from 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism V.1, ed. E.F. Söderlund, trans. Mendel Sharpiro (London: 
George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1962), 257-58.  
34 Heckscher, Mercantilism, 257.  
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36 Ibid., 11.  
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decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves.”37 The violence of the enclosures attests 
to the importance of land accessibility for peasants and wage earners throughout the period. 
When wage earners, or the poor, still had access to land, either in the form of communal land 
(i.e. the commons) or their own farms, they could easily supplement their income with the goods 
they produced off their land. Under the new system, however, the poor were left with little of 
their own to fall back on in times of scarcity or unemployment.   
 It was, moreover, precisely because access to the land secured “independence” to the 
laboring poor, that it was viewed as a threat by advocates of enclosure to the rise of 
industrialization and the growing demand for labor.38 The dire situation that this caused the 
laboring poor continued well beyond the Tudor period. As McNally discusses, “by the late 
eighteenth century, between one quarter and one half of village populations relied upon poor 
relief,” noting that  “it is especially significant that we find a strong correlation between the 
extent of enclosure and per capita poor relief.”39 Smith’s response to the enclosures will be 
considered in more detail in the next chapter. What follows is a reconstruction of his response to 
the feudal and customary practices described thus far.  
  
Smith’s Response: Labor, Poverty, and Grain 
Smith introduces his criticism of the Statute of Artificers in his discussion concerning the 
privileges of corporations (i.e. guilds). These privileges included the ability of corporations to 
limit the length of the term and number of apprenticeships available in particular trades. He 
locates the primary effect of these privileges as the restraint of competition in certain 
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employments.40 The statute’s effect, in setting a mandatory apprenticeship term to seven years, 
was the same according to Smith. In short, the statute nationalized the longstanding policies of 
the guilds.    
Smith voices several practical complaints against the statute. He states, for instance, that 
because it pertains only to trades established before 1563, when the act was established, certain 
oddities exist such that a wheel-wright could make coaches, since coach making was not subject 
to the statute, but a coach maker could not make wheels (they must instead purchase them from a 
master wheel-wright).41 Smith also contends that apprenticeships do not protect the quality of 
work being produced—as it was commonly claimed in defense of the institution—nor do they 
encourage industriousness in workers.42 He claims, “In the inferior employments, the sweets of 
labour consist altogether in the recompence of labour. They who are soonest in a condition to 
enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest…to acquire the early habit of industry.”43 Because, he 
continues, apprentices receive no reward for their labor, they develop “an aversion to labour,” 
and “generally turn out very idle and worthless.”44 Smith also considers the duration of the 
apprenticeship as unnecessary, given that “in the common trades” most could develop “the 
dexterity of hand” in a shorter duration of time and “without much practice and experience.”45 
Smith criticizes the statute equally in regard to its economic effects. In general, Smith 
views the statute and the practices of corporations as being beneficial to artificers and traders, but 
not to the broader public. This is because, in restricting the number of people employed in a 
particular industry, the regulations “under-stock” the market with laborers (and the goods and 
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41 Ibid., 167. 
42 Ibid., 168-69. 
43 Ibid., 169. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 170. 
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services they provide).46 While the under-stocking of goods and services produces high profits 
and wages for tradesmen, who can charge a higher price on account of the scarcity of 
goods/services, it comes at the expense of consumers purchasing those commodities. Thus, 
Smith contends, if employment was opened up to free competition the “profits of the masters as 
well as the wages of the workmen” would be reduced, but “the public would be a gainer, the 
work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market.”47   
Smith’s critique of the statute is consistent with his criticism of monopolies in general. 
Monopolies occur when manufacturers or merchants conspire to raise the price of a particular 
good (or create an artificial scarcity) in order to increase their profits.48, Smith thinks such 
practices would not be possible under a system of free competition. On his account, high profits 
in a free market will always attract new capital and labor. Overtime, it will also cause profits and 
market prices to decrease due to the increase in supply of the good and the efforts of producers to 
undersell their competition.49 The view that the statute and guild privileges create monopolies in 
various trades is also reflected in Smith’s discussion of the corporation’s ability to “combine” 
and “conspire” “against the public” in order “to raise prices.”50    
 Aside from burdening the public with high market prices, Smith also views the statute as 
harmful because it prevents people from having control over their labor. Smith writes:  
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all 
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies 
in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength 
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is a plain 
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty 
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49 Ibid., 82.  
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both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders 
the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing 
whom they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted 
to the discretion of the employers whose interest it so much concerns. The affected 
anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ an improper person, is evidently as 
impertinent as it is oppressive.51   
 
In order to criticize the statute on non-economic grounds and in particular its apprenticeship 
clause, Smith invokes an argument similar to the one put forward in the seventeenth century by 
Locke. On this outlook, labor is viewed as a type of property that individuals have exclusive 
entitlement rights to and can therefore alienate (i.e. sell) to whomever they see fit.52 As Locke 
states in The Second Treatise, “every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any 
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his.”53 For Smith, then, the problem with the statute, as well as the privileges of the corporations, 
is that both obstruct and regulate the free employment of labor. Without the proper 
apprenticeship qualification or permission from a corporation a skilled worker may not be able to 
move from one employment to another or take up the same employment in a different area. Such 
policies block, in other words, what Smith believes to be protected by natural law, which is the 
freedom to employ one’s labor or hire someone’s labor in accordance with one’s own individual 
judgment.  
Smith condemns the settlement laws for violating individual rights in the same way. 
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Where the statute restricts the mobility of artificers and manufacturers, Smith contends that the 
settlement laws restrict all “common” laborers.54 To recall, while the settlement laws laid 
restrictions on entry into a new parish, they did not entirely prohibit it. Smith contends, however, 
that the qualifications made it essentially impossible for a common laborer to obtain settlement 
in a new parish. It was highly unrealistic that one who “lives by labour” alone could afford any 
of the requirements of the law, i.e. the ability to pay parish rates, be elected as a parish member, 
obtain an apprenticeship or service, afford payment for housing, etc.55 Smith concludes that such 
policies are “an evident violation of natural liberty and justice,” adding that “There is scarce a 
poor man in England of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who has not in some part of his 
life felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements.56 Thus, according 
to Smith, the settlement laws, like the statute, restrict the “free circulation of labour,” and violate 
the freedom of a person to choose “what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often 
as he thought proper.”57 These restraints on freedom, Smith contends, also produce economic 
inequalities between those employed in the same trade in different towns. Because people cannot 
move freely from town to town, some places will have larger populations with low wages, while 
others, smaller populations and high wages.58 If the freedom of labor were permitted, such 
inequalities between towns would no longer exist and labor could flow to places of high demand, 
equalizing the wages of workers within the same trades.  
Smith also comments on the regulation of wages. While controls on wages had fallen out 
of practice in the eighteenth century, the combination acts set restrictions on wages in certain 
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industries. In particular, Smith addresses an act by George III, which set limits to the pay and 
duration of work for London tailors. The act was sanctioned after a tailors’ strike in 1720, and 
was a clear attempt to deter workers from “combining” to demand higher pay. Smith comments 
on the act as follows:  
Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their 
workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in 
favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise 
when in favour of the masters. Thus the law which obliges the masters in several different 
trades to pay their workmen in money and not in goods, is quite just and equitable. It 
imposes no real hardship on the masters. It only obliges them to pay that value in money, 
which they pretended to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods. This law is in 
favour of the workmen; but the 8th of George III. is in favour of the masters. When 
masters combine together in order to reduce the wages of their workmen, they commonly 
enter into a private bond or agreement, not to give more than a certain wage under a 
certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same kind, 
not to accept of a certain wage under a certain penalty, the law would punish them very 
severely; and if it dealt impartially, it would treat the masters in the same manner. But the 
8th of George III. enforces by law that very regulation which masters sometimes attempt 
to establish by such combinations. The complaint of the workmen, that it puts the ablest 
and most industrious upon the same footing with an ordinary workman, seems perfectly 
well founded.59 
 
Smith views the act as supporting the tendency of employers to “combine” against their workers 
to keep wages low. However, while Smith objects to the act and therefore to the regulation of 
wages, he does not suggest that legislation has the right to prevent the combinations of laborers 
or employers. He states, “it is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings by any law…[that] 
would be consistent with liberty and justice.”60 He comments, however, that the law also “ought 
to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”61 Legislation 
should not promote such activity amongst employers, but neither, thinks Smith, should it prevent 
it.  
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Smith does not appear, then, to directly promote the combination of laborers. He points 
out the hypocrisy of the legislation in permitting one form of combination (that of the employers) 
and not another (that of the laborers), but nowhere seems to promote the latter. In other words, it 
seems unlikely that Smith would favor labor unions. Smith also describes worker combinations 
as resorting to “shocking violence and outrage.”62 He writes, “they are desperate, and act with 
folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an 
immediate compliance with their demands.”63 The workers “seldom derive any advantage from 
the violence of those tumultuous combinations, which…generally end in nothing, but the 
punishment or ruin of the ring-leaders.”64 Moreover, Smith’s recognition that the masters have 
significant bargaining power over their employers, given their ability to hold out longer during a 
dispute over wages (since the masters possess more wealth), does not seem to deter Smith’s more 
general disdain for combinations.65   
 In accord with his critical stance towards the regulation of labor and poverty, Smith also 
views the regulation of grain as a hindrance to economic liberty. As already mentioned, while the 
regulation of grain was largely on the decline throughout the eighteenth century, it remained the 
de facto policy in periods of scarcity and received widespread support from many of Smith’s 
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contemporaries, including liberal economists.66 Externally, moreover, imports and exports 
continued to be regulated through tariffs and bounties (respectively), instituting a policy of grain 
protection that remained in effect until the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.   
 As discussed in the preceding chapter, a common criticism against the liberalization of 
grain was that it permitted middlemen and traders to overcharge the public by purchasing large 
quantities of grain for resale. The Scottish mercantilist, Sir James Steuart, who is believed to be 
the indirect target of many of Smith’s criticisms, summarizes the popular sentiment of the time:  
The forestalling of markets is made a crime, because it diminishes the competition which 
ought to take place between different people, who have the same merchandize to offer to 
sale. The forestaller buys all up, with an intention to sell with more profit, as he has by 
that means taken other competitors out of the way, and appears with a single interest on 
one side of the contract, in the face of many competitors on the other. This person is 
punished by the state, because he has prevented the price of the merchandize from 
becoming justly proportioned to the real value; he has robbed the public, and enriched 
himself; and in the punishment, he makes restitution.67 
 
Steuart suggests thus that forestalling is, in effect, a type of monopoly that requires the most 
stringent form of government regulation in order to be avoided.68 Unlike Smith, Steuart did not 
believe free competition to be a remedy for monopolies, but rather the cause of them.69    
Far from viewing the inland trader as a threat to the public, Smith’s response is to show 
how the trader, in regulating the demand of grain in relation to its supply, performs a public 
good. If and when traders do raise prices, he argues, it is not because they purposefully 
overcharge their customers, but rather because the level of supply for the season demands it of 
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them. To raise their prices above this level risks the possibility of being left with a surplus of 
grain that can be lost to “natural causes,” or sold at a depressed price at the start of the next 
season.70 Conversely, if traders keep their prices too low in periods of scarcity, then the grain 
will be bought up before the end of the season and both the trader and the people will suffer. The 
merchant will lose out on profits, and the people will be subject to famine. In this way—invoking 
the “invisible hand” of the market— the trader, “without intending the interest of the people,” 
provides for consumers like a “prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. 
When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short allowance.”71  
Smith views all attempts to regulate grain and prohibitions on engrossing and forestalling 
as therefore hindering the best “palliative” for a dearth.72 He contends, that whenever the 
government decreases the price of grain during times of scarcity it either hinders merchants from 
bringing the grain to the market or, if they do bring it to the market, it encourages people to buy 
up the grain before the end of the season.73 It prevents, in other words, the necessary mechanism 
of high prices (regulated by the traders) during periods of scarcity. 
Aside from worsening situations of scarcity, Smith accuses the regulations of infringing 
on the liberties of those employed in the trade. Smith demonstrates how the prohibition on 
forestalling had the effect of forcing farmers to split their capital and labor between two 
employments: the production and the sale of grain. They were, in other words, forced to be both 
a farmer and a merchant since they were prohibited or restricted from selling their grain directly 
in wholesale to the dealers.74 Smith concludes that in addition to decreasing the productivity of 
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grain production (since the farmer had less capital to invest in the production of grain), these 
policies were “evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust.”75 He continues, “the 
law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interest, as in their local situations 
they must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislator can do.76 Much as in the case 
with the statute and the settlement laws, Smith condemns the regulations for preventing a 
“freedom” of trade (in the sense of employment) for the farmer, who is forced to carry on two 
trades instead of one. The regulations also interfered with the individual judgment of those 
employed in the trade. In the case of the merchants Smith writes:  
When the scarcity is real, the best thing that can be done for the people is to divide the 
inconveniencies of it as equally as possible through all the different months, and weeks, 
and days of the year. The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as 
exactly as he can: and no other person can have either the same interest, or the same 
knowledge, or the same abilities to do it so exactly as he, this most important operation of 
commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him: or, in other words, the corn trade, so far at 
least as concerns the supply of the home market, ought to be left perfectly free.77 
 
On Smith’s account, as much as the regulations hindered the mobility of labor, it also hindered 
the liberties of individuals to act (as economic agents) in accordance with their own judgment. 
 In many ways thus, in addition for arguing against the economic shortcomings of these 
feudal and customary practices, Smith often employed a concept of justice to support his claims. 
In a rough sense, this idea of freedom aligns with a negative conception of freedom, which 
emphasizes the importance of non-interference. In the case of employing one’s labor or capital, 
any attempt on part of the government to impose their will on economic agents is held to be in 
violation of liberty and property (a claim that was also advanced by Turgot in his defense of 
grain merchants and traders).  
                                                
75 Ibid., 669.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 674. 
 88 
 
Foreign and Colonial Trade 
 While economic reform in the Stuart and Tudor periods regulated production and 
distribution at the domestic level, by the eighteenth century, due to the growing importance and 
expansion of international trade, economic reform and debate turned outward. The prevailing 
foreign trade policy at the time, promoted under what Smith calls the “mercantile system,” 
entailed a protectionist stance toward imports.78 This approach to trade was an outgrowth of a 
variety of seventeenth and eighteenth century concerns, including the issue of unemployment 
and the mercantile obsession with bullion (money in the form of gold and silver). In regard to the 
latter point, because the amount of money was believed to be in short supply, mercantilists 
viewed other countries as competitors in the race toward the accumulation of gold and silver. 
This supported the drive to colonize (to maintain direct access to foreign gold and silver 
reserves), but also to out-produce foreign competitors in manufactured goods. The latter 
approach was often defended on the grounds of a “balance of trade” theory, which argued that in 
order to keep the stock of money high in a particular country, exports, especially in 
manufactured goods, should outweigh imports to ensure that money coming in would 
overbalance money going out. Restrictions on imports were also believed to protect existing 
industries and the laborers they employed from being undersold by foreign competitors, what 
today would be referred to as an “infant industry” argument.  
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 Although balance of trade theories were popular throughout the early seventeenth 
century, most notably in the work of Thomas Mun, who Smith references, the emergence of 
protective tariffs came somewhat later.79 Import duties existed in England prior to the 
seventeenth century, but they were primarily directed toward generating revenues and not 
explicitly intended to ward off foreign competitors.80 One exception was an early prohibition on 
the importation of woolen cloth in 1337 under Edward III.81 In general, however, prior to 1688, 
most duties on imports remained at a flat 5 per cent rate and were equally applied to exports (not 
then directed toward the promotion of domestic industry).82 This changed in 1690, when under 
pressure from competition with the East India Company (and the growing expense of war), a 
protective tariff of 20 per cent on Indian and Chinese textiles was introduced, followed by 
prohibition in 1701.83 The reforms of 1722 under British Prime Minister Walpole further 
solidified the new protectionist approach to trade. Under these reforms, export duties on 
manufactures were eliminated and imports duties raised, with an exception for the importation of 
raw goods to encourage production. Subsidies (bounties) for certain goods were also instituted, 
as were regulatory measures to set quality control standards.84   
  England’s protectionist policies also extended to its colonies. Initially, in the case of the 
American colonies, trade was conducted through companies that were granted exclusive royal 
patents, like the Plymouth and London Companies formed in 1606. For a brief period in the early 
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seventeenth century, trade was open to other foreign traders, including the Dutch, until 1625 
when England forbid the exportation of tobacco on foreign ships.85 These restrictions were, in 
practice, only loosely observed until the Navigation Acts, a series of laws established in 1651-
1663 (with two further acts in 1673 and 1696). Under these Acts, colonists were forced to import 
goods from England (on English ships) and were no longer permitted to export goods to foreign 
countries other than England (some exceptions were granted).  
 By the eighteenth century, while trade with the American Colonies was open to all 
British subjects, in other parts of the world it was still under the control of exclusive companies. 
Regulated and joint-stock companies were the two main types of chartered companies. The 
regulated companies of England that Smith discusses include the Hamburgh Company, Russia 
Company, Eastland Company, Turkey Company, and the African Company. The joint-stock 
companies include the Royal African Company, South Sea Company, Hudson Bay Company, 
and the British East India Company. Members of the regulated companies traded independently 
with their own capital and, much like guilds, entrance required a fee and approval by the 
company. In joint-stock companies, membership required the purchasing of a share. In both 
cases, while the companies were privately owned, a patent was necessary from the government 
to operate their trade in certain areas.  
 
 
Smith’s Response: Foreign and Colonial Trade 
Smith disagrees with many aspects of the mercantile system. His main dispute, at the 
theoretical level, hinges on the mercantile conception of wealth. As already discussed, the 
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mercantilists equated wealth to the total sum of bullion in any one country. Consequently, it was 
believed that the best means to increase wealth was through foreign trade, specifically by 
maintaining a positive balance of trade or through the acquisition of colonies. It was also held 
that profits were obtained through the “buying cheap and selling dear” of goods, i.e. what is 
known as the “profit upon alienation” theory.  
Smith rejects both the importance of money (as a measure of wealth) and the mercantilist 
conception of profit. Wealthier nations, Smith contends, are nations that possess larger annual 
stocks of goods, not bullion; money “circulates” and “distributes” goods, but it is the goods 
themselves that make up the total “revenue” of a nation (revenue here meaning wealth).86 This is 
why, as outlined in books one and two, Smith attributes increases in wealth to increases in 
productivity (where more goods are produced per unit of labor). Smith attributes the main causes 
of productivity to a developed division of labor and the employment of productive labor, i.e. 
labor that “adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed.”87 Based on this 
conception of wealth, Smith claims that foreign trade contributes less to a nation’s wealth than 
agriculture and manufacturing, which employ a greater sum of productive labor.88 For Smith, 
moreover, profit is the revenue that remains after the cost of the initial capital used to produce a 
good is replenished (upon the sale of the good).89 Thus profits can be obtained from the 
production of domestic goods irrespective of a nation’s involvement in foreign trade. 
                                                
86 Smith offers several definitions of wealth, but more commonly refers to it as the total annual 
produce of a nation. Smith, Wealth of Nations, 368.  
87 That is, labor that produces an exchange value, which makes up for the cost the initial capital 
put down to produce the good plus some revenue (in the form of profit or rent). Ibid., 422-24. 
88 Ibid., 462-74. 
89 Smith writes: “As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons, some of 
them will naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people, whom they will supply with 
materials and subsistence, in order to make a profit by the sale of their work, or by what their 
labour adds to the value of the materials. In exchanging the complete manufacture either for 
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While Smith favors domestic industry, especially agriculture, over foreign trade, he does 
not view foreign trade as altogether unimportant.90 In this way, Smith departs from the 
Physiocratic view that viewed agriculture as the only productive form of industry. Smith believes 
that if nations sufficiently develop their domestic industries, foreign trade can serve a useful 
function in the production of wealth. Smith, however, does not agree with the mercantilist, who 
believes that foreign trade increases wealth because it increases bullion. Rather, he writes:   
It [foreign trade] carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for 
which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for 
which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for 
something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. 
By means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour 
in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest 
perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their 
labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive 
powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real 
revenue and wealth of the society.91 
 
Trade is important thus, but not because it generates so much profit through the act of exchange 
alone. Rather, trade contributes to national wealth because it provides a larger market for 
domestic industries and thereby enhances its productivity (the true measure of wealth). As an 
example of this, Smith discusses how the discovery of America expanded the European market 
and increased its productive powers.92 As stated in book one, chapter three, the “extent of the 
market” contributes significantly to the development of the division of labor: without a greater 
                                                                                                                                                       
money, for labour, or for other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to pay the price of 
the materials, and the wages of the workmen, something must be given for the profits of the 
undertaker of the work who hazards his stock in this adventure.” Ibid., 68. See also Ibid., 424. 
90 Smith views agriculture as the most productive form of industry because it employs not only 
the productive labour of “servants” and “labouring cattle,” but also the labor of nature whose 
“labour costs no expence.” Ibid., 462.  
91 Ibid., 562. 
92 Ibid., 563. 
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demand for goods, industries will not be able to expand their productions beyond the immediate 
needs of the domestic market.93   
 In addition to his criticisms of the theoretical conception of wealth and its relation to 
foreign trade, Smith also criticizes the trade policies adopted under the mercantile system. At the 
time, protectionist policies had placed restrictions on foreign imports in an attempt to protect 
domestic industries from foreign competitors. In regard to its economic effects, Smith contends 
that the import restrictions divert capital into less productive industries and therefore decrease 
the total annual revenue of the country.    
Smith’s reasoning is as follows. If a government, for example, were to impose import 
restrictions on silk, it would result in more capital flowing into the production of silk, than if no 
protective measures were in place (and foreign silk is cheaper than domestic silk). In turn, given 
Smith’s assumption that there is a fixed amount of labor and capital within the country, import 
restrictions would direct capital away from other (non-silk) industries. So, for instance, less 
capital would be invested in the production of wool. Assuming, however, that the silk industry is 
less profitable than the industries from which labor and capital are diverted (i.e. the wool 
industry), these policies would cut into the countries total revenue. It would be better to import 
silk (for cheaper) from abroad and invest capital in industries in which that particular country has 
an “advantage.”94 Buying silk, in other words, frees up more capital to invest in industries in 
                                                
93 Ibid., 27; Ibid., 562. 
94 “If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, 
better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in 
which we have some advantage…The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less 
diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value 
than the commodity which it is directed to produce.” Ibid., 546-47. 
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which greater profits can accrue. Restrictions thus divert part of the nation’s capital and labor 
away from advantageous (i.e. profitable) industries into less advantageous ones.95  
Aside from being economically unwise, Smith contends that import restrictions also 
interfere with the judgment of individuals:  
What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the 
produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his 
local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The 
statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to 
employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but 
assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no 
council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of 
a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it...To give 
the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular 
art of manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought 
to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful 
regulation.96  
 
In making certain industries appear more profitable than they actually are, or would be without 
restrictions in place, the government encourages people to invest their capital and labor into 
them. Governments essentially thus, according to Smith, make choices for people as to where it 
is best for them to invest instead of leaving this choice up to individuals themselves.   
 Smith also criticizes the restrictions on trade that the European nations subject their 
colonists to. In general terms, Smith views the creation of colonies and colonial trade as 
economically advantageous for the colonies and colonizing countries alike. He even suggests it 
(potentially) has advantages for the natives of the country, commenting on how in “savage and 
barbarous nations,” the colonizing country introduces agriculture and industry, as well as a 
system of government and juridical stability.97    
                                                
95 Ibid., 573-74. 
96 Ibid., 572-73. 
97 “The colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts, 
superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many centuries among savage 
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The example of the Northern American colonies is of particular interest to Smith. He 
attributes their rapid economic development to the abundance of land (protected by restraints on 
engrossing and primogeniture), the relative dependency and distance from Europe, the moderate 
taxes, and the less oppressive monopoly to which it was subject.98 Unlike other colonies, Smith 
comments on how the American Colonies were no longer subject to the exclusive trade of 
companies, and were also permitted by the Navigation Acts to export some goods (non-
enumerated goods) to other European countries.99 For these reasons, despite the negative effects 
of the monopoly, the colonists were able to make significant progress in agriculture. Smith 
emphasizes too, the beneficial effects of trade with the colonies for the European nations, both 
because of the increase of “enjoyments” made available to Europeans, as well as the 
encouragement of European industries through the expansion of a new foreign market.100    
 In making trade with the colonies exclusive, however, Smith argues that European 
nations negate the beneficial effects of trade. Much of his commentary addresses the negative 
economic effects for England. He contends that although England maintains an advantage over 
other European countries by excluding them from access to colonial goods, its advantage is only 
relative. For example, while England may pay less than France for tobacco from Maryland or 
Virginia due to its monopoly, under a system of free trade, the cost of tobacco would become 
even cheaper. Without its monopoly, England may lose its “relative” advantage over France, but 
it would obtain an “absolute” advantage due to the lower prices afforded to it within a system of 
                                                                                                                                                       
and barbarous nations. They carry out with them too the habit of subordination, some notion of 
the regular government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws which 
supports it, and of a regular administration of justice.” Ibid., 716. 
98 Ibid., 718; Ibid., 725-29. 
99 Ibid., 731. 
100 Ibid., 750-51. 
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free trade.101 Other disadvantages include the “revulsion” of capital from British industries into 
the colonial trade.102 Seeing how profits in the colonial trade were initially high, Smith explains 
how capital shifted from other British industries into the new trade. This in turn, caused a 
decrease of competition in the older industries and, as consequent, a rise in profits.103 The effect 
of this, however, is to cause the decay of older industries and (due to high profits) British goods 
to be undersold by foreign competitors.104 It also forces capital into a less productive industry 
(foreign trade) and leaves less capital available for the productive industries, i.e. agriculture and 
manufacturing.105  
In general, Smith views Britain’s dependency on trade with the colonies as an unnatural 
and risky form of economic development. He argues that in investing its capital into one “great 
channel” instead of “a great number of small channels” England is less “healthful.”106 Smith 
continues:   
Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital 
parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many dangerous 
disorders scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A 
small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its 
natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and 
commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring the most 
dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic.107  
 
For these reasons, Smith recommends, as one option, a “moderate and gradual relaxation” of the 
monopoly (much like his recommendation for removing import restrictions).108 Where to permit 
                                                
101 Smith assumes the production of tobacco would increase under free trade and therefore result 
in lower prices. Ibid., 755-56. 
102 Ibid., 757. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 761. 
105 Ibid., 763. 
106 Ibid., 768. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., 769; On the gradual removal of import restrictions see Ibid., 588. 
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trade with other nations “all at once” would have disastrous effects on the industries dependent 
on it.109 Interestingly, he comments how it will be up to the “wisdom” of statesmen and 
legislatures to determine how the system of perfect liberty ought to be implemented in these 
cases.110 The best option for England, Smith concludes, would be to grant the colonies political 
emancipation. If it were to go through with such a plan:  
Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expence of the 
peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce 
as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of 
the people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present 
enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother 
country, which, perhaps, our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished, would quickly 
revive…the same sort of parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other, 
might revive between Great Britain and her colonies, which used to subsist between those 
of ancient Greece and the mother city from which they descended.111 
 
While acknowledging that no nation would ever voluntarily give up their colonial dominions, he 
suggests that it would be the best solution to end the growing expenses of the colonies (given the 
failure of the colonies to generate much revenue for the kingdom).  
Smith comments on how the economic liberties of the colonists are also compromised 
under monopoly. Although permitted to sell raw goods to the British (and in certain cases other 
Europeans), the colonists were prohibited from the exportation of manufactured goods. As Smith 
comments: “[Britain] will not suffer colonists to work in those more refined manufactures even 
for their own consumption; but insists upon their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers 
all goods of this kind.”112 The prohibition was consistent with British foreign trade policy that 
encouraged the exportation of manufactured goods and prohibited foreign imports (except raw 
goods that were needed for manufacturing). Smith concludes that Britain turned the colonies into 
                                                
109 Ibid., 770. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 783. 
112 Ibid., 738. 
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a nation of “customers” to meet the demands of “a nation whose government is influenced by 
shopkeepers.”113 He also condemns the policy as a violation of justice: “To prohibit a great 
people, however, from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from 
employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, 
is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind.114 Smith, however, does not view 
the restrictions placed on the American colonies as economically “hurtful.”115 Because land was 
“so cheap” and labor “so dear” in the colonies, he states that it is better for the colonists to import 
cheap European manufactures and focus on agricultural production.116 In line with Smith’s views 
on the natural progression of economic development, he argues that the American colonies are 
not yet in the phase of development where the production of manufactures for foreign trade 
would be economically fruitful. As such, Smith says of the prohibitions, that they are “only 
impertinent badges of slavery” put in place by “the groundless jealously of the merchants and 
manufacturers of the mother country;” that only in a “more advanced state” might such 
restrictions “be really oppressive and insupportable.”117 Thus, for the time being, Smith saw the 
prohibitions as unjust, but as otherwise not economically harmful.    
 Lastly, Smith faults the exclusive trading companies for committing a variety of 
oppressive acts in their trade with overseas countries. The consequences for European subjects 
include the usual constraints imposed by monopolies, including the exclusion from participation 
in a trade (without meeting the entry requirements of the regulated or joint-stock companies) and 
                                                
113 Ibid., 780. 
114 Ibid., 738-9. 
115 Ibid., 739. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid., 739. 
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the subjection to monopoly prices.118 Trading companies also carry negative economic effects 
for European countries in general. Whether in the case of a rich or poor country, they lead to a 
“derangement of the natural distribution of stock.”119 For rich countries, exclusive companies 
prevent more stock from entering into the trade than if the trade were open to all subjects 
(thereby experiencing the loss of capital investment in a profitable trade). Where in poor 
countries they cause more stock to enter into the trade than without the existence of the 
companies. As a result, the country loses capital to an industry “which must be more or less 
unsuitable to their present circumstances”—i.e. not all countries were well suited for 
participating in foreign trade.120  
 Smith also details the destructive effects of the companies on native populations and local 
forms of land cultivation. He comments on how in Africa and East India, exclusive companies 
have not been successful in the creation of colonies, unlike in the case of the Americas, where 
colonies are “numerous and thriving.”121 Smith contributes some of this to the denser populations 
of Africa and East India, as well as the fact that the natives are not “weak and defenceless as the 
miserable and helpless Americans.”122 But aside from these differences, Smith notes that it is 
largely the “genius” of the companies, and the “unfavorable” conditions they create, that 
ultimately prevents the development of thriving colonies.123 Smith lists several examples of the 
destructive tendencies of trading companies that have created these conditions. In the instance of 
the Dutch East India Company, this includes the burning of surplus spices, the “extirpat[ion]” of 
clove and nutmeg trees, and “the arts of oppression,” which have reduced the population of 
                                                
118 Ibid., 801. 
119 Ibid., 803. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 805. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., 806. 
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Moluccas.124 In the case of the British East India Company, Smith cites examples of the 
“destructive” practices surrounding the production of poppies (including the plowing of “rich 
fields” of rice and grain) for the opium trade in Bengal.125 He also comments that it seems likely 
that the British will soon adopt the practice of the Dutch, who restrict production (often through 
destruction) in order to meet the needs of the company and to prohibit natives from selling some 
of the surplus goods themselves. It is worth noting that while Smith describes a system where the 
economic liberties of the natives are (on his own definition of economic liberty) clearly violated, 
he does not explicitly refer to how these practices violate the “sacred rights” of justice, or the 
right of natural liberty. Instead he speaks only of the “oppressive” and “destructive” measures 
perpetuated by the companies.   
 Smith attributes these destructive acts to the failure of the companies to act as sovereigns 
of a country ought to act, commenting that the companies fail even to consider themselves as 
sovereigns.126 The proper goal of a sovereign is always to increase the revenue of a country, 
which comes from increases in the annual produce of the land. Instead, Smith contends, the 
companies rule as merchants. They care not for increasing the productivity of the land, through 
the freedom of trade and the extension of the market, rather they seek to cut off competition and 
reduce the total surplus (creating thus an artificial scarcity of goods). As Smith summarizes: 
“trade, or buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principle business, and by a 
strange absurdity, regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of the 
merchant.”127  
                                                
124 Ibid., 807. 
125 Ibid., 808. 
126 Ibid., 809. 
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As merchants, they also lack authority within the country and therefore rely on 
“despotical” forms of governance, where they “command obedience” through military means.128 
Smith also comments on the destructive tendencies of the company servants who establish 
monopolies within the country through private trades. In the end, Smith blames not the 
individuals, but the “system of government.”129 He writes it is “the situation in which they [the 
servants of the East India company] are placed, that I mean to censure; not the character of those 
who have acted in it. They acted as their situation naturally directed.”130 He concludes that the 
companies are “nuisances” and “always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they 
are established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under their 
government.”131 In the final book of the Wealth of Nations, moreover, Smith goes into the details 
of the economic failures of joint-stock companies, which he attributes to the mismanagement of 
the directors.132   
 In sum, Smith accuses the mercantile system for its injustices along with its economic 
failures. He contends that the injustice of the mercantile system is founded on the restraints it 
sets against individuals in their pursuit of commercial gain. Specifically, protectionism (which 
encourages a monopoly of domestic goods), the monopoly over the colonial trade, and the 
exclusive trade of companies with foreign countries, all hinder the ability of people to freely 
partake in a global system of competitive exchange. The mercantile system also directs the flow 
of capital and labor into less profitable industries and restricts the choice of individual agents as 
to where it may be best to invest their capital. In a more general sense, Smith notes how the 
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129 Ibid., 814. 
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132 Smith contends that without their exclusive monopoly rights the companies would not be able 
to survive its competitors. Ibid., 941.  
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system is founded on the corrupt influence of those who benefit from it the most—i.e. the 
merchants, manufacturers, and traders, who are afforded the high profits that accrue under 
monopolies. Smith writes of this group that they act as a “formidable” force and “intimidate” the 
legislature into support of such policies.133 This comes all at the expense of the people, not only 
in restricting their economic opportunities, but also in subjecting them to higher market prices. 
For these reasons Smith defends the freedom of trade, viewing it as the best possible means to 
secure a more prosperous and liberal system of trade for the “general good” of society at large.134  
 
    Markets and Economic Independence 
 From the preceding sections, it is clear that Smith viewed liberalization in labor markets, 
the grain trade, and domestic and foreign trade as an extension of justice, insofar as it protected 
citizen’s economic liberties and property.135 Smith, however, also ascribed another important 
value to markets. In the third book of the Wealth of Nations, Smith discusses how the 
introduction of commerce freed subjects from feudal relations of dependency and dissolved the 
arbitrary authority of feudal lords. Smith’s account is intended to be a historical one, but his 
commentary also addresses how modern market relations offer individuals greater forms of 
independence and freedom. This section provides an overview of this discussion to help clarify 
Smith’s understanding of the connection between market economies and independence. 
Importantly, it will be revealed that through this identification Smith departed from traditional 
republican association of markets (especially in labor) with domination.   
                                                
133 Ibid., 592. 
134 Ibid. 
135 The influence of natural law on Smith’s understanding of liberty will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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 In book three, Smith compares what he calls the “natural progress of opulence” to the 
historical development of European commercial societies. Because “subsistence” comes “prior to 
conveniency and luxury,” Smith states that in the natural course of development the “cultivation 
and improvement of the country” precedes the development of the town.136 Towns, moreover, 
Smith contends, are generally dependent on the surplus produced in the country, both for their 
subsistence and for their manufactures. As such, they “can therefore increase only with the 
increase of this surplus produce.”137    
 While the natural course of opulence requires an initial stage of agricultural development, 
Smith contends that in the history of European nations the reverse was true. Towns developed 
prior to the country. Smith attributes this to the discouragement of agriculture in the feudal 
period and the unique history of feudal towns. In the case of the former, during the feudal period, 
land was both scarce (due to entails and primogeniture), but also under-cultivated. Smith reasons 
that this was because the lords were too preoccupied with war to improve their land, and that the 
tenants of the land, who did not possess full property rights, lacked incentive to produce anything 
above what was necessary for their own subsistence.138   
 Development in the cities, conversely, was encouraged due to the interest of the king in 
securing power over the lords.139 People within the cities were granted certain liberties on the 
part of the king (unlike the occupiers of the land under a lord) and therefore were incentivized to 
develop and extend commercial production. As Smith summarizes, only when people “are secure 
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of enjoying the fruits of their industry” will they “naturally exert it to better their condition and 
to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniences and elegancies of life.”140  
 Despite the “unnatural” progression of opulence in Europe, Smith shows how the 
development of towns eventually led to the development of agriculture in the countryside. Smith 
attributes this to three things. First, the commercial growth of towns expanded the market for 
goods produced in the country and therefore encouraged the development of agriculture; second, 
wealthy merchants from the towns began to purchase land in the country and use capital to 
improve them for profit; and third, the commerce of the towns brought about political stability in 
the region.141 On this third point, Smith writes:  
Commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with 
them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who 
had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile 
dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the 
most important of all their effects. Mr. Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has 
hitherto taken notice of it.142  
 
The claim that Smith attributes to Hume is found in Hume’s essay “Of Refinement in the Arts.” 
Here Hume writes, “progress in the arts [the arts of industry] is rather favourable to liberty, and 
has a natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free government.”143 According to Hume, 
developments in commerce positively affect the art of government by contributing to the rise of 
the “middling rank of men.”144 He contends that wealthy farmers, merchants, and traders “are the 
best and firmest basis of public liberty,” because they, unlike the poor peasants, “submit not to 
                                                
140 Ibid., 512. 
141 Ibid., 519-520. The relationship between liberty and commerce works both ways. Smith 
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142 Ibid., 520. 
143 David Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts,” in David Hume Essays: Moral, Political, and 
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slavery,” and unlike the barons (or lords), do not seek to “submit to the tyranny of their 
sovereign.”145 The middling ranks instead, “covet equal laws, which may secure their property 
and preserve them from monarchical as well as aristocratical tyranny.”146 Smith’s account of 
how commerce introduces political stability diverges from that of Hume’s. Smith attributes the 
introduction of order and government (and with it the liberty and security of people) not to the 
intentions of any one group or individual, but rather to the unintended effects of individuals in 
pursuit of their own self-interest.147    
 Smith’s narrative is as follows. In the feudal era, the authority of the lords and barons far 
exceeded that of the kings. The lords were “the judges in peace, and the leaders in war, of all 
who dwelt upon their estates;” “they could maintain order and execute the law within their 
respective demesnes,” and “the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that of 
making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights possessed allodially by 
the great proprietors of land.”148 These powers, which were granted to the lords, were founded in 
the social relations that existed between lords and their subjects. With nothing to trade their 
revenue for, the lords spent their wealth on the maintenance of their retainers and the tenants 
who occupied their land. In return for the “rustic hospitality” of the lords, the subjects, lacking 
any means with which to repay the lords, offered them their obedience in exchange.149 Feudal 
relations were constituted thus by relations of dependency that bred servility amongst those 
beneath the lord.  
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With the rise of commerce and trade in the towns, however, the wealthy proprietors of 
land were afforded an opportunity to exchange their revenue for luxury goods. They used this 
opportunity to spend their fortunes on themselves instead of the maintenance of their subjects. In 
doing so, however, the relations of dependency upon which their authority was based, were 
destroyed:  
All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have 
been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a 
method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they had no disposition 
to share them with any other persons. For a pair of diamond buckles perhaps, or for 
something as frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or what is the same 
thing, the price of the maintenance of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole 
weight and authority which it could give them…For the gratification of the most childish, 
the meanest and the most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power 
and authority.150  
 
To purchase new luxuries for themselves, the lords soon dismissed their retainers. They also 
removed the peasants from the land, leaving a few to remain, but only in exchange for a high rent 
(thus instituting long-term commercial leases).151 In effect, those who were once dependent on 
the lord were soon granted their independence; room was made for the institution of “a regular 
government,” and the disturbances of feudal wars came to an end.152 As the lords lost power, the 
state was able to unify its political power, and institute more stable relations and a regime of 
political rights within the kingdom.153  
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 In Smith’s description of the development of commercial society, he also provides an 
account of how market relations emancipate producers from the arbitrary authority of the lords 
(or other forms of servile labor). Smith’s description here, is one that continues to find resonance 
in contemporary discussions about the value of markets. Smith reasons that a wealthy person can 
potentially support more workmen in a market society, than if they had directly provided for 
people who were their subordinates (as was done on the feudal model). This is because in paying 
for “precious production[s],” the wealthy proprietor supports the revenue of the workmen and 
their employers (in wages and profit). Importantly, however, although a wealthy person 
“maintains” the members of society by being the source of their income, they do so 
“indirectly.”154 It is because of this latter fact that, according Smith, economic relations in 
commercial societies are not coercive. As Smith describes it:    
By paying that price he [a wealthy person] indirectly pays all those wages and profits, 
and thus indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their 
employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very small proportion to that of 
each, to very few perhaps a tenth, to many not a hundredth, and to some not a thousandth, 
nor even a ten thousandth part of their whole annual maintenance. Though he contributes, 
therefore, to the maintenance of them all, they are all more or less independent of him, 
because generally they can all be maintained without him… Each tradesman or artificer 
derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand 
different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not 
absolutely dependent upon any one of them.155  
 
Smith argues that unlike in feudal societies, in market societies people do not depend on any 
particular individual for their maintenance. Therefore, they owe no particular person political 
allegiance or service. As a worker or an employer, they depend only on the wages or profit they 
receive in exchange for the products they produce. As Smith notes, that money is derived from 
multiple individuals (i.e. multiple consumers) and therefore the worker or employer isn’t 
                                                
154 Note here how Smith aligns with Turgot’s view that wealthy people provide the source of 
revenue for the other classes.  
155 Ibid., 526-27. 
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beholden to any single person for their survival. That is, if one particular seller, consumer, or 
employer tries to coerce one into buying, selling, or employing, subjects are free to seek out 
others to accomplish their economic aims.   
 Smith’s suggestion that relationships within the sphere of the market are freedom 
enhancing is also supported by an earlier comparison in the Wealth of Nations. It occurs before 
the famous passage where Smith declares “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-
interest.”156 While many point to this passage as evidence of Smith’s psychological egoism, 
some scholars suggest that this passage can also be read as a commentary on the egalitarian 
nature of market relationships.157 This is evident in his comparison between the servile behavior 
of a dog that “fawns” to “gain the favour of those whose service it requires” with the behavior of 
people in a “civilized” country, who appeal to each other’s “self-interest.”158   
 As will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, Smith’s belief that the market 
emancipates wage earners departs from a traditional republican view. On this latter view, wage 
labor was viewed as a form of dependency. The reasoning being that, insofar as wage earners 
rely on their employer for their subsistence, they remain vulnerable to their abuse. For many 
republican thinkers the ownership of property, other than one’s labor, was necessary to secure 
subjects from forms of domination. Smith’s contribution here is unique. He does not reject the 
republican understanding of freedom, but claims that ownership of property in one’s person, in 
the form of labor, is sufficient to secure economic independence. What is particularly troubling 
about this view, however, is that Smith is also sensitive to the forms of oppression and inequality 
                                                
156 Ibid., 23-24.  
157 Anderson, Private Government, 5. 
158 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 23. 
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that workers face in relation to their employers. Some scholars suggest that, for this reason, 
Smith supported an economic model that entailed self-employment and decreased the 
commodification of labor—i.e. that he favored a “society of equals.”159 The next chapter will 
consider this possibility.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of some of the key arguments that Smith advances in 
the Wealth of Nations in his polemic with feudal and mercantile practices. It should be noted, 
however, that Smith’s attack on feudal and mercantile regulations did not prevent him from 
supporting various forms of regulation or wealth redistribution. Smith’s support for progressive 
taxation and the public funding of social institutions like education has led scholars to associate 
Smith with contemporary theories that favor a liberal welfare state. Some of the exceptions to 
intervention that Smith granted will be considered in more detail in a comparison with Kant, who 
is also associated with this view.     
As argued in the introduction, however, the focus of this dissertation is less on 
establishing whether or not pro-market thinkers favored intervention, given that intervention is 
consistent with support for a market economy. Rather, it interrogates the extent to which the 
same values that pro-market thinkers accused the state of violating were employed in the 
development of their alternative economic models. This chapter demonstrates the importance of 
justice and liberty in Smith’s criticism of state-led practices, which he believed hindered the 
economic and republican freedoms of all members of society. The next chapter considers how 
Smith’s claims were compatible with his response to the growing inequality in the distribution of 
                                                
159 Anderson, Private Government, 17-22.  
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land and the concomitant proletarianization of the laboring poor, both of which were outcomes 
of the transition to a new model of agrarian capitalism.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Smith and the Society of Equals 
 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how Smith’s economic arguments were largely informed by 
ethical claims about the nature of market economies. This centered on his belief that free markets 
protected the economic freedom and welfare of society and replaced feudal relations of servitude 
with non-coercive forms of economic interdependency. Like Turgot, then, Smith’s defense of 
liberal reform did not neglect concerns about the laboring poor. Smith’s critique of the 
mercantile system challenged the abuse of the state in permitting and encouraging monopolies 
that stymied equal opportunities for economic agents. This has led many scholars to argue that 
the caricature of Smith as a dogmatic proponent of laissez-faire is a faulty one. Some have gone 
so far as to claim that Smith was “egalitarian” in his economic outlook and even an anti-capitalist 
thinker.     
This chapter considers more closely the plausibility of these interpretations by locating 
Smith’s outlook in the context of other eighteenth century debates. In particular, it examines 
Smith’s reaction to the controversial practice of enclosure and engrossing, which was strongly 
condemned by his contemporaries throughout the period. Critics claimed that these practices 
were harmful for society because they created a monopoly in land. Unlike his contemporaries, 
however, Smith did not favor reforms that would prevent the consolidation of land by a 
landowning class. In other words, while some thinkers in the eighteenth century promoted the 
ideal of a free society of equals, Smith was not one of them. Conversely, I argue that Smith’s 
outlook was likely on the side of the improvers in the debate over the enclosures. In the 
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conclusion of the dissertation, I return to contemporary interpretations to demonstrate how his 
response to the enclosure movement challenges the claim that Smith was a radical, egalitarian 
economic thinker.   
 
Enclosure, Engrossing, and Agrarian Capitalism 
The English transition to an agrarian capitalist economy has its origins in the peasant 
uprisings against feudal lords in the fourteenth century. Throughout Europe, an ongoing 
subsistence crisis led to increased forms of exploitation of the peasant class.1 English peasants 
were unique, insofar as they were successful in winning concessions from the lords, including 
secure tenures and longer leases. As McNally notes, the securing of leases occurred during a 
period in which rents were relatively stable and food prices were on the rise.2 As a result of these 
factors, there soon emerged a wealthy class of peasants, or yeomen farmers, who were able to 
secure a profit above their cost of production.3 With this surplus they invested in the 
improvement of the land and increased their productivity.4 According to one historian, the 
yeomen “were responsible for much of the productivity growth in the early modern period.”5   
The yeomen class consisted of owner-occupiers and family farmers who were either 
freeholders or leaseholders (including copyholders) with relatively secure tenant or property 
rights.6 The practice of enclosure and engrossing developed with the rise of yeomanry farming. 
                                                
1 McNally, Political Economy, 5.  
2 Ibid., 6.  
3 McNally notes some historians refer to the yeoman as capitalists—but says this term should be 
used with caution. Ibid.  
4 While the enclosures occurred in the fourteenth century, fears of depopulation led the Tudor 
monarchy to institute protections for peasants, which also benefitted the yeomanry.  
5 Robert C. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman: The Agricultural Development of the South 
Midlands 1450-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14.   
6 Ibid., 14.  
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Prior to it, agriculture operated on an “open-field system” where people produced on divided 
strips of land. On this system, after food was harvested from the land, it was converted into 
common land (i.e. the “commons”) so that people could use it to graze their animals on or for 
other subsistence-based reasons. The enclosures refer to the process of privatizing land that was 
held in common.7 Often occurring in tandem with enclosure was the process of “engrossing,” or 
the consolidation of smaller pieces of land for the creation of large farms.    
According to McNally, the landlords were the ultimate beneficiaries of engrossing and 
enclosure. Allen too, makes a distinction between the yeomanry model—an earlier model of 
small scale, owner-occupier farming— and landlordism, which ultimately replaced yeomanry 
farming. The transition from the yeoman model to landlordism (or agrarian capitalism) occurred 
through an aggressive move on the part of the landlords to engross and enclose land. As McNally 
describes: 
From the late sixteenth century onwards, sections of the gentry took advantage of the 
weakened status of the village community to launch a sustained offensive against the 
rights of the small tenants...They attempted to break the grip of copyhold agreements and 
to turn them into forms of leasehold renewable only at the will of the lord. They drove up 
rents every year or every few years ("rack-renting"). They attempted to supplement 
income by increasing fines and enforcing obsolete obligations. And, most important, they 
undertook to enclose and reorganize lands—a path which tended to raise the productivity 
of the land by 50 percent on average. Contrary to older views which saw the eighteenth 
century as the great age of enclosure, modern research suggests that by 1700 three-
quarters of all enclosure had already taken place. As a result of this multifaceted 
offensive, rents doubled during the half century from 1590 to 1640.8 
 
Enclosure and engrossing dramatically changed agricultural production and property distribution. 
As noted in the previous chapter, by the start of the eighteenth century “English landlords 
                                                
7 In the early phase of the enclosures (fifteenth to sixteenth centuries) enclosed land was 
typically converted into pasture for textile production. As Thompson notes, because livestock 
farming was less labor intensive it tended to reduce agricultural employment. Thompson, 
“Parliamentary Enclosure,” 623. 
8 McNally, Political Economy, 7. 
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controlled as much as 70-75 per cent of cultivable land, thus leaving owner-occupiers with some 
25-30 per cent of cultivable land.”9 Presumably thus, while some wealthy yeomen became 
capitalist farmers, the majority was pushed into the new class of the rural proletariat, along with 
small proprietors.10  
Once land was consolidated, it was then leased out to wealthy tenants (i.e. capitalist 
farmers), who invested in production and labor (wage laborers) to produce goods for the market. 
The new model was not directed toward family subsistence, but rather toward profit. With 
landlords rapidly raising rents, farmers were compelled to increase their productivity and 
incorporate themselves into a new capitalist market logic.11 With less access to the commons, 
which historically enabled the poor to supplement their incomes, workers were also forced to sell 
their labor to purchase goods on the market. As McNally notes, in the nineteenth century, Marx 
described this process as “primitive accumulation.”12 According to Marx, “freeing” the peasants 
from the land (or the “means of production”), essentially forced them into their new role as wage 
earners (i.e. the proletariat), given that the only thing they could exchange in order to purchase 
their means of subsistence was their labor power.13   
Enclosure and engrossing continued into the eighteenth century. The change in land 
transfers from peasants to large landowners between 1690-1750 was particularly significant.14 
During this period too, the gentry increasingly came to rely on parliamentary support for the 
                                                
9 McNally, Against the Market, 11.  
10 McNally, Political Economy, 12.  
11 Ibid., 7-8.  
12 The idea being that access to cheap labor was necessary for the accumulation of profit on part 
of the capitalist class. This could only be accomplished by removing people from their source of 
subsistence, i.e. the land.  
13 Marx thus speaks of the “double freedom” of workers under capitalism, where workers are 
free to sell their labor power, but also free from the means of production (and therefore forced to 
sell their labor power).  
14 Ibid., 10.  
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further consolidation of land. While in the Tudor period the monarchy instituted anti-enclosure 
measures to protect tenants (due to concerns over depopulation), in the eighteenth century over 
6.5 million acres of common land was enclosed through a series of parliamentary acts.15  
In response to these changes, there were significant periods of resistance and calls for 
reform. Allen documents three common reforms advocated by anti-enclosure proponents in the 
seventeenth century: “the prevention or reversal of enclosures,” “the enfranchisement of 
copyholds,” and “an ‘agrarian law’ to set an upper limit to the property that any individual could 
own.”16 Many of these reforms were advanced by a radical sect of revolutionaries, including the 
Levellers, in the upheaval leading to the English Civil War. As Allen notes, Leveller Richard 
Overton (1599-1664) advocated turning enclosed fields into commons again for the “use and 
benefit of the poor,” and John Lilburne (1614-1657), also a Leveller, supported the abolition of 
“servile tenures.”17 James Harrington (1611-1677) (who was not a Leveller) adopted the third 
idea of reform in his book Oceana (1656). Although the idea of agrarian reform circulated 
amongst radicals during this period, the intellectual tradition that Harrington drew from was 
republicanism, as demonstrated in his referencing of Machiavelli’s text Discourses on Livy 
(1517). As it will be seen below, Roman influences were also common in the eighteenth century 
debate over the parliamentary enclosures.  
Importantly, the outlook promoted by seventeenth century radicals differed from the anti-
absolutism adopted by the landowning class during the period of the English Civil War. As 
McNally notes, while the gentry class was also opposed to absolutism, radical egalitarian 
reforms threatened their holdings in property and therefore their incomes (in the form of rent). 
                                                
15 Ibid., 9-11.  
16 Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman, 304. 
17 Ibid. 
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For this reason, although favoring a limitation on the monarchy’s power, the landowning class 
eventually supported its restoration.18 As noted by Allen, none of the reforms advocated by the 
radicals were instituted. In particular, the enfranchisement of copyholds and leaseholds did not 
prevail until 1922 with the Law of Property Act.19 Resolutions passed during this period were, 
alternatively, to the benefit of the landowners, not small proprietors.20  
The idea of implementing an agrarian law continued into the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth century. Better known writers who adopted this outlook include John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon (authors of Cato’s Letters 1720-1723), the Scottish philosopher (and Smith’s 
teacher) Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), the Scottish writer Andrew Fletcher (1655-1716), 
Richard Price (1723-1791), and Stephen Addington (1729-1796).21 As Allen notes, for these 
thinkers, the application of republican ideas to the English context “was subversive,” believing 
that, “the rise of the great estate and the destruction of the yeomanry produced authoritarianism 
and subservience.”22 Because some of these thinkers employed the idea of a republican agrarian 
law, contemporary scholars sometimes refer them to as “agrarian republicans.”  
 
Richard Price and the Owner-Occupier Model 
Price’s criticism of enclosure and engrossing was particularly trenchant. Price was a 
British nonconformist minister who wrote on a range of topics including economics, morality, 
theology, and politics. Although active in various intellectual circles at the time, Price became 
                                                
18 Large landowners also increasingly found representation with the (growing) House of 
Commons. McNally, Political Economy, 8-10. 
19 Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman, 305. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Thompson notes that many critics of the enclosures during this period were unknown—but 
were “engaged pamphleteers” who employed similar republican arguments in their defense. 
Thompson, “Parliamentary Enclosure,” 623. 
22 Ibid., 306. 
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known to the wider public when he published a series of texts defending the American Colonists 
in their struggle for independence. These texts included Observations on the Nature of Civil 
Liberty (1776) and Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty, and the 
War with America (1777). Both pamphlets were later republished in one volume entitled Two 
Tracts (1778).   
In these texts, Price argues that the American colonists lacked political freedom under 
British rule. Price, like Rousseau (whose idea of the social contract will be considered in more 
detail in the conclusion), held that political authority originates in the collective will and 
agreement of the people.23 Price claims that just as personal freedom requires that one “be guided 
by one’s own will,” and that to be guided by another’s will “is the characteristic of servitude,” a 
country’s political freedom also requires it to be “guided by its own will.”24 He concludes from 
this, that if one country attempts to rule over another, as the British did to the American 
colonists, they violate the country’s political freedom and subject them to condition of 
“slavery.”25 Central to Price’s understanding of liberty thus was the concept of self-governance. 
He states, “There is one general idea that runs through them all [his accounts of liberty]; I mean 
the idea of self-direction, or self-government.”26 The importance placed on self-governance also 
carried over into his critique of the enclosures. For Price, the problem with engrossing and 
                                                
23 For the influence of Rousseau, consider his statement: “it is obvious that civil liberty, in its 
most perfect degree, can be enjoyed only in small states where every independent agent is 
capable of giving his suffrage in person, and of being chosen into public offices.” Price, also 
notes, however, in the case all members are not capable of suffrage, they can elect 
representatives (something Rousseau opposed). Richard Price, Political Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 24.  
24 Ibid., 26. 
25 Price discusses various kinds of liberty including physical, moral, religious, civil, and political. 
Ibid., 30. 
26 Ibid., 22. 
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enclosing was that it forced self-sufficient producers into new relations of market dependency 
and therefore into accepting the authority and governance of the landowners and employers.  
Price became interested in the effects of the enclosures as an outcome of his research on 
mortality rates in urban and rural areas in Observations on Reversionary Payments (1773).27 
While in earlier editions of this text Price identified depopulation with luxury in urban areas, he 
later came to view engrossing and enclosure in rural areas as a major barrier to population 
growth. As this text is rather obscure, it will help to provide a brief overview of the postscript, 
where he offers an analysis of the negative effects of the parliamentary enclosures on the 
laboring poor.     
Price begins the text by comparing “savage” and “civilized” states and notes that in the 
latter there are different “degrees” or “stages” from “simple” to “luxurious.”28 It is the former, or 
“simple” stage of a civilized state, to which he attributes greater happiness for mankind. Here, 
“agriculture supplies plenty of the means of subsistence; the blessing of a natural and simple life 
are enjoyed; property is equally divided; the wants of men are few, and soon satisfied; and 
families are easily provided for.”29 Conversely, in civilized states, “property is engrossed, and 
the natural equality of men subverted;” he continues, “artificial necessaries without number are 
created; great towns propagate contagion and licentiousness; luxury and vice prevail; and, 
together with them, disease, poverty, venality, and oppression.”30 In such conditions, he adds, 
“all liberty, virtue, and happiness must be lost, and complete ruin follow.”31  
                                                
27 Thompson notes that due to its popularity, it was published under seven editions dating from 
1771 to 1812. Thompson, “Parliamentary Enclosures,” 627. 
28 Richard Price, Observations on Reversionary Payments (Third Edition, 1773), 379-380. 




England is cited as an example of a civilized society in this later “luxurious” stage. 
Among the ills of advanced civilization, a chief concern for Price was the problem of 
depopulation. As one of its causes, he lists the “the accumulation of property” and continues the 
postscript explaining the harms of this phenomenon. To quote at length:  
Let a tract of ground be supposed in the hand of a multitude of little proprietors and 
tenants, who maintain themselves and families by the produce of the ground they occupy, 
by sheep kept on a common, by poultry, hogs, etc.; and who, therefore, have little 
occasion to purchase any of the means of subsistence. If this land gets into the hands of a 
few great farmers, the consequence must be, that the little farmers will be converted into 
a body of men who earn their subsistence by working for others, and who will be under a 
necessity of going to market for all they want.32  
 
In this passage, Price articulates the concern that the enclosures deprived people of land and of 
the possibility to be self-sufficient, or at least not entirely dependent on a wage. Price continues 
to note that as subsistence becomes more difficult, children become economic “burdens,” and 
people leave to find employment in urban areas, which results in a decline of population.33 He 
also predicts that there will be an increase in labor, “because there will be more compulsion to 
it,” more corn grown (as bread becomes a staple), parishes overrun with poor, and increases in 
manufactures in towns as workers are removed from agricultural production.34  
The importance of land for ensuring self-sufficiency among the poor is also emphasized 
in his commentary on the price of grain. He claims that in the past, when grain prices were high, 
it did not cause “alarm” amongst the poor.35 This was because people “could live more upon 
other food which was then cheap; and because also being more generally occupiers of land, they 
                                                
32 Ibid., 382. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 382-83. 
35 He compares the price of grain in 1679 at 3 l. to the current conditions where the price of grain 
is below 3 l. and the wealth of the kingdom has “doubled.” In the current year he notes that when 
the price of grain approaches the price when bounties are instituted, “there is an alarm, the poor 
are starving, insurrections begin, and the exportation is prohibited.” Ibid., 384.  
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were less under a necessity of purchasing bread.”36 However, he continues, when the poor are 
forced off the land, high prices have a greater impact on their livelihood since their main source 
of subsistence is grain purchased on the market.37 Because of this, when prices are high the poor 
“are rendered incapable of maintaining themselves.”38 Price was concerned thus that if people 
were primarily dependent on the market for meeting their subsistence needs, market failure or 
disruptions could be potentially catastrophic. Conversely, with greater independence from the 
market comes greater security, especially for the poor. Price’s comments also make an 
interesting contribution to the grain debate. On his account, the solution to a subsistence crisis is 
giving people access to the land, whereas for Turgot and Smith the solution is faith in the market 
economy, or, in Turgot’s case, the introduction of government led employment programs.  
As a solution to the engrossing of land, Price speaks favorably of an agrarian law. He 
mentions, for instance, historical precedents, including the Roman laws of Licinius that limited 
the acreage of land that one could hold.39 Price also quotes Francis Bacon on his approbation of 
anti-enclosure Tudor era policies, which sought to prevent the “servile condition” of people and 
“keep the plough in the hands of the owners and not hirelings.”40 Bacon in particular refers to the 
Tillage Act under Henry VII, which established “that all houses of husbandry, with 20 acres of 
ground to them, should be kept up forever.”41 As Thompson notes, Bacon was active in 
                                                
36 Ibid.  
37 Price also provides some evidence that many of the enclosed properties, now produce less in 
tillage than before, in part because they are converted to pasture. Ibid., 388-89. He quotes 
Addington, who also comments on the immense decrease in small proprietors and displacement 
by wealthy graizers who enclosure the land. Where “four or five” engross land that “was before 
in the hands of 20 or 30 families.” Ibid., 390. 
38 Ibid., 384. 
39 Ibid., 381. 
40 Ibid., 391. 
41 Ibid. 
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politically opposing the enclosures and understood Tudor era policies as being favorable to the 
development of a yeomanry class.42  
Price favorably mentions several other Tudor era statutes that sought to make land 
available for the poor and prevent further enclosure. He concludes the postscript noting that 
“modern policy,” unlike the Tudor era reforms, is “more favorable to the higher classes of 
people; and the consequence of it may in time prove, that the whole kingdom will consist of only 
gentry and beggars, or of grandees and slaves.”43 Price’s reference to modern policy refers to the 
parliamentary acts. He writes: “How astonishing is it that our parliament, instead of applying any 
remedy to these evils, should chose to promote them, by passing every year, bills almost without 
number, for new enclosures?”44 He notes too, that when more people are self-employed the 
wages of labor increase, but this has not been the case in England where the price of labor is high 
but increases in the price of food make it such that it remains low.45 In sum, he writes, “Upon the 
whole, the circumstances of the lower ranks of men are altered in almost every respect for the 
worse. From little occupiers of land, they are reduced to the state of day laborers and 
hirelings.”46  
That Price favors the yeomen and small owner-occupier model of agriculture over the 
emerging capitalist model is also evident in his commentary on the American colonies. In the 
postscript, he notes that America is an example of a “simple” earlier state of civilization where 
“everyone occupies land for himself” and is in a state of great happiness.47 The idea of an owner-
occupier, yeomanry model is taken up again in his later text, Observations on the Importance of 
                                                
42 Thompson “Parliamentary Enclosure,” 631. 
43 Price, Observations, 393. 
44 Ibid., 390.  
45 Ibid., 393-94. 
46 Ibid., 394. 
47 Ibid., 380-81. 
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the American Revolution and Means of Making it a Benefit to the World  (1785). In the section 
“Of an Unequal Distribution of Property,” Price describes the inhabitants of Connecticut as 
follows:  
an independent and hardy yeomanry, all nearly on a level, trained to arms, instructed in 
their rights, cloathed in homespun, of simple manners, strangers to luxury, drawing 
plenty from the ground, and that plenty, gathered easily by the hand of industry and 
giving rise to early marriages, a numerous progeny, length of days, and a rapid 
increase—the rich and poor, the haughty grandee and the creeping sycophant, equally 
unknown—protected by laws which (being their own will) cannot oppress, and by an 
equal government which, wanting lucrative places, cannot create corrupt canvassings and 
ambitious intrigue.48  
 
Price warns, however, that such a state of affairs may not continue. He states that the government 
could soon “degenerate into an instrument in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the 
many.”49 As a palliative to corruption, Price again invokes the idea of an agrarian law. He 
mentions “Plato, Sir Thomas More, and Mr. Wallace” as “some great men” who developed the 
idea of “community of goods” and the abolition of property.50 Ideas that, if put into action, 
would make it “impossible for any one member of a state to think of enslaving the rest, or to 
consider himself having any interest distinct from that of his fellow-citizens.”51 Price states that 
he is not able to give the best alternative to inequality, but that “there is an equality in society 
which is essential to liberty,” and that every state ought to seek to maintain it.52 As further 
recommendations, he argues against “hereditary honors and titles of nobility,” the practice of 
primogeniture, and also, in an interesting departure with Smith, foreign trade.53  
                                                
48 Price, Political Writings, 145.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 He adds further “Such theories are in speculation pleasing, nor perhaps are they wholly 
impracticable.” Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 146.  
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The historical record also supports the concerns raised by Price in his discussion of the 
enclosure movement. As Allen notes, at the end of the eighteenth century: 
The open fields were enclosed, and the small peasant holdings were amalgamated into 
large farms let to tenants who cultivated them with wage labor. By the nineteenth 
century, a unique rural society had emerged in England. This new society was 
characterized by exceptional inequality. English property ownership was unusually 
concentrated. Rents had risen, while wages stagnated. By the nineteenth century, the 
landlord’s mansion was lavish, the farmer’s house modest, the laborer’s cottage a hovel.54 
  
The anti-enclosure movement failed thus to halt the development of agrarian capitalism. The 
enclosure movement also found ideological support from eighteenth century pro-enclosure 
proponents, i.e. the “improvers.” A common defense put forward by such thinkers centered on 
the idea that inequality in property was necessary for agricultural and economic growth. Allen 
refers to this idea, which continues to inform contemporary scholarship on the period, as a 
“trade-off between growth and equity.”55 This view is not far from the contemporary free market 
outlook, often used to argue against progressive taxation, that economic inequality is necessary 
for economic growth.56 It is also reproduced in contemporary discussions on global development, 
where it is believed that small peasant farming should be replaced with large-scale farms to 
“modernize” their economy.57  
                                                
54 Allen, Enclosure and Yeoman, 1. 
55 The idea being that “growth in farm efficiency and the expansion of manufacturing could not 
have been achieved in an egalitarian society.” Ibid., 2. 
56 This view is disputed by Piketty, whose empirical work shows that economic growth in 
Europe and the US was greater in more egalitarian periods (1950-1980) compared to the period 
after 1980 (where there was greater inequality but less growth). Piketty, Capital and Ideology, 
24.  
57 Ibid., 2. As evidence against this dominant view, Allen points to successful twentieth century 
rural development programs that support a “yeoman” or owner-occupied family farming 
systems. He notes how in poor countries there are limited forms of employment in the industrial 
sector—here thus, “labor absorption (rather than labor shedding) in agriculture has become a 
policy objective.” He adds “the yeomen’s agricultural revolution in England was consistent with 
this style of peasant-oriented development, while the landlord’s revolution was not.” Ibid., 311.  
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Allen’s historical research upends this assumption. While this debate is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, I’ll mention two points that Allen raises. First, Allen demonstrates how 
yeomanry farming, not later forms of capitalist farming, that contributed to England’s high 
productivity gains. Because the former model entailed greater equality of land distribution, his 
research challenges the view that inequality (or large-scale farming) is necessary for economic 
growth. Second, Allen argues that the material effects of the “radical programme,” advanced by 
thinkers like Price, would be of a greater advantage to the laboring poor than the landowner 
model was. To support this claim, Allen analyzes the economic data from 1800 (in the midlands 
region of England) and claims that if farms had been limited to 40-acres of land and 
independently owned, the rural unemployment problem would be “eliminated” and farm incomes 
increased (without affecting output).58 In particular, because rent and the cost of labor would be 
eliminated, he concludes that, “the recreation of peasant proprietorship would have increased the 
total incomes of rural agricultural families by between 67 per cent and 100 per cent.”59 Allen 
also considers how the yeomanry model was better for the laboring poor on the grounds of its 
more positive psychological effects. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
however, the landowner model was fully established in England. While republican ideas 




                                                
58 Ibid., 308. 
59 Ibid., 309. 
60 For example, Jefferson’s support for a yeomanry model was incorporated into his draft for the 
constitution of Virginia in 1776, which stated that adults without property would be given 50 
acres of land. Thomas Paine in Agrarian Justice also proposed a type of agrarian reform to limit 
economic inequality. Allen, 306-07. 
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Smith on the Society of Equals 
In his description of economic progress, Smith speaks favorably of the yeomanry class 
and small proprietors. Smith, like Price, was also critical of the policy of primogeniture. His 
critique of the latter appears in the third book, where Smith describes how the development of 
commerce in Europe took an “unnatural” path of progression because the towns developed prior 
to agriculture in the country. Smith includes among the restrictions that slowed agricultural 
growth in Europe the policies of primogeniture and entail, which prevented the breaking up of 
land by hindering division upon succession. Smith’s criticism here was that such policies left 
large tracts of land “uncultivated” and incapable of “improvement.”61 While Price also viewed 
primogeniture as a threat to the equal distribution of land, his main concern was the engrossing 
and enclosing of land, by the landowning class, for agricultural “improvement.”62 To get clear on 
Smith’s position here it is necessary to consider in more detail his commentary on these themes. 
Another barrier to agricultural development that Smith identifies relates to his discussion 
of yeomanry farmers. He claims that in addition to primogeniture and entail, agricultural 
progress in the feudal period was slowed because of the insecure position of those who 
“occupied the land.”63 Smith’s reasoning is that when producers lack property rights and cannot 
keep the surplus produce they generate there, is little incentive for them to work. This is 
especially evident in the example of slavery, where, for the slave, “work he does beyond what is 
sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and 
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62 Smith’s concern then, that great proprietors engrossed land and left it unimproved or 
uncultivated, is somewhat distinct from that of Price, who worried that the policy of 
improvement undertaken by large landowners came at the expense of small proprietors. 
Arguably, Smith may have had in mind supporting cultivation by small landowners, but, as I will 
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of the enclosures.  
63 Ibid., 492. 
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not by any interest of his own.”64 Thus, it is only with the development of lease holding farmers 
that the motivation to produce over and above one’s subsistence emerged. Here, farmers “find it 
for their interest to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the farm; because 
they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration of the lease.”65  
Smith notes that, despite the slow development of protected leases in England, the 
yeomen were able to achieve secure property rights and the protection of long-term leases. Smith 
concludes that farmers who have secure leases are “altogether independent” from the proprietor, 
noting that proprietors cannot ask more from their leaseholder “beyond what is either expressly 
stipulated in the lease.”66 He goes so far as to claim that even a tenant at will “is not altogether 
dependent upon the landlord” and (presumably, unlike a slave) “will expose neither his life nor 
his fortune in the service of the proprietor.”67 Because of their security in land, Smith claims that 
the yeomen “have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England, than all their 
boasted regulations of commerce taken together.”68 
Smith also speaks favorably of small proprietors and independent owner-occupiers. For, 
as discussed above, and as also noted by Smith, yeoman, insofar as they were still leaseholders, 
were not the same as proprietors of the land. Smith notes, interestingly, that when a farmer, 
instead of a proprietor, cultivates land the improvement comes about more slowly. This is 
because a portion of the produce is absorbed by rent, which cannot be invested into the “further 
improvement of the land.”69 His favorable view of small proprietors also appears in the 
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69 Ibid., 501.  
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comparison he makes between England and the American colonies. Consider, for instance, these 
two passages from the third book: 
From artificer he becomes planter, and neither the large wages nor the easy subsistence 
which that country affords to artificers, can bribe him rather to work for other people than 
for himself. He feels that an artificer is the servant of his customers, from whom he 
derives his subsistence; but that a planter who cultivates his own land, and derives his 
necessary subsistence from the labor of his own family, is really a master, and 
independent of all the world.”70 
 
A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his little territory, who views it all 
with the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who 
upon that account takes pleasure not only in cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of 
all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful.71  
 
In linking property ownership to independence, Smith aligns with the republican outlook that 
views material independence and self-sufficiency as a form of economic freedom. Some 
scholars, including Elizabeth Anderson, have concluded thus that Smith’s critique of monopoly 
also applied to the monopolization of land. Specifically, she refers to his conception of the free 
market as a form of “commercial republicanism,” which supports free markets “because state-
granted monopolies and privileges, and property rules such as entail and primogeniture, 
concentrate the means of production in a few hands and thereby force the rest into 
dependency.”72   
Despite, however, Smith’s appraisal of the independent farmer and owner-occupier, there 
are important distinctions between Smith and Price that challenge Anderson’s interpretation.73 
Smith is curiously silent, for instance, about the immense changes in land ownership that 
occurred during the period. Unlike Price, he does not discuss the accumulation of land by the 
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gentry and the concomitant increase in their political and parliamentary power—the latter of 
which was attested by numerous parliamentary acts of enclosure. Alternatively, Smith describes 
the yeomanry as “independent” and claims that the transition to commerce led to a decline in the 
political power of proprietors. In his narrative in the third book, he writes how with the 
development of commerce, “the great proprietors were no longer capable of interrupting the 
regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of the countries.”74 He continues, “A 
regular government was established in the country as well as in the city, nobody having 
sufficient power to disturb its operations in the one, any more than in the other.”75   
Smith is, moreover, aware of the history of enclosure and engrossing. In his account of 
the development of commerce, he writes: “Farms were enlarged, and the occupiers of land, 
notwithstanding the complaints of depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for cultivating 
it, according to the imperfect state of cultivation and improvement in those times.”76 Enclosure is 
also described in relation to methods of agricultural improvement.77 Smith’s description here, 
however, is neutral. If Smith was opposed to the monopolization of land, as Anderson suggests, 
it is perplexing that he is silent about the parliamentary enclosures, especially given that it was a 
topic his contemporaries continued to debate.      
Smith’s economic explanations also assume the landowner model, not the yeoman model 
of owner-occupiers. This is evident, for instance, in his comments on the topic of land rent in 
book one of the Wealth of Nations. Here, Smith reiterates what he has already described in the 
preceding chapters, which is that the “whole annual produce” of a country divides into three 
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parts: the rent of land, the wages of labor, and the profits of stock.78 He adds to this observation 
that these forms of revenue map on to “the three great, original and constituent orders of every 
civilized society.”79 There are “those who live by rent,” (i.e. proprietors), “those who live by 
wages,” (i.e. workers), and “those who live by profit” (i.e. merchants and manufacturers).80 
Importantly, Smith characterizes the proprietor class, or the class that lives by rent, as a class 
whose revenue “costs them neither labor nor care.”81 This class is not, therefore, associated with 
a class of small proprietors or self-employed farmers.  
Throughout the book, Smith assumes this triadic arrangement, or landowner model of 
agriculture. On this model, and as it was also practiced at the time, proprietors rent land out to 
farmers, who then employ workers to cultivate the land and produce a surplus sufficient to cover 
both the costs of production and rent. As another example of this, Smith writes that investment in 
agriculture is the most profitable way to employ stock because a farmer’s “laboring servants” 
(along with his “laboring cattle”) are able to generate a value over and above the capital invested 
by the tenant farmer, i.e. rent for the landlord. He adds, “of all the ways in which a capital can be 
employed, it [agriculture] is by far the most advantageous to the society.”82 Smith’s analysis of 
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agriculture development, much like that of the Physiocrats Quesnay and Turgot, is clearly based 
on the agrarian capitalist model. 
It might be claimed that Smith is being purely descriptive in his economic analysis. 
Smith’s language, however, is often normative. For example, his description of the “constituent 
orders of every civilized society” as the group that makes up the “revenue” from which “every 
other order is ultimately derived,” ascribes an important function to the class of proprietors, 
merchants, and manufactures.83 Smith, like Turgot, also claims that the interest of the proprietors 
“is strictly and inseparably connected with the general interest of the society.”84 The interests of 
those who live by wages are also tied to the general interest of society, but Smith describes them 
as “incapable” of “comprehending” society’s interest.85 Their “education” and “habits” “render 
him [the worker] unfit to judge even though he was fully informed;” moreover, in “public 
deliberations…his voice is little heard and less regarded,” except in the case that it is supported 
(albeit, instrumentally) by his employers.86 Although Smith speaks here of wage earners, and not 
capitalist farmers (in fact it is unclear where tenant farmers can be located within these three 
orders), his description of proprietors as those who do not labor, certainly presumes that 
“civilized societies” are those based on agrarian capitalist economies.87  
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87 It is interesting too, that Smith describes the cultivation of land by indigenous people as 
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There are other passages that also suggest that Smith, despite his positive assessment of 
independent farmers, was opposed to the owner-occupier model. Perhaps the most conflicting 
piece of textual evidence is found in his explicit critique of an agrarian law. In his Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, Smith writes: 
For tho an agrarian law would render all on an equality, which has indeed something very 
agreeable in it, yet a people who are all on an equality will necessarily be very poor and 
unable to defend themselves in any pressing occasion…So that in the present state of 
things a man of a great fortune is rather of advantage than disadvantage to the state, 
providing that there is a gradual descent of fortunes betwixt these great ones and others of 
the least and lowest fortune.88 
 
Here, Smith identifies inequality in property ownership with favorable conditions for economic 
growth.89 His claim, moreover, that those who possess great fortunes are of an advantage to the 
state, insofar as their wealth descends down to those of “the least and lowest fortune,” is a claim 
that reappears in the Wealth of Nations.90 In the opening pages of the book, he claims that while 
modern commercial societies are vastly unequal in comparison to primitive societies, the 
“workman” of the “poorest” and “lowest” order is, nevertheless, significantly better provided 
for.91 This idea is also expressed in an early draft of the Wealth of Nations where Smith claims 
that the division of labor “can alone account for that superior opulence which takes place in 
civilized societies, and which, notwithstanding the inequality of property, extends itself to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
describe the proper development of society, which entails the growth of a division of labor and 
production of goods for aim of exchange.” Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 15. 
88 Ibid., 195-96.  
89 To reiterate the point made above, the idea that inequality is necessary for growth, is common 
theme in contemporary free market outlooks.  
90 Ibid.  
91 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 2. Here I follow Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff’s claim that this 
question was fundamental to Smith’s economic analysis in The Wealth of Nations. Istvan Hont 
and Michael Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: An Introductory Essay,” in 
Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, eds. Istvan 
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lowest member of the community.”92 Smith, then, did not identify an unequal distribution of 
property as the cause of impoverishment for the poor, as did Price. Alternatively, he set out to 
show how such inequalities would be compensated for by increases in productivity and the 
trickling down of wealth to the least advantaged members of society.   
Together, this suggests that Smith was likely on the side of the “improvers” in the debate 
over the enclosures in the eighteenth century. As Thompson notes, improvers, including Hume, 
directly refuted the republican critique of enclosure and the call for a more equal distribution of 
property.93 For instance, in his essay Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations (1752), Hume 
disputes the republican claim that modern commercial societies were less populous than ancient 
republics (a view held by Montesquieu).94 To dispute this, Hume argues that the republican 
dependency on slavery was itself a cause of depopulation. Smith’s critical mention of “party 
pamphlets,” which purported how “the wealth of the nation was fast declining, that the country 
was depopulated, agriculture neglected,” may also be a reference to contemporary concerns 
about depopulation and decline in tillage as a result of enclosure.95 Hume also held that the best 
way to encourage agricultural production was through the growth of industry and trade. A 
similar outlook is attested by Smith in his belief that demand from industrial growth and 
manufactures in the city helps increase agricultural output. This appears at odds with Price’s 
understanding of the self-sufficient yeomanry who rely on “homespun” clothing.96  
In his discussion of justice in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), 
Hume also directly criticizes the idea, which he attributes to the Levellers, that property should 
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be equally distributed.97 Smith, as seen above, repeats this sentiment in reasoning that while 
equality in property appears “agreeable” enough, it would prevent the large growth of fortunes, 
and consequently, lead to growing impoverishment for the laboring poor.98 Thompson notes that 
other proponents of enclosure, including Sir James Steuart, supported this view. Although 
sometimes a target of Smith’s criticisms, Steuart also viewed the removal of small proprietors as 
beneficial to the state, given that (echoing Smith) wealth would trickle down to the poor.99 
Steuart and other improvers also held that the consolidation of land would lead to the creation of 
new industrial laborers in the towns, which would then increase the demand and production of 
agricultural output.100 Thompson concludes of Hume and Steuart that their “contribution to the 
enclosure debate was to deny the economic value of the classical republican economy of 
independent smallholders.”101  
Other arguments that were used to challenge Price’s call for an agrarian reform included 
the claim that the exportation of surplus corn was essential for a nation’s wealth.102 It was also 
argued that permitting enclosure “was more compatible with individual liberty” and that the 
older open field system, “with its requirement of universal agreement among all proprietors as to 
the mode of cultivation, was an impediment which obstructed the natural course of production, 
and prevented the improvement of the land” (improvers here, apparently overlooked the role of 
the parliament in permitting such acts).103 In short, improvers applied anti-interventionist 
arguments to defend the use of property for enclosure or engrossing. Thompson concludes that 
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while Price and other opponents of enclosure invoked “moral and political reasons” for their 
opposition, improvers, of which many were Scottish thinkers, focused “on the economic 
potential of a modern system of large-scale commercial farming, liberated from the low 
productivity constraints of small-holding.”104   
In sum, although Smith held the independent owner-occupier—who is “a master, and 
independent of all the world”—in high regard, his esteem for the yeomanry did not translate into 
support for an agrarian ideal of a society of equals. Alternatively, in the debate between growth 
and equity, Smith’s economic analysis pushed him in favor of the former. This is not to suggest 
that Smith was altogether opposed to the value of equality, but rather that his interpretation of it 
differed from that of Price’s. On Price’s outlook the laboring poor ought to be compensated for 
their loss of property and/or access to the commons with actual property, whereas for Smith 
compensation takes the monetary form of a wage. As further evidence of this view, in his 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith claims that the greatest source of security within the nation 
comes from elimination of “dependency,” the opposite of “freedom and independence.”105 He 
continues:  
Commerce is one great preventative of this custom [having servants and dependents]. 
The manufactures give the poorer sort better wages than any master can afford; besides, it 
gives the rich an opportunity of spending their fortunes with fewer servants, which they 
never fail of embracing.106  
 
While both Price and Smith may have believed that those without property should not be left to 
suffer, for Price the compensation the poor receive in the form of a wage embedded them in 
relations of dependency and unfreedom. As attested by the passage above, Smith alternatively 
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describes wage labor as a practice that enables people to overcome servile relations. To 
understand why Smith did not follow Price on this point requires some further examination.  
 
Republican Freedom and Wage Labor 
It may be asked, given Smith’s expressed concern for the laboring poor, why it was that 
Smith did not promote Price’s conception of a society of equals? Above, I have argued for the 
possibility that Smith’s economic explanation rested on the assumption, circulated by 
“improvers” during this period, that the small owner-occupier model was not favorable to 
economic growth. However, it is also important to consider other normative views that may have 
influenced Smith on this point. In particular, an important difference between Smith and Price 
relates to Smith’s characterization of wage labor as a form of economic independence. In 
claiming that workers were free, Smith was less concerned with the fact that the monopolization 
of land encouraged the proletarianization of the rural poor.   
Smith’s account of economic independence marks a departure from other eighteenth 
century republican outlooks. As discussed in the introductory chapter, classical and agrarian 
republicans identified wage labor with republican unfreedom. On this outlook, it was believed 
that if a person was dependent on another for their subsistence, as a wage earner is on their 
employer, they could become subject to the arbitrary power of their provider. This outlook 
clearly informs Price’s criticism of engrossing and enclosure. For, on his account, removing 
people from the land forced them into greater dependency on the market for meeting their 
subsistence needs, and therefore into dependency on employers for earning a wage. For this 
reason, Price and others understood inequalities in property as a threat to independence and 
freedom.  
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In claiming that wage labor emancipates people from relations of dependency, Smith 
clearly departs from the classical and agrarian republican view. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Smith believed that the introduction of commerce dissolved feudal relations of 
servitude. To recall, in a key passage from the Wealth of Nations, Smith argues that workers 
achieve independence in market economies, because, unlike in feudal societies, producers are not 
dependent on any single person for their subsistence.107 His comments here correspond to the 
contemporary view that workers are not dominated by their employers since they possess the 
right to exit—i.e. the ability to leave their employers and seek employment elsewhere.108  
While Smith does not describe wage labor as a form of servitude, as did other 
republicans, it is important to note that he did comment on the oppressive conditions that 
workers faced. He notes, for instance, that in disputes over wages with their masters, workers 
were disadvantaged because they lacked the necessary stock (or capital) to withhold their 
labor.109 He comments that “a landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant” could live 
“a year or two” on the stocks they have saved up, unlike laborers who, for the most part, “could 
not subsist a week” without employment.110 Smith concludes from this, that while workers are 
necessary for masters, this “necessity is not so immediate” for the master as it is for the 
workman.111 In being dependent on their employer to provide them with a wage, employers also 
obtain an “advantage” in disputes over wages and are able to “force” workers into “compliance 
with their terms.”112 Smith comments, moreover, that the law tended to favor employers insofar 
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as it only prohibited the “combination” of workers and not the combination of masters.113 Smith, 
in the final book of the Wealth of Nations, also discusses the negative effects of the division of 
labor for the laboring poor. He claims that in subjecting workers to a type of labor that entails 
repetitive and simple “operations,” they are prevented from developing their “understanding.”114 
As a result of this, he claims that workers become “stupid,” “ignorant,” and incapable of 
developing their social, intellectual, and martial virtues.115  
  In these passages, then, Smith acknowledges the unequal relations between workers and 
their employers, as well as the demeaning and oppressive conditions that unskilled workers may 
be subject to. Smith does not conclude from this, however, that workers were therefore unfree. 
One possible explanation for this is that Smith held a proto-contractarian view of wage labor. On 
this outlook, because people possess property in their person, they are free to alienate it, like any 
other piece of property, through a contractual exchange. Although subject to the authority of 
their employer, insofar as they “freely” contracted out their labor, it cannot be said that their 
employers dominate them.  
 This outlook has its roots in the tradition of natural law, which was influential on Smith’s 
thinking, especially as it pertained to his jurisprudential and moral thought.116 Hugo Grotius, the 
natural law theorist Smith favorably addresses in his discussion of jurisprudence, is typically 
cited as a formative figure in the theorization of rights in terms of subjective possession.117 For 
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Grotius all rights entail a relationship of ownership, where to have a right to something is to have 
dominium over it. Grotius even goes so far as to claim that because persons have a right to 
liberty, and thus have dominium over their liberty, they are free to alienate it through voluntary 
submission into slavery or despotism.118  
 Not all natural law theorists are in agreement with Grotius. On Locke’s view, for 
instance, while rights are also viewed in terms of possession, the right to one’s liberty is 
something that cannot be alienated since this would be to “forfeit” one’s “preservation” and 
“life.”119 Since no one has “power” over their own life (only God does), he contends in The 
Second Treatise, no one can voluntarily give away their liberty, and thus their life, to another 
person.120 Locke does, however, permit a modified version of voluntary slavery in the form of 
servitude, where a master and slave enter into a contract of “limited power on the one side and 
obedience on the other.”121 He also gives the example of a time when men sold themselves into 
“drudgery,” a form of servitude distinct from slavery, where the masters do not possess absolute 
power over the life and death of their servants. Thus, in Locke, while absolute liberty is 
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inalienable (and slavery/absolutism objectionable) other rights remain alienable, including the 
right to alienate one’s labor.122 
 Smith’s views fall more in line with Locke than with Grotius.123 Like Locke, Smith sets 
limits on what rights can be alienated. He writes that because in voluntary slave contracts “the 
person and all he hath” is transferred to the master “from the moment the bargain begins,” such 
contracts are “illusory.”124 In agreement with Locke, however, Smith believes that people are 
still free to alienate their labor, and, in fact, that such an act is tantamount with one’s liberty. 
Smith’s adoption of this view is evident, for instance, in his criticisms of feudal and mercantile 
policies. In his critique of the guild system he employs a Lockean argument to claim that 
regulatory policies violated the right of workers to employ their labor as a form of “property” 
where they see fit. He writes (to quote at length again): 
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all 
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies 
in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength 
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain 
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty 
both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him.125   
 
On this outlook, independence and freedom are not tied to the ownership of property, but rather 
to ownership of property in the person. As further evidence of this, in his Lectures of 
Jurisprudence Smith identifies “commercial right,” or the “the right one has to the free use of his 
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person,” with a natural right of liberty.126 Smith’s account of natural liberty is also similar to the 
definition of liberty offered by Francis Hutcheson, his professor at the University of Glasgow 
(and Chair of Moral Philosophy). Hutcheson too lists a person’s right over their “industry” and 
“labour” as a right secured by natural liberty.127  
 Smith’s understanding of economic independence anticipates the outlook of “laissez-
faire republicans” in the nineteenth century. As Alex Gourevitch describes it, this variant of 
republicanism is characterized by its re-framing of wage labor as free labor.128 According to 
laissez-faire republicans, while workers may be subject to the authority of their employer, they 
are still free since they “voluntarily” contract out their labor. Laissez-faire republicans strongly 
opposed, moreover, the analogy made by republican radicals (i.e. labor republicans) in the 
nineteenth century between wage labor and slavery—i.e. “wage slavery.”129 The former group 
claimed that it was enough for workers to own their own labor to be independent and free from 
civil forms of domination. This discourse was most visible in state and federal United States 
                                                
126 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 8. Smith’s account of natural liberty is also similar to the 
definition of liberty offered by Francis Hutcheson, his professor at the University of Glasgow 
(and chair of moral philosophy). Hutcheson too, lists a person’s right over their “industry” and 
“labour,” as a right secured by natural liberty. Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy 
(London: A. Millar, 1755), 293-299. 
127 Hutcheson lists seven types of natural rights, including the right to life, liberty, private 
judgment, society (i.e. “commerce”), and marriage. Hutcheson’s discussion of liberty is as 
follows: “As nature has implanted in each man a desire of his own happiness, and many tender 
affections toward others in some nearer relations of life, and granted to each one some 
understanding and active powers with a natural impulse to exercise them for the purposes of 
these natural affections; ‘tis plain each one has a natural right to exert his powers, according to 
his own judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in all such industry, labour, or 
amusements, as are not hurtful to others in their persons or goods, while no more publick 
interests necessarily requires his labours, or requires that his actions should be under the 
direction of others. This right we call natural liberty.” Hutcheson, A System of Moral 
Philosophy, 293-299. 
128 Their conception of freedom was still based on the republican idea of sui juris, not a negative 
conception of freedom.  
129 Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 42-46.  
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Supreme Court decisions in the nineteenth century that ruled against protective labor regulations 
on the grounds that they violated the freedom of contract.130 In rejecting the connection between 
property ownership and independence, Smith offers an early example of the laissez-faire 
republican view.131 The question, however, concerning where Smith falls in the typology of the 
republican tradition will be further developed in the conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
In many ways, the enclosure debate in the eighteenth century can be understood as a 
debate over the meaning and significance of economic equality and independence. It was also a 
debate over how the newly emerging ownership society was to be organized. While Smith and 
Price both invoked the laboring poor in their economic discussions, they held very different 
views in regard to the type of reforms needed to improve the position of the least advantaged on 
the basis of these values. I have argued that, although Smith praises the independent farmer, the 
republican owner-occupier ideal was not the economic model he theorized and supported in the 
Wealth of Nations. Unlike other thinkers during the period, Smith fails to extend his critique of 
monopoly to the growing consolidation of land by the proprietor class. Two reasons I’ve 
conjectured for why Smith took this route include (1) his belief about the necessity of inequality 
(and large farms) for economic growth, and (2) his ethical judgment about the status of wage 
labor. This latter point will be considered in more detail in the next chapter on Kant. For Kant, 
like Smith, also rejects the classical republican association of wage labor with unfreedom.    
                                                
130 Ibid., 56-64. 
131 This too appears consistent with his inclusion of human capital as a type of “stock” in the 
form of “fixed capital” that one can invest in. Smith, Wealth of Nations, 358. 
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These observations prove especially important in determining whether or not Smith 
should be classified as a “capitalist” thinker. Smith’s criticisms of profit seeking merchants and 
manufacturers does not necessary translate into a critique of the capitalism of his day. To do so 
would require that he adopt the criticisms found in thinkers like Price, who attacked the 
monopolization of land by the gentry and the proletarianization of the rural poor through 
engrossing and enclosure.132 Interestingly, however, scholars on Smith have not paid sufficient 
attention to his views in relation to these important eighteenth century political and economic 
transformations. I hope to have shown why such an examination remains important in better 
situating Smith in his own historical moment and for scholars who rescue aspects of Smith’s 
economic and moral or political thought for their own normative projects.  
                                                
132 Allen makes the interesting point that early critics presented a different critique of enclosure 
than criticisms of primitive accumulation in Marx. For Marx, although he was critical of such 
processes, “he thought that those changes were progressive and desirable.” On this point then, 
Marx is in agreement with the “improvers” in the eighteenth century. Conversely, Allen seeks to 
support the early critics of enclosure by refuting the belief that large farming and enclosure was 
necessary for economic growth. For both economic and ethical reasons then, Allen argues in 
defense of the small-owner occupier model. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman, 10. For more on 
how Marxist theory departs from contemporary struggles of the global poor (especially global 
environmental movements) see: Omar Dahbour, “Marx and Political Ecology,” Radical 




Kant’s Republican Defense of the Market Economy 
 
 
In the previous chapters, it was demonstrated that the values Turgot and Smith attached to the 
free market economy faced serious scrutiny by critics of liberal reform in the eighteenth century. 
In contrasting their views to their contemporaries, concerns were raised about how their ethical 
defense of a market economy overlooked the deleterious effects of economic liberalization on 
the poor. This was exemplified in their inattention to the power that economic agents (i.e. grain 
merchants and traders, landlords, and employers) amassed through liberal reform. What is most 
troubling is that Smith and Turgot appear to adopt republican values in their defense of 
liberalization. This raises the question, how did pro-market thinkers overlook (or account for) the 
abuse of republican freedoms in the economic realm, in particular in the oppressive relationship 
that occurred between workers and employers? This chapter considers these themes in 
relationship to Kant’s economic thought. Kant is helpful in this discussion because he provides a 
philosophical explanation of republican freedom, which is lacking in Smith and Turgot. Kant 
thus might offer a stronger justification for the pro-free market, republican outlook of the 
eighteenth century.    
To consider the extent to which Kant is successful in his republican defense of the free 
market, this chapter examines his discussion of hereditary privilege, commerce, wage labor, and 
state intervention (in the form of wealth redistribution and protectionism). Before doing so, 
however, it should be noted that many scholars would dispute the characterization of Kant as a 
free market thinker. Because Kant’s comments on the topic are limited, there are conflicting 
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interpretations in the literature. On one interpretation, Kant is said to subscribe to the liberal 
economic outlook of his contemporaries, including Smith, whose work Kant was familiar with.1 
According to a second interpretation, however, it is argued that because Kant was amenable to 
wealth redistribution and state intervention in trade, he departed from the “radical” free market 
positions of his contemporaries.2 In contemporary terms, these two views might cast Kant’s 
outlook as aligning either with an anti-interventionist libertarian outlook or a liberal welfare-
oriented approach to the state and free markets.   
The problem with these contemporary interpretations, however, is that support for 
intervention is not incommensurable with support for a free market economy (as my introductory 
chapter demonstrates). Thus, it is possible that Kant’s favorable views on state intervention did 
not entirely set him apart from thinkers like Smith and Turgot. In order to clarify, then, what 
Kant’s views on the market were and how they fit in with the normative foundations of his 
republican thought, it will require a more detailed examination of his commentary on the topic.   
  
Republican Freedom and Hereditary Privilege 
This section introduces Kant’s republican conception of freedom and examines his 
application of it to the discussion of hereditary privilege. This feudal custom relates to economic 
concerns because it was viewed as a barrier to upward mobility in the eighteenth century. In 
Germany, moreover, although the process of state building was underway during this period, the 
authorities of the old estate society continued to hold significant political power. The feudal 
custom and practice of hereditary privilege had not yet been abolished.    
                                                
1 Samuel Fleischacker, “Values Behind the Market, Kant’s Response to the Wealth of Nations,” 
History of Political Thought 17, no. 3 (1996). 
2 Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Idea of World Citizenship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 145. 
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As Reidar Maliks details, three political positions dominated the eighteenth century 
German political landscape: the traditionalist defense of the old Reich, enlightened absolutism, 
and liberalism (backed by the emerging bourgeoisie).3 It was with the first group that the custom 
of hereditary privilege found its ideological support. As Maliks summarizes, traditionalists, 
including Justus Möser and Johann Gottfried Herder, defended the practice on the grounds that 
freedom was a privilege not a universal right. From the perspective of these thinkers, “social 
conventions and membership of traditional estates, guilds, and towns (characteristic of the late 
feudal old Reich) determine a person’s legal status, not natural rights.”4 In response to this view, 
Kant contends that hereditary privilege violates the innate right of freedom and the equality of 
opportunity granted to all through this fundamental right.   
Kant introduces the idea of equality of opportunity in his discussion of the three 
principles of public right.5 In his discussion of equality, the second principle of right, Kant 
permits that certain inequalities remain consistent with right, including disparities in wealth, but 
excluding hereditary privilege. He writes: 
Every member of a commonwealth must be allowed to attain any level of rank within it 
(that can belong to a subject) which his talent, his industry, and his luck can take him; 
and his fellow subjects may not stand in his way by means of a hereditary prerogative 
(privileges [reserved] for a certain rank), so as to keep him and his descendants forever 
beneath the rank.6 
 
Further on, Kant claims that because “birth is not a deed of the one who is born,” they “cannot 
incur by it… any other subjection to coercive laws than merely that which is common to him 
                                                
3 Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 17-23. 
4 Ibid., 45.  
5 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use 
in Practice,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 290.  
6 Ibid., 293. 
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along with all others.”7 In claiming that none can by birth or descendance obtain a “superior” 
status of rank, Kant contests the traditionalist outlook that viewed rights as privileges. 
Kant is careful, however, to emphasize that equality in rights is consistent with economic 
inequality. Kant assumes here that as long as people are equal before the law, other forms of 
inequalities that exist within the private sphere of the market or household are permissible.8   
After asserting one cannot bequeath one’s rank, he writes (reiterating his point in the passage 
quoted above): 
He may bequeath anything else, whatever is a thing (not pertaining to personality) and 
can be acquired as property and also alienated by him, and so in a series of generations 
produce a considerable inequality of financial circumstances among the members of a 
commonwealth (of hireling and hirer, landowners and agricultural laborers, and so forth); 
but he may not prevent their being authorized to rise themselves to like circumstances if 
their talent, their industry, and their luck make this possible for them.9 
 
This point will be returned to below. It is interesting to note here, however, that for Kant, the 
accumulation of wealth is associated with the existence of unequal social relationships, i.e. that 
between workers and employers. To understand how Kant views these inequalities to be 
consistent with right requires a closer examination of his understanding of freedom.  
Kant’s criticism of hereditary privilege relates to his conception of “innate equality,” 
which is entailed in his conception of freedom.10 In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant 
defines equality as “independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind 
them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui iuris).”11 Hereditary privilege 
violates this principle because it creates an intermediary power between subjects and the king, 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 292. 
9 Ibid., 293. 
10 Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy ed. and trans. Mary J. 
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 393-94. 
11 Ibid. 
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which can “coercively prevent others from attaining by their own merit the higher levels of 
subordination.”12 In other words, those with less privilege are asymmetrically bound by those 
with greater privilege in regard to rank and economic status. In addition to claiming that people 
are not responsible for the family they are born into, Kant also claims that no subject would 
willingly consent to such a situation. He writes, “Since we cannot admit that any human being 
would throw away his freedom, it is impossible for the general will of the people to assent to 
such a groundless prerogative.”13 Kant concludes that the sovereign ought to gradually phase out 
positions of nobility and let the “natural division into sovereign and people” replace that of “the 
division into sovereign, nobility and commoners.”14     
The emphasis Kant places on independence and the idea of being one’s “own master,” 
brings his account of freedom in line with the tradition of republican thought. As discussed in the 
introduction, there is significant historiographical debate over how to define this tradition. Here, 
I follow Philip Pettit’s classification of republicanism as a body of political thought that 
promotes the three following ideals: (1) civil freedom (where freedom is defined as non-
domination), (2) an “empire of law,” or “constitutional constraints associated broadly with the 
mixed constitution,” and (3) a “contestatory citizenry,” i.e. a citizenry with “virtue to track and, 
if necessary, contest public policies and initiatives.”15 On his account, moreover, the second two 
ideals are instrumental to the first. In other words, constitutional law, a division of power, and 
                                                
12 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 293.  
13 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 471. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Pettit, “Two Republican Traditions,” 170; Pettit, Republicanism, 20.  
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civic virtue are valued not as ends in themselves, but as ends to the means of securing republican 
freedom.16   
Republican thought originated in classical Rome, was revived in the Renaissance period, 
and informed political discourse throughout the periods of the English civil war, and the French 
and American Revolutions. Republican ideas also circulated in Germany during the period of the 
French Revolution.17 Kant’s critique of hereditary privilege, for instance, accords with the 
criticism of the French nobility put forward by Rousseau and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès whose 
ideas influenced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789).18 Other German 
intellectuals also (initially) received the news of the French Revolution favorably and viewed it 
as confirming their growing support for political freedom, i.e. the idea that citizens have the right 
to participate in government and hold the government accountable for its actions.19 However, 
because many Germans favored a form of republicanism that was compatible with constitutional 
monarchy, the radical turn towards popular sovereignty and the experience of the reign of terror 
caused many to withdraw their support.”20    
                                                
16 On Pettit’s view, republicanism is distinct from populism and the civic-humanist tradition. In 
these traditions, democratic ideals and civic virtue are viewed as ends-in-themselves, not as 
means to the ends of freedom. Moreover, from the republican outlook, democratic rule amounts 
to tyranny of the majority. Freedom requires, alternatively, that people be subject to universal 
laws, as opposed to the private interests of an individual (absolutism) or a majority (democracy) 
Pettit, Republicanism, 8; Ibid., 30.  
17 Hans Erich Bödeker, “The Concept of the Republic in Eighteenth Century German Thought,” 
in Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States 1750-1850, eds. Jürgen 
Heideking and James A. Henretta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35-52. 
18 Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 41.  
19 Bödeker, “The Concept of the Republic,” 36-7. For more on how Kant and other German 
intellectuals reacted to the French Revolution see Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 41-49.    
20 Bödeker, “The Concept of the Republic,” 48.   
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While thinkers within the tradition of republicanism diverge in important ways, they 
unite in their conceptualization of freedom as nondomination.21 This idea of freedom is rooted in 
Roman law and the legal category of sui juris, which refers to the status of a free, independent 
person or a person who is not under the power (potestas) of another.22 From the republican 
perspective, then, to be unfree is to be subject to the arbitrary power of another person, i.e. to be 
dominated. As Pettit explains:  
Such a relationship means, at the limit, that the dominating party can interfere on an 
arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated: can interfere, in particular, on the basis 
of an interest or an opinion that need not be shared by the person affected. The 
dominating party can practice interference, then, at will and with impunity: they do not 
have to seek anyone’s leave and they do not have to incur any scrutiny or penalty.23  
 
Importantly, on the republican outlook domination is distinct from interference: there can be 
domination without interference (a “non-interfering master”) and interference without 
domination (a “non-mastering interferer”).24 An example of the former case would be a master 
who does not interfere with the choices of their slave. In this instance, while the slave is free to 
choose, it is a freedom that is dependent on the goodwill of the master. Because the master still 
possesses the power to interfere, the slave remains unfree even though in possession of certain 
negative freedoms (freedoms from interference). Domination refers not to a specific act of 
interference, then, but “the capacity to interfere arbitrarily” in one’s choices.25  
Kant’s account of freedom is in accord with this view insofar as it characterizes freedom 
as the possession of a certain status (sui juris) that protects an individual from interference and 
                                                
21 MacGilvray notes that it was common for many thinkers who did not identify with 
republicanism in the eighteenth century to adhere to its account of freedom. MacGilvray, The 
Invention of Market Freedom, 16.  
22 Watson, The Digest of Justinian, 18.  
23 Pettit, Republicanism, 22.  
24 Ibid., 31.  
25 Ibid., 23.  
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not freedom from interference as such. This may not be initially apparent. In the Metaphysics of 
Morals, Kant claims that external freedom requires “independence from being constrained by 
another’s choice.”26 One is externally free, then, when their choices are not constrained by the 
choices of others, where choice is defined as the ability “to do or to refrain from doing as one 
pleases…joined with one’s consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one’s 
action.”27  
The emphasis on choice might lead one to believe that Kant is strictly concerned with 
freedom as a form of non-interference. This is not Kant’s view, however. He makes this clear, 
for instance, in claiming that the type of freedom protected under the doctrine of right is not 
“lawless” freedom—or the natural freedom people possess in a state of nature—but lawful 
freedom.28 The type of freedom protected under the doctrine of right concerns not the ability to 
do whatever one wishes: it does not concern the “end” each subject seeks out, i.e. the “matter” of 
one’s choice.29 Rather, it concerns what Kant refers to as the “form” of one’s choice.30 Form, 
alternatively, relates to “the way choices are reciprocally related.”31  
                                                
26 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 393.  
27 Ibid., 374-74.   
28 Ibid., 459.  
29 Ibid., 387. As Arthur Ripstein points out, it is difficult to conceive how an equal system of 
negative freedom could be established. Any attempt to protect one person’s negative freedom, 
will necessarily entail hindering another person’s negative freedom. Arthur Ripstein, Force and 
Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 
33. 
30 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 387. 
31 Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 68. Ripstein distinguishes this in terms of one’s capacity to 
choose, as opposed to the particular choices one makes. On this account, a person can fail to 
achieve their purposes, but still possess their freedom if their means to set and pursue self-chosen 
ends remain within their control and not another’s. In sum: “You are independent if you are the 
one who decides what ends you will use your means to pursue, as opposed to having someone 
else decide for you.” Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 33-34. 
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According to Kant, for the form of one’s choice to be free it must be independent from 
the constraint of other private wills.32 This is possible only under a system of equal laws, where 
all possess the legal status of being one’s “own master.”33 Kant’s account of external freedom 
refers, then, to the position and juridical status of the chooser as opposed to the particular choices 
made available to them. As Maliks summarizes, “Lawful freedom is choice-making that is 
compatible with the equal freedom of others. It means that a person is legally independent from 
the arbitrary wishes of another and lives under law.”34 The emphasis Kant places on being one’s 
own master (sui iuris), i.e. being free from the subjection to another’s private will (as opposed to 
non-interference), puts his account of freedom in line thus with the republican commitment to 
nondomination.35  
Kant’s political outlook also expresses the traditional republican commitment to a 
separation of power. Kant supports a division of power under a republican constitution, where 
the role of the executive is limited to executing the law, not creating it.36 The creation of law is 
the responsibility of legislators who construct laws on the basis of a hypothetical contract, i.e. 
where a law is just if it is in accord with the principle of right and people can, in theory, consent 
to it.37 Through this division of power and the establishment of constitutional law, citizens are 
                                                
32 Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 393. 
33 Ibid., 394.  
34 Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 69.  
35 Here I follow Ripstein and Maliks in their identification of Kant’s conception of freedom with 
the republican conception of freedom as nondomination. Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 42-43; 
Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 69-70. This is not to overlook the differences that exist 
between Kant’s account of freedom with other republican and neorepublican thinkers (including 
Pettit). However, to the extent that Kant adopts the sui juris category (from Roman law), 
emphasizes the “form” not “matter” of choice, and views law as constitutive of freedom, I find 
this identification to be a plausible one.    
36 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. 
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 324.  
37 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 296-97. 
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protected from the arbitrary abuses of rulers (who are also subject to the rule of law) and other 
members within society.38 For Kant, then, the type of freedom secured under the doctrine of right 
refers to an interpersonal form of freedom, where people are protected from the arbitrary 
authority of a ruler as well as other subjects.   
In this section, I have suggested that Kant’s political account of freedom was influenced 
by republicanism. The question that remains is whether or not Kant understood a market 
economy to be compatible with republican freedom. In the passages discussed above, Kant 
introduces the possibility that free labor markets and economic inequality do not in conflict with 
republican freedom. He states that civil equality is “quite consistent with the greatest inequality 
in terms of the quantity and degree of their [individuals’] possessions, whether in physical or 
mental superiority over others or in external goods.”39 This departs thus from the principle held 
by classical or agrarian republicans that material equality in physical property is important for 
political and civil freedom and that wage labor is a form of domination. This problem in Kant 
will be explored below. Next, however, it will help to consider Kant’s remarks on the concept of 
commerce more broadly. Unlike other republican thinkers who adopted a classical republican 
view of commerce, Kant holds a favorable view of it and attributes to it an important role in his 
political theory.  
  
Virtue, Commerce, and Doux Commerce 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, in the eighteenth century there was little 
consensus about the positive effects of liberal reform. Concerns were often raised about the 
                                                
38 It is important to note that Kant, like other republican thinkers, is critical of democracy. For 
Kant, rule by a democratic majority, like rule by an absolute sovereign, can result in the 
domination of a minority group. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace, 324.  
39 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 292. 
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worsening economic and political conditions of the laboring poor. In this period, there also 
circulated complaints about the negative effects of commerce on virtue. In particular, it was 
believed that commerce thwarted one’s capacity to put the public good before one’s own private 
interest. This idea was often expressed by republican thinkers who held that a virtuous citizen 
was a subject who submitted their private interest or will to the collective interest of the 
community, i.e. the general will.40 On this view, then, commerce, insofar as it was associated 
with avarice and self-interest, was viewed as a threat to the political order. As an example of this 
outlook, in Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), Rousseau comments on how people 
who were once “free and independent” have become “slave[s]” to their “fellowmen” in seeking 
to satisfy growing needs, claiming, moreover, that the desire to earn more money leads people to 
“harm” one another and use them as means to the ends of making a profit.41   
This eighteenth century outlook was a continuation of ancient and Christian views that 
identified commerce and the pursuit of wealth with vice and corruption. These historical 
arguments took many forms. In a general sense, the belief was rooted in the characterization of 
the economic realm as a “realm of necessity.”42 As MacGilvray explains, on this outlook, 
“acquisition and consumption of material goods is obligatory for all people—there can be no 
particular honor or dignity in that—and so freedom is associated…with the activities that one is 
able to engage in once these material needs have been satisfied.”43 The characterization of the 
pursuit of material gain as an inferior activity is exemplified in Aquinas, who, restating Aristotle 
                                                
40 MacGilvray, Invention of Market Freedom, 102-103; Ibid., 111. 
41 Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, 67-68. Rousseau is also critical of wage labor. In On 
the Social Contract (1762), he argues that in the ideal polity no one ought to be “so rich as to be 
capable of buying another citizen,” nor anyone “so poor that he is forced to sell himself.” Ibid., 
170. 
42 MacGilvray, Invention of Market Freedom, 84. 
43 Ibid. 
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on this point, claims that wealth is not a man’s “supreme good” because “wealth is not sought 
except for the sake of something else.”44 The concern was that if wealth was treated as an 
ultimate good instead of an instrumental good, it would deter people from the pursuit of virtue, 
i.e. ends that are good in themselves.  
For this reason, as MacGilvray notes, involvement in the productive realm was associated 
with negative character traits, including being “self-regarding, calculating, and even 
duplicitous.”45 Classical republicans, like Cicero, also adopted this view. Cicero, for example, 
claims that because of the temptation of trade and commerce in maritime cities, there is a greater 
risk of people abandoning their civic duties, including the cultivation of military skill.46 Classical 
republican thinkers, as noted in the introduction, were also led to exclude wage earners and 
dependents on the grounds that they were incapable of political participation.47     
These ancient and republican understandings of commercial life reemerged in the 
eighteenth century. In particular, a debate was spurred by a controversial text, The Fable of the 
Bees (1714) by Bernard Mandeville. In this satirical text, Mandeville compared two communities 
of bees: one that sought out virtue and the other that pursued vice. He concludes that because the 
former bee society destroyed its economy and the other, by promoting industry, contributed to its 
economic growth, that “private vices” promote the “public good.”48 In this, Mandeville inverts 
the republican argument that commercial behavior necessarily leads to corruption and decline.   
                                                
44 St. Thomas Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles,” in Reflections on Commercial Life: An 
Anthology of Classic Texts from Plato to the Present, ed. Patrick Murray (New York: Routledge, 
1997), 89.  
45 MacGilvray, The Invention of Market Freedom, 31. 
46 Ibid., 30.  
47 Ibid., 31. 
48 Bernard Mandeville. The Fable of the Bees: Or; Private Vices, Public Benefits (United 
Kingdom: J. Wood, 1772). 
 155 
Mandeville’s argument elicited a variety of responses, including retorts by several 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Francis Hutcheson and Andrew Fletcher, who both 
incorporated aspects of the agrarian republican view, were more favorable to the classical view 
that commerce can have a deleterious effect on society, whereas Hume attributed to commerce a 
more positive function. Smith’s treatment incorporated both perspectives. That is, he recognized 
the negative effects of commerce on virtue, but ultimately attributed (in Mandeville fashion) the 
pursuit of wealth to positive economic outcomes.49 
Kant does allude to this anti-commercial view in his text Critique of Judgment (1790). 
Here he associates commerce with “self-interest, cowardice, and weakness.”50 However, in other 
respects, Kant appears to side with the position of Mandeville and Smith. For instance, in an 
early text, he introduces the idea of unsociability, which appears to distance him from the 
concerns expressed by critics of commerce in the eighteenth century.  He writes:  
Without those characteristics of unsociability—which are in themselves quite unworthy 
of being loved and from which arises the resistance that every man must necessarily 
encounter in pursuing his self-seeking pretensions—man would live as an Arcadian 
shepherd, in perfect concord, contentment, and mutual love, and all talents would lie 
eternally dormant in their seed; men docile as the sheep they tend would hardly invest 
their existence with any worth greater than that of cattle; and as the purpose behind man’s 
creation, his rational nature, there would remain a void.51  
 
Kant’s outlook here is suggestive of the view that the pursuit of self-interest, despite its 
“unsocial” qualities, generates positive societal effects. While Kant is not directly addressing 
                                                
49 Consider, for instance, Smith’s discussion of the “invisible hand” in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. He claims the belief that wealth will bring us happiness is a deception, but it is a 
deception that “keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind.” Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 214-215. 
50 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2000), 146.  
51 Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” in Perpetual 
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self-interest within the sphere of the market, it seems possible, given his outlook, that he would 
be immune to the concerns expressed by classical and radical republicans about civic virtue. 
Kant’s identification of commerce with peace also provides further evidence that Kant 
rejected the republican concern about commerce. This appears in his discussion of cosmopolitan 
right, which includes the right to “seek commerce” as a general right of hospitality.52 Kant’s 
justification for commercial right is grounded in his assumption that commerce fosters relations 
of peace and civility. For example, in Toward Perpetual Peace Kant claims that the “spirit of 
commerce …cannot coexist with war,” and that states are “compelled…to promote honorable 
peace” due to “the power of money.”53 In accord with this sentiment, he also states that through 
relations of “trade” people enter into “understanding, community, and peaceable relations with 
one another, even with the most distant.”54   
Kant’s comments here accord with what historians now refer to as the “doux-commerce” 
thesis, or the idea that commerce tends to “soften” or “polish” manners.55 For example, in The 
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu writes: “it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are 
gentle (doux) mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle 
mores.”56 The characterization of commerce as a “moralizing” or “civilizing agent” was a 
common theme in eighteenth century discussions about the effects of commerce on civil society. 
Hume (who also favored free trade), for example, argues that the growth of industry leads to 
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developments in liberal arts: where “the same age, which produces great philosophers and 
politicians, renowned generals and poets, usually abounds with skillful weavers, and ship-
carpenters.”57  
Laurence Dickey suggests that Hume, and others, found support for the doux-commerce 
thesis in the stoic concept of Oikeiosis (or “sociability” within Natural Law theory): “a doctrine 
that holds that as human beings have more contact with each other they begin to exhibit a 
willingness to negotiate and co-operate with each other in common endeavors.”58 In line with 
this view, it was argued that because commerce brings people into greater forms of interaction 
with each other, people cultivate “other-regarding disposition[s]” and a growing sense of 
humanity and “cosmopolitan fellowship.”59 Demonstrating this perspective, Montesquieu (who 
clearly influences Kant) claims, “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace,” and the 
“spirit of commerce unites nations.”60 From the doux-commerce outlook thus the positive effects 
of commerce extend beyond private life into the public and international sphere.61   
From these passages, it appears that Kant understood commerce to promote positive 
virtues. This sets Kant apart from other eighteenth century thinkers who were skeptical about the 
societal effects of markets and brings his outlook closer line with pro-market thinkers like Hume 
and Smith. These observations do not yet demonstrate, however, Kant’s understanding of how 
the economy ought to be organized, given that “commerce” can occur in different institutional 
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frameworks, nor does it make the connection between freedom and a market economy. It is to 
these latter points that we now turn.  
 
Kant on Wage labor 
An important claim advanced by Turgot and Smith is that a market economy liberates 
producers from relations of servitude and protects their individual freedom. To recall, Smith 
expresses this view in the third book of the Wealth of Nations, where he contends that “the most 
important” effect of introducing commerce and manufactures in Europe was that it brought about 
“liberty and security” for individuals.62 Smith attributes this to the independent or impersonal 
nature of market relations. He states that in contrast to feudal relations, where “tenants and 
retainers” are dependent on a single lord for their subsistence, in market societies “tradesman[s] 
or artificer[s]” derive their subsistence not from any one particular person, but potentially “a 
hundred or a thousand different customers,” and therefore are “not absolutely dependent upon 
any one of them.”63 For Smith, then, in market societies, sellers of goods and the wage-laborers 
they employ are not subject to the forms of “servile dependency” that characterized feudal 
relations of production.64   
That Smith adheres to this view, I suggest, also relates to his adoption of a contractual 
understanding of labor. Both Turgot and Smith refer to labor as a type of property and therefore 
something that can be voluntarily alienated without violating the liberty of the person. On this 
outlook, the alienation of labor becomes an act that is expressive of freedom. This view departs 
from agrarian republicanism, which describes freedom not in terms of one’s ability to own and 
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alienate one’s labor, but rather as a form of self-governance over labor and the ownership over 
property in land. On the agrarian republican outlook, if a person owns land or has free access to 
it, they will not be compelled to work under the direction of an employer. Thus, access to land is 
viewed as a necessary means to securing republican freedom and preventing servitude in the 
form of wage labor.  
Kant, I argue, adopts a view similar to that of Turgot and Smith in terms of identifying 
wage labor with freedom. Kant’s description of producers as free, however, is not entirely 
straightforward. On the one hand, Kant, like Smith, characterizes craftsmen, merchants, artisans, 
and leasehold farmers (as opposed to tenant farmers) as independents, i.e. as subjects who 
possess the quality of “being one’s own master (sui iuris).”65 For Kant, to be one’s own master it 
is necessary to own “some property,” but this property can include “any art, craft, fine art, or 
science,” insofar as one can be supported by it, presumably through the sale of it in exchange for 
goods or money.66 For this reason, Kant includes “craftsmen” along with landowners as an 
example of subjects who are entitled to a vote.67  
On the other hand, however, and in contrast to Smith, Kant appears to identify wage 
earners as “passive” not “active citizens.”68 Passive citizens are dependent citizens and therefore 
are disenfranchised citizens; they possess civil freedom but lack political freedom. Kant defines a 
“dependent” as “anyone whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) depends 
not on his management of his own business but on arrangements made by another.”69 Examples 
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66 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 295.  
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Kant provides here include a woodcutter for hire, a private tutor, and a tenant farmer.70 Much 
like Smith’s description of servants beholden to feudal lords, Kant says of these subjects that 
they are “underlings of the commonwealth because they have to be under the direction or 
protection of other individuals, and so do not possess civil independence.”71   
Kant’s characterization of wage laborers as dependents (i.e. passive citizens) might imply 
that he did not ultimately view wage earners as free in the republican sense of the term. If this 
were correct, his outlook would fall closer in line with the classical republican view. The 
important thing to note in response to this concern is that Kant does not identify dependency with 
an absence of civil freedom, but rather with an absence of political freedom. Thus, in his 
discussion of active and passive citizenship requirements, he concludes of passive citizens: “This 
dependence upon the will of others and this inequality is, however, in no way opposed to their 
freedom and equality as human beings, who together make up a people.”72 Kant reasons, 
moreover, that because positions of higher rank and active citizenship status are open to other 
members of society, such inequalities remain consistent with right, where “anyone can work his 
way up from this passive condition to an active one.”73  
To recall, for Kant, people are free when they are free from forms of arbitrary authority. 
This, however, is secured through the establishment of a republican constitutional order, not 
through participatory forms of democracy. Thus, if one lacks political freedom, i.e. the right to 
vote, they still remain in possession of their status as a free person in possession of the same 
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rights as other citizens (albeit not the right to vote). Kant, moreover, has pragmatic reasons for 
excluding dependents from the right to vote. Kant’s worry is that if dependents are enfranchised, 
they will vote under the direction of their master. Kant was not alone in holding this view.74 
Under the influence of the Abbé Sieyès, who feared that universal franchise would empower the 
aristocracy, the distinction between active and passive citizenship was enacted into law at the 
start of the French revolution.75  
Despite, however, Kant’s assurance that wage laborers remain equal under civil law 
(even if they are disenfranchised), his description of them as dependents still raises some 
concern. For instance, Kant writes:  
Thus the welfare of one is very much dependent upon the will of another (that of the poor 
on the rich); thus one must obey (as a child its elders or a wife her husband) and the other 
directs; thus one serves (a day laborer) and the other pays him, and so forth.76  
 
Kant’s comments here are consistent with his remark, quoted above, that dependents remain 
under their superior’s “direction.”77 His claim that dependents are under an obligation to “obey” 
and “serve” private persons, moreover, appears to contradict his view that they possess equal 
civil freedoms. For, as discussed earlier, Kant is opposed to the existence of intermediary powers 
between citizens and the state. Maliks describes the problem as follows:   
The remaining puzzle, which still lacks a satisfactory answer, is why Kant was prepared 
to accept that women and mere workers could be completely subservient in private 
relations. As contemporary Kantians have argued, it is difficult to see how their 
dependent position is compatible with their innate right to freedom as independence, 
since it renders them very much dependent on the arbitrary choices of a paterfamilias or 
an employer. That such private relations of dependence are sometimes chosen by the 
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dependent person does not solve the problem, since, as Bergk rightly pointed out, giving 
up one’s natural right to independence is to make oneself into a mere thing.78  
 
Maliks therefore suggests that Kant does not provide a satisfactory answer as to why private 
forms of subjection are consistent with civil freedom. Presumably, Kant’s claim that higher 
positions of rank remain open to dependents does not detract from the fact that people within 
these positions are still subject to forms of domination.   
It seems possible, however, that Kant understood his account of contractual rights to 
refute these concerns. Contract rights are private acquired rights that grant individuals exclusive 
entitlements to acts performed by other persons. Specifically, Kant defines a contract as a 
“possession of another’s choice, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to 
a certain deed in accordance with laws of freedom.”79 Kant permits, then, the possibility that 
one’s choice can be subject to another’s control without it violating their freedom. Through a 
contract, Kant writes, “something is added to my external belongings; I have become enriched by 
acquiring an active obligation on the freedom and the means of the other.”80  
The possibility that one can come to acquire another’s choice without violating their 
independence is attributed to the consensual nature of the act. For Kant, contracts are the result 
of a “united will.”81 That is, one can only come to acquire a right to the deeds of others if it is the 
result of a mutual agreement and never through a unilateral acquisition.82 Ripstein summarizes 
the view as follows:  
If I consent to your use of my person (or powers) or property, I have decided how they 
will be used, and so your use of them is an exercise of my freedom. If I consent to your 
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doing something that injures me or damages my property, the injury or damage results 
from the exercise of my choice.83  
 
Thus, through contracts, acts that would otherwise be coercive become expressive of freedom. 
Granting another the use of your powers or the right to set ends for you become permissible in 
this context.    
This is equally true in the case of employment contracts. Kant explicitly makes reference 
to the employment contract in his discussion of contracts to let and hire (locatio operae).84 These 
contracts entail “granting another the use of my powers for a specified price.”85 Importantly, for 
Kant, the employment contract is unlike a slave contract, for which Kant, in agreement with 
Smith and Rousseau, rejects.86 Bergk’s criticism in the quoted passage above (by Maliks) 
therefore overlooks the fact that Kant does not permit contracts that entail the complete 
alienation of one’s freedom (i.e. voluntary slave contracts), and that Kant therefore would oppose 
an employment contract based on these terms. For Kant, to renounce one’s freedom is to 
renounce all obligations and make any contract null.  
Conversely, employment contracts (ideally) grant others the use of your powers, but 
within certain limits, and through mutual agreement. Kant is especially clear on this point, 
writing:  
Now it might seem that someone could put himself under obligation to another person, by 
a contract to let and hire (location conductio), to perform services (in return for wages, 
board or protection) that are permissible in terms of their quality but indeterminate in 
terms of their quantity, and that he thereby becomes just a subject (subiectus), not a 
bondsman (servus). But this is only a deceptive appearance. For if the master is 
authorized to use the powers of his subject as he pleases, he can also exhaust them until 
his subject dies or is driven to despair (as with the Negroes on the Sugar Islands); his 
subject will in fact have given himself away, as property, to his master, which is 
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impossible. – Someone can therefore hire himself out only for work that is determined as 
to its kind and its amount, either as a day laborer or as a subject living on his master’s 
property (MM, 6: 330). 
 
Kant suggests, then, that workers may be subordinate to their employers, but not subordinate in 
the sense that would entail a real loss of freedom. To ensure this, Kant contends that contracts 
must specify the quality and quantity of work in order to limit the scope of the employer’s 
authority. Workers must serve their employer, but in doing so they are following through with 
the terms of an agreement they negotiated and consented to.    
In characterizing contractual relations as free relations, Kant’s commentary can be 
interpreted as responding to classical concerns about wage labor. For, although Kant 
characterizes wage laborers as servile, passive citizens, he views them as free citizens (in the 
republican sense of the term), nonetheless. As I suggest in the case of Smith, Kant’s 
identification of wage labor with free labor brings his views, moreover, closer in line with 
“laissez-faire republicanism” in the nineteenth century.87 On this outlook, and in contrast with 
the radical and classical republican view, ownership of property in the person (i.e. labor power) 
is viewed as sufficient grounds for economic independence and therefore freedom.  
An important question that remains, however, is whether or not Kant is successful in 
making this argument. There are, on the one hand, reasons to be skeptical here. One reason being 
that Kant and other defenders of the right of contract overlook structural forms of coercion that 
put workers and employers on unequal footing. Workers, insofar as they lack access to land, 
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resources, and wealth, are forced to become wage earners, and possess, moreover, significantly 
less bargaining power in disputes over working conditions and wages. To say workers “freely” 
enter into employment contracts therefore overlooks the structural conditions that coerce workers 
into accepting non-ideal conditions and pay. This was, moreover, why Price and other anti-
enclosure critics opposed the removal of small proprietors from the land.  
Secondly, the role of consent in contract theory (as described above by Ripstein) also 
raises concerns. While one may consent to the use of their person to their employer, it is not clear 
that the act of consent therefore legitimates what might otherwise appear as an act of domination. 
In line with this view, Carole Pateman argues that the idea of the contract, or contracting out 
one’s labor, is a fiction that masks relations of subordination.88 In sum, a defense of Kant’s views 
would have to respond to criticisms of contractarianism and make a case for its compatibility 
with republican values. This problem, I would add, remains true for contemporary republican 
thinkers who also maintain that free market practices (including wage labor) are compatible with 
a republican commitment to nondomination. 89  
  On the other hand, however, (and in response to these concerns) Kant may have assumed, 
like Smith, that competitive market conditions enhance republican freedoms because workers are 
free to leave their employers in the case of abuse. This refers to the idea of a “right of exit.” The 
problem with this response is that although workers are not subject to any single employer in a 
free labor market, they are still subject to employers as a class, insofar as they are forced to sell 
                                                
88 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
89 Some contemporary republican thinkers view the free market and capitalism to be compatible 
with republicanism (albeit under certain conditions). For example, although Anderson, in Private 
Government, is critical of workplace domination, she does not argue against free markets or 
capitalism. In another example, Robert Taylor argues, “the proper republican attitude toward 
competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent.” Robert Taylor, Exit Left: Markets 
and Mobility in Republican Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7. 
  
 166 
their labor to access their means of subsistence. Alternatively, Kant may have believed that a 
state welfare system, which Kant appears amenable to, could protect workers from domination in 
private labor markets. The next section further elaborates Kant’s views on this topic to better 
assess this possibility.  
 
Intervention: Wealth Redistribution and Protectionism 
As noted in the introduction, several scholars have objected to the characterization of 
Kant as a free market thinker. Many would dispute, for instance, F.A. Hayek’s claim that Kant’s 
political philosophy provides grounds for rejecting a model of welfare state liberalism. Hayek 
associates Kant’s political philosophy with his own neoliberal outlook, claiming, for instance, 
that both defend a “negative” conception of justice, which is opposed to an anti-liberal “social 
justice” theory.90 While most contemporary Kant scholars oppose this interpretation, some 
continue to identify aspects of Kant’s economic views with the free market position of his 
contemporaries, including Smith. This section will consider two views Kant held that complicate 
the pro-free market interpretation. One relates to his support for wealth redistribution by the state 
and the other his support for protectionist policies in foreign trade.  
Hayek’s claim is presumably rooted in Kant’s criticism of paternalism and his 
identification of the just state with freedom. According to Kant, the positive laws of a just state 
have their basis in the a priori principle of right. Right refers to “the sum of the conditions under 
which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal 
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law of freedom.”91 In this way, right and therefore the basis of the state is grounded in a concept 
of freedom, where freedom is defined as “independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice.”92   
Because the basis of the state is external freedom, Kant rejects the possibility that the 
state has a duty to secure the individual well-being or happiness of its subjects. Kant writes that 
“the concept of an external right” is grounded in the idea of “freedom in the external relation of 
people to one another,” and that, moreover, it “has nothing at all to do with the end that all of 
them naturally have (their aim of happiness) and with the means for attaining it.”93 The following 
quote from On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use in 
Practice emphasizes this point:   
No one can coerce me to be happy in his way (as he thinks of the welfare of other human 
beings); instead, each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him, 
provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which 
can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a possible universal law 
(i.e., does no infringe upon this right of another). A government established on the 
principle of benevolence toward the people like that of a father toward his children—that 
is, a paternalistic government (imperium paternale), in which the subjects, like minor 
children who cannot distinguish between what is truly useful or harmful to them, are 
constrained to behave only passively, so as to wait only upon the judgment of the head of 
state as to how they should be happy and, as for his also willing their happiness, only 
upon his kindness—is the greatest despotism thinkable (a constitution that abrogates all 
the freedom of the subjects, who in that case have no rights at all).94  
 
Kant’s comments here accord with his claim in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
that the “proper end of nature” does not relate to preservation, welfare, or happiness, but rather to 
the creation of a “good will,” which is also a free will.95 Kant reasons, moreover, that happiness 
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cannot be universalized into law: “the highly conflicting but always changing illusion in which 
someone places his happiness… make any fixed principle impossible.”96 Freedom thus, in the 
moral and political realm, is the proper end for rational beings.   
Kant suggests therefore that directing people in their pursuit of happiness or welfare is an 
infringement on the freedom of individuals to choose their own ends. This outlook is not far 
from Smith’s insistence that the state should limit its involvement in the economic activity of its 
citizens. There is also some textual evidence that Kant was concerned about the negative 
economic effects of intervention. Fleischacker, for instance, interprets an early passage from Idea 
for a Universal History as suggestive of this view.97 In the passage, Kant suggests that 
constraints on political or civil freedoms hinder “trade” and can weaken a nation’s international 
standing.98 Kant also contends that hindering subjects in their pursuit of  “well-being” “hampers 
the liveliness of enterprise generally.”99  
As further evidence of this interpretation, Fleischacker also points to Kant’s 
characterization of sumptuary laws, i.e. laws that prohibited the importation of luxury goods, as 
paternalistic. In his lectures on anthropology, Kant states: “If the regent makes the subjects 
immature, they are indignant. Denmark therefore did not do well when it introduced the order 
governing dress. Smith, in the book on national character, says just this.”100 Kant’s comments 
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here are not very surprising given his familiarity with Smith’s writing. Kant read Smith’s Theory 
of Moral Sentiments in the 1770s and is believed to have read The Wealth of Nations, although 
perhaps not in its entirety, quickly after the release of the German translation in 1776.101  
A closer examination of the economic views of Kant’s adversaries also lends support for 
the view that Kant was in agreement with Smith’s economic outlook. As Maliks details, Kant’s 
criticism of paternalism can be read as a response to enlightened absolutism, which was a 
dominant political outlook of the period. According to this school of thought, represented by 
thinkers like Christian Wolff, the role of the state is to “promote human perfection.”102 
Importantly, in order to achieve perfection, the state was held responsible for the welfare of its 
subjects. On Wolff’s view, as Maliks summarizes, “monarchs could intervene in the economy to 
encourage growth in rural areas and towns, build infrastructure, subsidize the arts, promote 
public health, and supervise public morals.”103  
Other thinkers associated with this school of thought include Johann Heinrich Gottlob 
von Justi and Joseph von Sonnenfels, who both produced important texts in the area of 
cameralist thought.104 Cameralists believed that the strength of the sovereign (and the state) was 
tied to wealth, which was derived through the revenue of the sovereign’s subjects. As Keith 
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Tribe summarizes: “The political power of a ruler was therefore directly linked to the economic 
welfare of that ruler’s subjects: the (political) happiness of a ruler rested upon the (economic) 
happiness of his subjects.”105 Unlike the Smithian view, however, it was believed that economic 
prosperity was the outcome of proper government oversight and management—i.e. not the 
invisible hand of the market. Justi and Sonnenfels’ writings offered thus various instructions 
related to forms of economic regulation.106  
Interestingly, Tribe notes that although cameralist thought had little influence outside of 
Germany during its period of activity, one notable exception is found in the economic thought of 
Sir James Steuart. Steuart drafted parts of his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy 
during his stay in Germany and is thought to have been one of Smith’s targets in his attack on 
mercantilist thought.107 To the extent that Kant also criticizes these views, it seems plausible that 
he sides with the liberal economic outlook. Maliks draws a similar conclusion and categorizes 
Kant’s political thought as aligning with the outlook of the emerging Prussian bourgeoisie, 
contending that Kant “supplied Germany’s growing middle classes with a metaphysical 
foundation for their liberal aspirations.”108  
As mentioned, however, there are some problems with this interpretation. The first being, 
that Kant, despite his warnings about paternalism, claims that the state is responsible for the 
welfare of the poor. He writes:  
To the supreme commander there belongs indirectly, that is, insofar as he has taken over 
the duty of the people, the right to impose taxes on the people for its own preservation, 
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such as taxes to support organizations providing for the poor, foundling homes and 
church organizations, usually called charitable or pious institutions. The general will of 
the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain itself perpetually; and for 
this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in order to maintain 
those members of the society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of state 
the government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of 
sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural 
needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth, since they owe 
their existence to an act of submitting to its protection and care, which they need in order 
to live; on this obligation the state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to 
maintaining their fellow citizens.109 
 
Given Kant’s warnings about paternalism, his reasoning is not entirely developed here. However, 
he suggests that economic welfare is a necessary component for the “preservation” of the just 
state, i.e. a state in which the external freedoms of all are secured.110   
Kant’s comments also do not explicitly state the extent to which the poor should be 
supported and therefore the extent to which the property rights of the wealthy are to be limited. It 
is clear, however, that he believes the state has a duty to ensure the welfare of the poor. He 
reiterates this claim, in a separate discussion on foundations (state-established institutions that 
exist “for the benefit of certain members”).111 Here, he promotes the existence of institutions for 
the “poor, invalids, and the sick.”112 Interestingly, he notes that it may be more consistent with 
freedom to support the poor and sick “with certain sums of money” so they can board where they 
choose, adding that when boarded in “splendid institutions, serviced by expensive personnel” 
their freedom is limited.113  
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Some scholars conclude from these passages that, according to Kant, freedom entails 
some basic assurance that subsistence needs are met. On this view, poverty relief is a duty of the 
state because it is tied to freedom. For example, Allen Wood writes: 
If we wonder how the state’s concern with the physical survival of its members can be 
reconciled with its fundamental task of protecting their external freedom, then we should 
reflect on the obvious fact that physical survival is a necessary condition for any human 
being to exercise free agency.114  
 
This position contrasts with twentieth century libertarian or neo-liberal outlooks that insist on the 
separation of wealth and freedom. From this perspective, one can be poor but still free, insofar as 
they remain free from the coercion of others.115 Wood’s comment suggests, however, that Kant 
adopts a more robust conception of freedom (compared to a negative conception), which 
emphasizes the importance of providing people with material goods so they are enabled to freely 
act on and develop their capacities. Wood concludes, moreover, that for these reasons, Kant 
should not be associated with a libertarian outlook.   
In line with this interpretation, Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant’s support for an 
interventionist state distinguishes his economic outlook from “radical” free trade proponents in 
the eighteenth century, including Smith.116 Kleingeld concludes as much not only from Kant’s 
remarks on wealth redistribution, but also on the basis of his commentary on free trade. In 
disagreement with Fleishacker’s interpretation of Kant, she points to a footnote where Kant 
appears to support protectionist policies in foreign trade. The footnote occurs in a passage where 
Kant claims that laws aimed at protecting the prosperity and welfare of citizens can be justified 
insofar as they are needed to secure a “rightful condition.”117 Kant claims that such laws bring 
                                                
114 Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 196. 
115 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 68.  
116 Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 145.   
117 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 298. 
 173 
“strength” and “stability” “internally and against external enemies,” so that people can “exist as a 
commonwealth.”118 Kant includes as an example of such legislation, prohibitions on trade:  
Certain restrictions on imports are included among these laws, so that the means of 
acquiring livelihood will promote the subjects’ interests and not the advantage of 
foreigners or encouragement of others’ industry, since a state, without the prosperity of 
the people, would not possess enough strength to resist foreign enemies or to maintain 
itself as a commonwealth.119 
 
Kant claims, in other words, that the state is not prohibited from improving the welfare of its 
subjects, including through the protection of domestic industry, if such measures can be deemed 
necessary for the securing of external freedoms and not happiness. Kant’s remark therefore goes 
against Smith’s argument that import restrictions are economically harmful for the nation.  
 Kant also appears to support protectionist policies in his discussion of colonialism. In 
Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant claims that China and Japan “wisely” place restrictions on 
trade with other countries.120 Kant’s praise of these protectionist policies is the outcome of his 
critical observation of “civilized” and “commercial” states who visit foreign countries “under the 
pretext…to set up trading posts,” but engage in acts of “oppression” which lead to the 
“incitement” of “wars, famine, rebellions, treachery.”121 For these reasons too, Kant establishes a 
limiting condition for cosmopolitan right. On this limiting condition, “the right to visit” does 
“not extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old 
inhabitants.”122 As Kant puts it in the Metaphysics of Morals, cosmopolitan right does not permit 
the “right to make a settlement on the land of another nation.”123 Some scholars, including Peter 
Niesen, conclude from this that Kant is critical of colonialism not only as the “imposition of 
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political order,” but also as the imposition of “a particular economic order by outside forces.”124 
He writes, “Kant’s opposition to colonialism is fueled by doubts about the universal introduction 
of a proto-capitalist private law system [that] would entail open borders for economic interaction 
on a global scale.125 In other words, Niesen assumes that Kant’s critical stance on colonialism 
translates into a criticism of free trade and capitalism.   
  Kleingeld and Niesen assume, then, that Kant’s economic thought is categorically distinct 
from an eighteenth century pro-free market outlook. They overlook, however, how in making 
exceptions to the principle of non-intervention, Kant did not depart from other eighteenth century 
free market advocates. On the topic of free trade, Smith, for instance, does not oppose all 
prohibitions on imported goods. Of the four exceptions to free trade that Smith permits the one 
that is most similar to Kant’s passage (quoted above) is his support for the British Navigation 
Acts.126 Smith contends that the Acts, like other trade restrictions, are economically harmful. 
However, because the shipping industry is tied to Britain’s military defense, Smith views them as 
necessary. He writes: “As defense, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act 
of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.”127 Here 
interestingly, Smith, like Kant (as well as other mercantilists of the period), puts national security 
at the center of his policy prescription. Smith also includes as an exception to free trade the 
removal of restrictions on manufactured goods that are widely produced in the home country. 
Smith comments: “humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored 
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only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection.”128 To do 
otherwise and remove prohibitions immediately might “deprive all at once many thousands of 
our people of their ordinary employment and means of subsistence.”129 Smith ultimately thinks 
that such a possibility is unlikely, given the ability of people to take up employment elsewhere, 
but his comments point to his amenability to government oversight for the sake of the nation’s 
economic welfare.     
As recent scholarship emphasizes, moreover, Smith was also not opposed to wealth 
redistribution.130 Smith includes in the final book of The Wealth of Nations several examples of 
public goods that the state may be responsible for paying, including public education. Smith’s 
comments on education follow his description of how the division of labor hinders the 
intellectual capacities of workers. From this he concludes, “For a very small expence the public 
can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, 
the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education.”131 Smith also favors 
progressive taxation.132 This includes his suggestion to tax luxury vehicles at a higher rate for 
tolls in order that “the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very easy 
manner to the relief of the poor.”133 In response to house rent taxes falling “heaviest upon the 
rich,” he writes, “in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very 
unreasonable.”134 And that, moreover, “It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute 
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to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that 
proportion.”135  
Lastly, Kant’s comments on Japan and China do not necessarily support the view that he 
was entirely opposed to free trade. After all, on Kant’s account, both countries do not completely 
cut off trade; they only restrict it, allowing, “access, but not entry” in China and access to the 
Dutch, though not with the “natives” in Japan.136 What is completely cut off, however, is the 
possibility of contact with the “natives” and “entry” beyond, presumably, the nation’s ports or 
commercial centers.137 It is possible to interpret his comments here as a praise of Japan and 
China’s ability to steer off European attempts at political conquest. In other words, that Kant 
favorably views the regulation of trade in these countries, not as ends in themselves, but rather as 
means to the ends of warding off political annexation.   
It is, moreover, anachronistic to interpret Kant’s critical remarks on colonialism as an 
implicit critique of free trade and therefore capitalism.138 As Dickey discusses, free trade ideas in 
the eighteenth century were often combined with anti-imperialist politics. Dickey examines how 
in tying commerce to universal benevolence, the doux-commerce thesis informed criticisms 
against British policy in the American colonies during the eighteenth century.139 Benjamin 
Franklin, for instance, under the influence of David Hume’s “Jealousy of Trade” (1760) essay, 
criticized the regulatory policies of England as “selfish” and put forward suggestions for England 
to adopt a laissez-faire approach in the colonies.140 As discussed in a previous chapter, Smith 
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also employed the argument for free trade in his defense of American independence. According 
to Smith, moreover, the injustice of European colonialism was not the imposition of economic 
order through free trade policies, but instead the imposition of economic order through monopoly 
(often in the form of joint-stock companies) and regulation—i.e. through mercantile policies141. 
It seems equally anachronistic to interpret Kant’s reference to “commercial” countries, which are 
responsible for colonial violence, as meaning “capitalist” countries. Likely, such a term was 
alternatively associated with the mercantile policies that dominated European political and 
economic practices during this period.    
 
Conclusion 
In sum, while Kant’s support for wealth redistribution and state intervention conflicts 
with some contemporary forms of free market fundamentalism, it was not entirely at odds with 
an eighteenth century free market outlook, which was equally amenable to state intervention, 
welfare support, and anti-imperialism. In his comments on hereditary privilege, commerce, wage 
labor, and intervention, Kant thus shares much in common with Turgot and Smith. This is not to 
overlook some anomalies. The footnote supporting import restrictions does raise questions 
concerning the extent to which Kant fully understood or adopted all aspects of Smith’s economic 
views on foreign trade.    
Kant also appears sympathetic to small landowners. Kant, like Smith, was opposed to 
entails, but goes further in suggesting that the consolidation of land is inconsistent with right. For 
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instance, in his explanation for why votes should be allocated according to property ownership 
and not the size of one’s property, as was supported by Turgot, Kant comments as an aside:   
Without even raising the question, how it could with right have come about that someone 
received as his own more land than he could himself make use of with his own hands (for 
acquisition by military seizure is not first acquisition), and how it came about that many 
human beings who could otherwise have acquired a lasting status of possession were 
thereby reduced merely to serving him in order to be able to live?142 
 
Here Kant appears sympathetic to the agrarian republican outlook. Much like Smith, however, 
Kant does not suggest anything like an agrarian reform to limit the appropriation of land 
(domestically). Alternatively, his comment in the same text that one may rightfully bequeath 
wealth and contribute therefore to “considerable inequality of financial circumstances among the 
members of a commonwealth” conflicts with this sentiment.143 What may be concluded from 
this, is that while there is significant evidence that Kant sided with many aspects of the 
eighteenth century pro-market outlook, he was also an inconsistent or undecided economic 
thinker—which would account for the several inconsistencies in his texts. On balance, however, 
like Turgot and Smith, it is not evident that Kant supported the more radical reforms of agrarian 
republicans who favored an egalitarian property scheme within the emerging ownership society.  
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CONCLUSION 
Economics Beyond Turgot, Smith, and Kant 
  
 
While Turgot, Smith, and Kant did not use the word “capitalism,” their economic thought 
responded to developments associated with the transition to a capitalist economy in the 
eighteenth century. This included the liberalization of domestic and foreign trade, the enclosing 
and engrossing of land, and the proletarianization of the laboring poor. As discussed in the 
introduction, capitalism is one possible institutional form that a market economy can take. What 
defines a capitalist economy is a property regime that endorses private over social or public 
forms of ownership. For this reason, capitalism is associated with a “proprietarian” ideology.1 
Economies that favor egalitarian distributions of wealth generally oppose this logic because they 
seek to limit the sacrosanctity of private property. As discussed throughout this dissertation, 
many of these thinkers made exceptions to non-intervention and set some limitations on property 
rights. Several contemporary scholars conclude from this that eighteenth century pro-market 
thinkers should not be read as apologists of capitalism, but rather as critics. 
This concluding chapter introduces some of these interpretations as they are applied to 
Smith’s economic outlook.2 After providing an overview of these interpretations, I draw from the 
previous chapters to challenge their conclusions. I suggest that, on balance, these thinkers did not 
adopt the progressive economic reforms that were advanced by other eighteenth century thinkers. 
As such, the identification of early pro-market thought as anti-capitalist proves unsubstantiated. 
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In particular, I challenge Elizabeth Anderson’s interpretation of Smith as a “commercial 
republican” thinker who was opposed to laissez-faire capitalism. I suggest that there is a closer 
analogy between Turgot, Smith, and Kant with the emergence of “laissez-faire republicanism” in 
the nineteenth century. I conclude by offering some suggestions for how the economic ideals of 
agrarian and labor republicanism provide a more egalitarian normative framework for rethinking 
contemporary economic practices.  
 
Smith the Anti-Laissez-Faire Thinker 
Scholars who interpret Smith as a critic of capitalism often point to his amenability to 
state intervention as evidence to support this claim. They claim that because Smith sought to 
limit the autonomy of the market, his approach to the economy was a socially embedded one. 
Interestingly, this assessment is in accord with Polanyi’s commentary on eighteenth century 
political economy. On Polanyi’s account, prior to the 1820s economic liberalism existed only as 
a “spasmodic tendency” that had not yet developed into a full-blown economic theory and 
practice.3 Polanyi comments, for instance, that to “credit François Quesnay with having 
envisaged such a state of affairs [i.e. laissez-faire] would be little short of fantastic.”4 He claims 
that Quesnay (and the Physiocrats), while supporting free trade in grain, otherwise demanded 
“the regulation of industry and agriculture by a supposedly all-powerful and omniscient 
government;” and that the “idea of a self-regulating system of markets had never as much as 
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entered his mind.”5 While Polanyi, moreover, is critical of Smith’s thesis of the “economic man” 
(i.e. the so-called natural “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”), he views the association 
of Smith with laissez-faire as equally misguided.6 He writes that, “wealth was to him merely an 
aspect of the life of the community, to the purposes of which it remained subordinate.”7 On 
Polanyi’s view, then, eighteenth century thinkers assumed the importance of a socially embedded 
market economy. They did not, conversely, advocate fully subjecting economic activity to 
market mechanisms outside the control of societal regulations and norms.   
Contemporary scholars writing on this topic are largely in agreement with Polanyi’s 
assessment. They note how Smith and other early free market thinkers differ from nineteenth 
century economic liberals, insofar as they promoted greater forms of state intervention in the 
economic sphere. Debra Satz, for instance, is explicit in making this connection. Drawing from 
Polanyi’s work, she claims that Smith and other classical economists “emphasized the social 
embeddedness of markets.”8 She claims that these thinkers “saw that markets could not become 
the sole institution or sole organizing principle of a liberal society without destroying that 
society,” and that, moreover, “they recognized that markets required limits if a liberal society, 
based on the equality and freedom of its members, is to be maintained.”9 
She notes that, in general, Smith identified markets as social institutions that have both 
positive and negative effects on individual freedom. In the case of the former, she points to 
Smith’s observation, made in the third book of The Wealth of Nations, that markets can free 
people from relations of dependency and servitude. Smith, to recall, attributes this to the 
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independent, or impersonal, nature of market relations.10 As Satz summarizes it: “freedom of 
commerce creates the possibility of multiple and optional webs of relationship with anonymous 
others, thus undermining the relations of personal and direct subjection and servility that 
characterized feudalism.”11 Smith characterizes this, moreover, as “the most important” effect of 
introducing commerce and manufactures in Europe.12   
Satz claims, however, that Smith also understood freedom to be a contingent feature of 
markets. Smith was aware, in other words, that markets could also curtail the freedoms of the 
laboring poor. This is evident in passages where Smith describes workers as being subordinate to 
the authority of their employers, and in his discussion of the negative impact of unskilled labor 
on workers’ capabilities. In response, she claims that Smith believed that a number of conditions, 
both political and economic, had to be in place for the freedom of laborers to be secured. Satz 
claims that Smith understood how in order to prevent employers from taking advantage of 
laborers, markets had to be competitive, and workers had to be skilled.13 She also alludes to the 
idea of a “right of exit”— the idea that in competitive labor markets, the threat of a worker 
leaving the job incentivizes employers to comply with their demands.14   
On the political end, Satz views Smith’s support for various forms of state intervention as 
a means to further protect worker’s liberties. As an example of this, she points to a passage 
where Smith appears to suggest that regulation is only “just and equitable” when it favors 
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workers, and not their employers, in disputes over wages.15 In further support of her view that 
“Smith was no simple critic of government intervention in markets,” she points to his 
amenability to progressive taxation, state-funded public education, and intervention in credit 
markets (i.e. favoring a limit on rates of interest).16 Satz concludes from these passages, 
moreover, that:  
Smith made an important contribution to economic thought with his observation that 
specific types of exchanges have constitutive effects on their participants. For this reason 
I doubt that Smith would accept “the market” as the essence of those practices we 
conventionally label “the labor market” or endorse the view that employment regulations 
should be driven entirely by efficiency criteria. Indeed his perspective—that labor 
markets shape workers’ capacities and preferences—can be expanded to embrace a vision 
of the role that work plays in our lives that links work to some level of material well-
being (a minimum wage), democratic organization (union organizations, worker’s rights 
on and off the job, the workplace as a site for furthering democratic capacities, perhaps 
by lessening the sharp divide between manual and mental labor), and for some balance 
among our different life activities (hours regulation). At the very least Smith himself 
clearly recognized that the functioning of labor markets inevitably raises questions 
relevant to the structure of public life, in a way that the functioning of a market in cars or 
apples does not.17 
 
Satz’s interpretation of Smith is intended to show how early free market thinkers judged the 
market on normative grounds that differ from the criteria employed in contemporary economic 
theory. On this latter outlook, market failure is associated not with the curtailment of freedom, 
but rather with failures in allocative efficiency or in preference maximizing capabilities.18 
Alternatively, on her view, because Smith is concerned with the political and moral effects that 
markets have on subjects, he constructs a system that would grant greater institutional power to 
the state to regulate labor markets on behalf of the workers. For these reasons, Satz views 
Smith’s approach to markets as one that falls within the category of a socially embedded outlook.    
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While Satz is correct to point out that Smith was favorable to certain forms of 
intervention, to what extent does this prove that he was a critic of capitalism? Satz seems to 
suggest as much in her claim that Smith adopts an “embedded” approach to markets and would 
be in favor of workplace democracy or worker unions. Satz’s comments here appear to place 
Smith in the tradition of socialist thought. This conclusion, however, seems unsupported. As 
noted in chapter two, while Smith was critical of the fact that the law favored employers over 
workers in disputes, he did not suggest that workers should be permitted to “combine.”19 That is, 
Smith was critical of the combination of both employers and workers. This is significant, 
moreover, given Smith’s claim that workers, because they possess less stock than their 
employers, are at a disadvantage in bargaining over wages.20 Although Smith recognizes the 
political and economic advantages that result from unequal holdings of capital, it seems unlikely 
that he would be open to anything that would radically limit the profits that accrue to owners and 
employers. To recall, Smith believes that without the incentive of a profit, owners of capital 
would not risk their investments.21   
Smith’s discussion of progressive taxation also does not extend to landowners. In book 
five, he comments that, in general, “every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to 
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the 
public treasury of the state.”22 On the rent of the land, while Smith permits a tax on landlords, he 
insists that such taxes should not inhibit the improvement of the land. He writes: 
The principle attention of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every means in his 
power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer; by allowing both to pursue 
their own interest in their own way, and according to their own judgment; by giving to 
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both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompence of their own 
industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part of their 
produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest communication both by 
land and by water, through every part of his own dominions, as well as the most 
unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes.23 
 
His comments on progressive taxation occur thus not in his discussion of the rent of land, but 
instead when he discusses taxes on housing—which is an unproductive unit, unlike the land.24 In 
defending the rights of the landlords and farmers, the emphasis is not on limiting the 
accumulation of property or wealth of proprietors, but rather encouraging it. It aligns thus with 
the emerging proprietarian ideology of modern ownership societies, which does not seek to 
radically limit the wealth of proprietors or the gentry class. 
Smith’s support for intervention, then, departs from the anti-capitalist outlook of the 
critics discussed in the preceding chapters. From this perspective, it was argued that a more equal 
distribution of land would increase opportunities for the ownership of property and, therefore, 
economic self-sufficiency. Thinkers like Price opposed the process of enclosure and engrossing 
on the grounds that it led to the proletarianization of the poor. Critics of liberal reform in France 
also opposed the introduction of free trade in grain because it allowed the owners of grain to 
dictate the price and allocation of grain. To reiterate the point emphasized in the introduction, 
when discussing alternatives to contemporary free market economies, it is not just about 
intervention: “the fundamental question…is not ‘free market’ or ‘intervention,’ but rather 
intervention ‘for whom’ and ‘for what.’”25 The types of reform proposed by the critics of the 
grain trade and the enclosures, also sought intervention. Their proposals, if enacted, would have 
radically hindered the ownership rights of an emerging class of wealthy proprietors and 
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employers. Alternatively, Turgot, Smith, and Kant, as I have demonstrated in the preceding 
chapters, often took the side of defending the property rights of employers, landlords, and 
merchants. That is, the types of intervention they sought, were consistent with permitting forms 
of inequality in wealth. This is most explicit in Kant, who claims that economic inequality is not 
inconsistent with right.    
 
Smith the Commercial Republican 
Elizabeth Anderson goes further than Satz in arguing that Smith supported a more equal 
distribution of property and subsequently a reduction in the commodification of labor. Anderson 
suggests, then, that Smith favored a limitation on the property rights of the gentry and merchant 
classes. On Anderson’s account, Smith was a “commercial republican” thinker, where 
commercial republicanism: 
secures widespread personal independence through a property regime that supports self-
employment. This requires free markets in consumer goods and land, because state-
granted monopolies and privileges, and property rules such as entail and primogeniture, 
concentrate the means of production in a few hands and thereby force the rest into 
dependency.26 
 
Anderson suggests that republican support for free markets in the eighteenth century was 
understood in terms of its ability to break up monopolies in agriculture and trade. In the 
mercantile state, trade was an exclusive and monopolistic practice controlled by the state and the 
guilds. The presumption was that free trade would increase opportunities for self-employment. In 
agriculture, Anderson emphasizes how Smith opposed primogeniture on the grounds that it 
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would increase the number of yeoman farmers (which she defines as “small proprietors who 
work their own land”).27   
Anderson claims that there are four features of commercial republicanism (as it is 
developed by Smith) that make it distinct from laissez-faire capitalism. These include: (1) A de-
emphasis on economies of scale, (2) the lack of joint-stock companies, or the use “of stock 
markets for raising capital,” (3) small labor markets and, (4) support for “pro-labor state 
regulation.”28 She claims that although Smith was “not as hostile as radical republicans to wage 
labor,” he supported a society in which wage labor would be minimized through the existence of 
small-scale enterprises. She comments how these enterprises, moreover, “could still support a 
robust republican culture of workers’ independence, since they could be run on a collaborative 
basis.”29 The upshot of Anderson’s interpretation is that she believes Smith favored the breaking 
up of monopolies in trade and land and supported the decommodification of labor. Anderson 
makes this point explicit in her book Private Government, where she claims, “the early pro-
market view did not aim to promote the commodification of labor.”30 She continues: “rather, 
they hoped that with the right reforms, the emerging market order would liberate people from 
servitude, including wage labor, rendering it—in Lincoln’s most optimistic vision—at most as 
only a temporary stage of life.”31  
In many respects, Anderson brings Smith’s commercial republican view closer in line 
with the agrarian republican tradition, which supported self-employment and property 
redistribution on the basis of their identification of wage labor with servitude. This is clear in 
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29 Ibid., 58. 
30 Anderson, Private Government, 124.  
31 Ibid. 
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Anderson’s characterization of Smith, along with the Levellers, Locke, Thomas Paine, and 
Abraham Lincoln, as an advocate of a “free society of equals.”32 From the preceding chapters, I 
hope to have shown why Anderson’s grouping together of these diverse range of thinkers faces 
several shortcomings once the details of their outlooks on markets, property distribution, and 
wage labor are considered in more detail. In chapter three, I demonstrate how Smith, while 
critical of monopolies, did not oppose the monopolization of land that occurred in the period of 
the parliamentary enclosures. Although Smith criticized primogeniture and praised yeoman 
farmers, his economic thought presupposes and favors a model of agrarian capitalism that relied 
on large farms and wage labor. Additionally, Smith departs from the agrarian republican outlook 
in adopting a contractarian view of the employment contract that identifies wage labor with 
freedom.  
In sum, Turgot, Smith, and Kant were critics of “ternary” (to borrow Piketty’s term) 
societies. As such, they opposed existing forms of inequality that resulted from status-based 
distinctions in the feudal era. This included economic privileges such as royal monopolies (or 
patents) and hereditary privileges that limited property ownership. The new proposals for an 
ownership society that were intended to replace ternary societies came in a variety of forms that 
were more or less egalitarian in their economic outlooks. Smith, as I’ve demonstrated, did not 
follow in adopting the more progressive measures proposed by his contemporaries. Anderson has 
erred thus in classifying Smith (and also Locke), as a thinker that favored a limitation on the 
accumulation of property.  
 
Laissez-Faire Republicanism 
                                                
32 See chapter one in Private Government. Ibid., 1-37.   
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As discussed in the introduction, on the classical and radical republican view, because 
wage labor was associated with economic dependency, it was seen as a form of republican 
unfreedom. From this perspective, to acquire the status of sui juris one had to be free from the 
control or direction of another’s private will. Wage labor, because it entails following the orders 
of a private employer or master, was viewed as a form of unfreedom on both of these accounts. 
The association of wage labor with dependency, was expressed in particular by agrarian 
republicans in their distinction between free labor and wage labor. To recall, this view was 
articulated in Lincoln’s statement: “The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for 
wages awhile, saves surplus with which to buy tools or land, for himself; then labors on his own 
account another while…[this] is free labor.”33 Agrarian republicans supported reforms that 
would increase opportunities for land ownership and self-employment, believing that progressive 
redistributive efforts were the best means to eradicate the existence of “wage slavery.” 
The commercial republican interpretation of wage labor departs from the agrarian view, 
insofar as it views wage labor as a form of economic independence. This is evident in Smith’s 
comparison between feudal and market societies, and his claim that in the latter artisans and 
tradesmen (and also the wage laborers they employ) are free from relations of servility.34 
Scholars frequently cite Smith’s discussion here to emphasize the normative dimensions of his 
economic outlook. What is overlooked, however, is the extent to which Smith’s departure from 
the republican tradition (and its characterization of wage labor as servitude) brings his views 
closer in line with traditional laissez-faire. For instance, Lisa Herzog also makes note of Smith’s 
                                                
33 Lincoln, “Address before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society,” 478-79.  
34 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 526. 
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departure from the “civic humanist” tradition and its ascription of “a special dignity and capacity 
for virtue” to the possession of landed property.35 She writes: 
By expanding the notion of capital, Smith turns civic humanism against itself, as it were: 
commerce and exchange, seen by civic humanists as corrupting the moral bases of 
society, lead to a situation in which everyone can participate, on an equal legal footing, in 
the independence that the civic humanists value. Not everyone has the independence that 
comes from landownership, but almost everyone has, or can acquire, human capital. This 
allows people to choose freely whom to work for and with whom to enter into exchange 
relationships, rather than depending on one single employer, as had been the case in 
feudalism. These one-sided dependencies, with all their opportunities for personal 
animosities and sadism, are replaced by the “cash-nexus,” which connects people of 
equal legal standing, and by an ‘exit option’ for any particular relationship, because every 
customer contributes ‘but a very small proportion’ to a person’s subsistence.36 
 
Anderson and Satz adhere to Herzog’s charitable reading of Smith. This is puzzling, however, 
insofar as this outlook is one that is characteristic of a traditional defense of laissez-faire.37 This 
is especially surprising for Anderson, given her criticism of workplace domination that is 
permitted by the “private government” of the workplace. Anderson is critical of how contractual 
relations for most workers (who are “at-will”) are undemocratic, even if they remain free to leave 
and work for another employer. Perhaps aware of this tension, Anderson erroneously claims that 
Smith sought to limit the commodification of labor and develop an economy of self-employed 
workers. 
In the typology of republicanism, then, the distinction between “commercial 
republicanism” and the development of “laissez-faire republicanism” in the nineteenth century is 
                                                
35 Herzog, Inventing the Market, 70. 
36 Ibid. 
37 As Milton Friedman writes: “the central feature of the market organization of economic 
activity is that it prevents one person from interfering with another in respect of most of his 
activities. The consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other 
sellers with whom he can deal. The seller is protected from coercion by the consumer because of 
other consumers to whom he can sell. The employee is protected from coercion by the employer 
because of other employers for whom he can work, and so on. And the market does this 
impersonally and without centralized authority.” Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 14-15. 
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a tenuous one. On Gourevitch’s account, laissez-faire republicanism is a variant of republicanism 
that is characterized by its re-framing of wage labor as free labor.38 He attributes the emergence 
of this view to the rapid expansion of a permanent wage-labor force and introduction of factory 
production in the nineteenth century. Because “free labor,” as agrarian republicans defined it, 
became increasingly difficult to obtain, economic independence took on a new meaning. On this 
outlook:    
The free laborer is free in virtue of the control he exercises over his labor-power as his 
own property, not as a form of inalienable control over the activity of work itself. To 
freely alienate this control over one’s capacity to labor, through a labor contract, was no 
violation of one’s independence because the individual had consented to give this control 
over his property to another for a specified period of time and on terms to which he had 
consented.39 
 
In other words, where agrarian republicans claimed that economic independence was made 
possible through owning productive property and thereby having direct control over one’s labor, 
laissez-faire republicans claimed that it was enough to possess property in one’s person to be 
considered economically independent. On this view, while workers labor under the private will 
of an employer, they do so “voluntarily” by consenting to the terms of their employment. This 
outlook can also be described as the application of proprietarian logic to labor. Because labor is 
described as a type of property, employers can claim that any intervention in employment 
contracts violates the worker’s property rights.  
Although Gourevitch identifies laissez-faire republicanism as a nineteenth century 
development, I suggest that this outlook has its origins in thinkers like Smith and Kant, who both 
view wage labor as an expression of republican freedom.40 This is especially clear in Kant’s 
discussion of wage labor and employment contracts. Kant, although describing wage-laborers as 
                                                
38 Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 51.  
39 Ibid., 61. 
40 Ibid., 49.  
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“dependents,” does not view them as unfree in the republican sense of the term. Alternatively, 
Kant views wage laborers as lacking political freedom (as being passive not active citizens), but 
not as lacking in civil freedom. For Kant, moreover, civil freedom is republican freedom. Kant 
also adopts this view by incorporating the idea of contractual rights, which allows him to claim 
that wage laborers are both dependent on their employers and civilly free. Gourevitch overlooks 
this important distinction and mischaracterizes Kant as a pre-nineteenth century thinker who, like 
Cicero, identifies wage labor with dependency and therefore represents an economic outlook 
closer in line with the classical republican view.41  
 
Labor Republicanism 
To help illuminate how the ideals of the agrarian republican tradition may be of use in 
contemporary approaches to markets, this section considers the idea of labor republicanism.  
As already discussed, the agrarian republican tradition sought to overcome economic 
dependency by equalizing property ownership and establishing greater opportunities for free 
labor in agricultural production. This model came closest to being enacted in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries in America, as exemplified in the egalitarian property schemes 
proposed by Lincoln, Paine, and Jefferson.42 In England, given the rapid consolidation of land, it 
was too late for the agrarian reforms proposed by anti-enclosure thinkers to be enacted.    
In the nineteenth century American context, as the number of wage laborers rose and 
industrial employment expanded, the agrarian republican model became increasingly untenable. 
                                                
41 Ibid., 49. 
42 A closer study of the American (agrarian) republicans and their views on slavery would have 
to be factored in to consider the extent to which their model was fully egalitarian. For a 
discussion on Jefferson’s republicanism and slavery see Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: 
Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2012), 250-253.  
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In response, there emerged a “labor republican” movement that adjusted the small producer ideal 
of the agrarian republican tradition to the contemporary industrial setting. This labor republican 
outlook was articulated in the early 1820s-30s by “workingmen’s” organizations and again (in a 
more developed form) in the late nineteenth century by the Knights of Labor.43 What united this 
group of thinkers was their republican critique of wage labor and adoption of the principle of 
cooperative production.   
The labor republican critique of “wage slavery” was directed at the laissez-faire 
reformulation of wage labor as free and voluntary. On this account, wage laborers were said to 
be free because they possessed control or ownership over their labor power. Laissez-faire 
republicans claimed that insofar as workers were free to enter and leave employment contracts or 
to alienate their labor power as they saw fit, they were not subject to the arbitrary authority of a 
single employer. Any attempt to intervene in labor markets, moreover, was viewed as a violation 
of the worker’s right to enter into contract with the employer of their choosing.44 
 In response to this argument, labor republicans claimed that although workers were not 
legally bound to their employers (as in the case of chattel slavery), they were still subject to them 
through “personal” and “structural” forms of economic domination.45 Gourevitch details how 
labor republicans articulated this claim.46 In terms of the structural aspect of domination, it was 
                                                
43 The Knights of Labor formed in 1869 as a “secret organization.” Peak membership reached 
700,000 members in 1886, but the organization dissolved in the 1890s. Gourevitch, From 
Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 99.  
44 Gourevitch provides an overview of court cases where this logic was applied. The most 
famous case being Lochner v. New York in which a maximum hours law for bakers was rejected 
on the basis that it “infringed” on the liberties of the workers and their “independence of 
judgment.” Ibid., 63.  
45 This is Gourevitch’s terminology. Ibid., 106-16. 
46 What follows is a summary of Gourevitch’s reconstruction. As he notes, the labor republican 
view was never articulated as a “philosophical form of a formal treatise,” but rather was 
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argued that unequal distributions of property compelled dispossessed workers to sell their labor 
to the property owning class. To recall, this view was central to Price’s criticism of the 
enclosures. While workers were not legally forced to work for an employer, the fact that they 
lacked “material independence” (i.e. productive assets) meant that they were economically 
compelled to be dependent on a minority class of landowners.47 It was emphasized too, 
moreover, that while workers were free to leave an abusive employer, they were not free to opt 
out of selling their labor power altogether. In other words, while workers were not subject to a 
single employer, insofar as they lacked material assets, they remained subject to employers as a 
class.   
It was also argued that these structural relations supported personal forms of domination 
both in the making of the employment contract and in the worker’s relationship to their 
employer. In this way, labor republicans offered a criticism of the contractual defense of wage 
labor theorized by laissez-faire advocates. In regard to the making of the employment contract, it 
was argued that because workers are dependent on their employers for their livelihood, they are 
forced to accept conditions of labor that they would otherwise be opposed to (i.e. if they were 
materially independent). Employers and workers, in other words, do not meet each other as 
equals in setting the terms of the contract by virtue of the fact that the employers are owners of 
property, while workers are not.  
What made workers unfree in the eyes of labor republicans was not only the fact that 
workers lacked bargaining power in setting the terms of the contract. It was also understood that 
the employment contract itself was constitutive of subordination and servitude. This is because 
                                                                                                                                                       
articulated in a variety of essays, pamphlets, and other textual sources throughout the period. 
Ibid., 101.  
47 Ibid., 107. 
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the labor contract entailed handing over one’s person to the private use of another. On the 
classical republican outlook, this was an obvious instance of domination, insofar as the person is 
subjected to an arbitrary will. On the contractual view, however, as long as one consents to the 
use of their person by another, it cannot be said to be in violation of their freedom. Gourevitch 
insightfully details the labor republican response to this argument:   
It was a mockery of the idea of consent to say that the worker, by agreeing to sell his 
labor, had thereby consented to every command of the boss, and thus followed only his 
own will. The actual contract was exactly the opposite, an agreement not to control those 
decisions—an agreement of subjection. In fact, to labor republicans, the whole point of 
the contract was that the worker had consented to evacuate his will, to suspend its 
exercise for the period of employment. Outside violating the very general terms of the 
contract, the employer was at liberty to do what he liked. Here was where labor 
republicans drove home their argument against the laissez-faire republicans. The basic 
logic of any contract to sell property was that sale of a commodity involves giving over 
ownership and control rights of that commodity to the buyer. But the special character of 
the labor commodity—as a physical commodity (the body) inseparable from the seller’s 
person—meant that labor contract was necessarily an agreement to give up control over 
the seller’s will for the duration of the working day.48 
 
It was unclear, in other words, how the act of consent (which, moreover, can hardly be said to be 
given “freely” by the dispossessed) made it such that the worker was no longer subject to the 
authority of their employer. Therefore, from the labor republican view, what appeared to be an 
act of domination from one perspective was the paradigm of freedom from another. 
 Contemporary scholars, including Carole Pateman, have put forward similar critiques of 
contract theory. Like the labor republicans, Pateman, although herself not a republican thinker, 
also views contract theory as a “means of creating relationships of subordination” that are, in 
turn, “presented as freedom.”49 Pateman claims that contracts, like the employment contract, are 
                                                
48 Ibid., 113. 
49 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 118. 
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constitutive of social relations where obedience is exchanged for protection.50 Where, the one 
“who provides protection, has the right to determine how the other party will act to fulfill their 
side of the exchange.”51 This is true, for example, in the employment contract, given that, in 
return for remuneration, the worker agrees “to obey the direction of an entrepreneur.”52 Pateman 
concludes from this that the identification of contracts with freedom is ideological, insofar as 
contractual agreements entail submission into a relation of subordination.     
Pateman’s critique of contractarianism is indebted to Rousseau, who offers a similar 
criticism of social contract theory. In general, social contract theorists argue that political 
authority is justified if people agree to it.53 Hobbes, for example, claims that the authority of the 
sovereign is legitimate because people bring the sovereign into power through a contractual 
agreement (whether voluntarily or not). Rousseau’s criticism of Hobbes is that his version of the 
social contract is not actually contractual in the sense of constituting a free mutual agreement, 
given that it entails the exchange of freedom for protection. On Rousseau’s view, such an 
                                                
50 Pateman also refers to the employment contact (as well as the social contract in liberal 
societies) as a “promise to obey,” which is distinct from a promise. She writes of this distinction: 
“Promising…implies that individuals are capable of independent judgement and rational 
deliberation, and of evaluating and changing their own actions and relationships; promises may 
sometimes justifiably be broken. However, to promise to obey is to deny or to limit, to a greater 
or lesser degree, individuals’ freedom and equality and their ability to exercise these capacities. 
To promise to obey is to state that, in certain areas, the person making the promise is no longer 
free to exercise her capacities and decide upon her own actions, and is no longer equal, but 
subordinate.” Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critique of Liberal 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 19. While rejecting aspects of Hegel’s 
version of the social contract, she remarks that she is indebted to him for her theorization of 
promising. Ibid., 106.  
51 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 59. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Social contract theorists have different interpretations of what is entailed by “agreement.” For 
some, hypothetical consent is possible (i.e. tacit consent). For others, partial consent is sufficient. 
Rousseau’s account is more radical in demanding full agreement by those who are ruled (albeit 
excluding women). On these distinctions see Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 15-
16. 
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exchange cannot be described as contractual, given that the act of alienating one’s freedom is a 
contradiction in terms. In this way, Rousseau viewed Hobbes’ social contract to be analogous to 
slavery, which Rousseau argues is a relationship based on force, not contractual agreement.54      
Rousseau’s alternative social contract theory claimed that sovereignty is an inalienable 
right of the people. On this view, in order for people to remain free but still subject to civil laws, 
they must live under the laws that they themselves have created. In this way, people maintain 
their freedom because they are subject to a collective will, not the private will of a sovereign. 
Rousseau’s solution to the problem of political authority relates to the idea of popular 
sovereignty and self-governance. As Pateman describes it, Rousseau’s version of the social 
contract was a “democratic” account that criticized the “liberal” account of political obligation.55 
It was, moreover, a similar theory of democracy that informed the labor republican’s solution to 
workplace domination.     
As Gourevitch details, in response to their analysis of workplace domination, labor 
republicans theorized an alternative economic arrangement of cooperative production. This 
model entailed “an economy of interdependent producer and consumer cooperatives, collectively 
owned and managed by workers.” 56 Labor republicans, then, went beyond the individualist 
agrarian model of their predecessors (although, importantly, still employed the ideal of “self-
                                                
54 As Rousseau writes: “Finally, it is a vain and contradictory convention to stipulate absolute 
authority on one side and a limitless obedience on the other. Is it not clear that no commitments 
are made to a person from whom one has the right to demand everything? And does this 
condition alone not bring with it, without equivalent or exchange, the nullity of the act? For what 
right would my slave have against me, given that all he has belongs to me, and that, since his 
right is my right, my having a right against myself makes no sense?” Rousseau, The Basic 
Political Writings, 145. 
55 Pateman agrees with Rousseau and claims that political authority (or authority in any sphere) 
is justified only through participatory or self-managing forms of democracy. Pateman, The 
Problem of Political Obligation, 5. 
56 Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 118. 
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governance” advocated by Price). Recognizing the cooperative nature of industrial labor, they 
reinterpreted what “productive control” over one’s labor would have to entail.57 On their view, 
this “could only mean equal, collective rule over their joint activity.”58 Like Rousseau’s solution 
to the problem of political absolutism, labor republicans claimed that workers were free only if 
they were subject to rules that they themselves created. As Gourevitch details, this did not mean 
doing away with hierarchical arrangements altogether. While there was still the need for 
technical expertise and management, on the self-governance model “managers would be 
accountable to workers” and therefore not pose a threat to the worker’s freedom.59 Workers, in 
other words, might have to comply with workplace rules, but because these rules have been 
collectively decided upon, it cannot be said they are following the orders of a private arbitrary 
will.   
While the idea of worker cooperatives existed in the early workingmen’s movement, it 
was not until the late nineteenth century, with the formation of The Knights of Labor, that these 
ideas were put into action. Gourvetich details how the Knights created “500 producer 
cooperatives, and thousands of consumer co-ops, employing tens of thousands of workers.”60 
Importantly, moreover, the labor republican vision went beyond supporting the development of 
worker collectives within an otherwise capitalist economy. Rather, they believed that the 
development of worker cooperatives would eventually “replace wage-labor with cooperation 
wholesale.”61 They also incorporated plans for “creating a parallel cooperative economy…[that] 
would have its own public credit system and issue currency notes, based on labor time, usable in 
                                                
57 Ibid., 120. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 121. 
60 Ibid., 123. 
61 Ibid., 124. 
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markets…selling only cooperative produced goods.”62 There were also ideas for a “national 
cooperative fund” that would help provide capital for cooperatives, and allow them to compete 
with non-cooperative businesses.63 Their economic outlook aimed thus to give workers, 
consumers, and communities greater decision-making power over economic activities that 
affected their livelihood and freedom. In many ways, the example of the worker cooperative 
model theorized by nineteenth century labor republicans aligns with the principles of economic 
democracy (discussed in the introduction). 
 
Conclusion 
In the preceding discussion, I hope to have shown how competing conceptualizations of 
economic freedom and equality circulated throughout the eighteenth century. Some of these 
outlooks were more explicit in addressing the economic harms associated with the development 
of the new ownership society and its corresponding proprietarian ideology. While a defense of 
property was also central to agrarian and labor republicans, in their emphasis on self-ownership 
or collective ownership, their proposal for a new property regime sought to prevent the 
consolidation of wealth and therefore political power in the hands of a minority class.   
In addition to defending an agrarian reform that would limit the accumulation of 
property, Price was also favorable to forms of communal property (i.e. the commons) that the 
enclosures threatened to dissolve. In the case of the labor republicans, they applied the ideal of 
self-governance promoted by agrarian republicans to the industrial context and supported 
collective ownership and governance in the workplace. Because these thinkers identified 
freedom with self-sufficiency (whether conceived as individual or collective), their defense of 
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property aimed to prevent the growth of a laboring class dependent on a wealthy class of 
proprietors. For reasons I have detailed already, in rejecting these reforms, Turgot, Smith, and 
Kant did not make the same connection between equality in property ownership with freedom. 
On their accounts, freedom was compatible with wage labor and inequalities in property 
ownership and wealth.    
The ideals and models proposed by agrarian and labor republicans continue to be relevant 
for contemporary economic debate. From a global perspective, small agrarian and indigenous 
communities are threatened with the same processes of primitive accumulation that English 
peasants fought against since the beginning of the early modern period up until the eighteenth 
century. In these communities, local governance over food and natural resources is under threat 
from multinational corporations that extract resources for short-term economic gain. Resistance 
to land grabbing and other forms of resource extraction mimic eighteenth century struggles 
against the enclosures and the liberalization of grain. The model of collective ownership and 
governance in the workplace that was expressed by labor republicans is a demand voiced in 
contemporary labor struggles in industrial and post-industrialized countries. The growing 
disparity in economic wealth and property ownership has also led many contemporary scholars, 
like Piketty, to propose new forms of social and public ownership to curtail the consolidation of 
property in the hands of an elite minority. These movements have closer intellectual roots with 
some of the critical positions outlined in this dissertation, not the more modest proposals of 
wealth redistribution found in the pro-market outlook of the early proponents of economic 
liberalization.   
 Recognizing that alternative proposals for economic justice have occurred in the past, in 
particular during the transitional period to a new economic and political regime, can help provide 
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insight into the contemporary moment. In the eighteenth century, different paths were proposed 
and debated, alternative conceptualizations of freedom and equality were theorized, and the 
liberal free market economy—which has been declared as “the only alternative” since the 
1980s—was only gradually (and not without resistance) implemented.64 Perhaps, now more 
aware of the shortcomings of the current inegalitarian ownership model, it would behoove 
scholars to revisit the egalitarian outlook that formed a formidable counter-discourse to the 
liberal economic tradition. These theories may prove to be useful in the normative work of 
reconstructing new approaches to economic justice. I have only sketched the philosophical 
underpinnings of these alternative economic models, but I hope to have convincingly shown why 
the more modest accounts of Turgot, Smith, and Kant fail to live up to the egalitarian label that 
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